science of logic-第36章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


the　Notion　to　lose　the　conditionedness　in　which　it　still　appears　at　the　stage　of　understanding　and　to
attain　to　perfect　truth。　But　this　expectation　is　disappointed。　For　Kant　defines　the　relation　of　reason
to　the　categories　as　merely　dialectical　and；　indeed；　takes　the　result　of　this　dialectic　to　be　the
infinite　nothing　…　just　that　and　nothing　more。

Consequently；　the　infinite　unity　of　reason；　too；　is　still　deprived　of　the　synthesis；　and　with　it　the
beginning　referred　to　above　of　a　speculative；　truly　infinite　Notion；　reason　becomes　the　familiar；
wholly　formal；　merely　regulative　unity　of　the　systematic　employment　of　the　understanding。　It　is
declared　to　be　an　abuse　when　logic；　which　is　supposed　to　be　merely　a　canon　of　judgment；　is
regarded　as　an　organon　for　the　production　of　objective　insights。　The　notions　of　reason　in　which
we　could　not　but　have　an　intimation　of　a　higher　power　and　a　profounder　significance；　no　longer
possess　a　constitutive　character　as　do　the　categories；　they　are　mere　Ideas；　certainly；　we　are
quite　at　liberty　to　use　them；　but　by　these　intelligible　entities　in　which　all　truth　should　be
completely　revealed；　we　are　to　understand　nothing　more　than　hypotheses；　and　to　ascribe　absolute
truth　to　them　would　be　the　height　of　caprice　and　foolhardiness；　for　they　do　not　occur　in　any
experience。　Would　one　ever　have　thought　that　philosophy　would　deny　truth　to　intelligible　entities
because　they　lack　the　spatial　and　temporal　material　of　the　sensuous　world？　

Directly　connected　with　this　is　the　question　of　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　Notion　and　the
character　of　logic　generally　are　to　be　considered；　a　question　on　which　the　Kantian　philosophy
holds　the　same　view　as　is　commonly　taken：　that　is　to　say；　in　what　relation　do　the　Notion　and　the
science　of　the　Notion　stand　to　truth　itself。　We　have　already　quoted　from　the　Kantian　deduction
of　the　categories　that　according　to　it　the　object；　as　that　in　which　the　manifold　of　intuition　is　unified；
is　this　unity　solely　through　the　unity　of　self…consciousness。　Here；　therefore；　the　objectivity　of
thought　is　specifically　enunciated；　an　identity　of　Notion　and　thing；　which　is　truth。　In　the　same
way；　it　is　also　commonly　admitted　that　when　thinking　appropriates　a　given　object；　this　thereby
suffers　an　alteration　and　is　changed　from　something　sensuous　to　something　thought；　and　yet　that
not　only　is　the　essential　nature　of　the　object　not　affected　by　this　alteration　but　that　it　is　only　in　its
Notion　that　it　is　in　its　truth；　whereas　in　the　immediacy　in　which　it　is　given　it　is　only　appearance　and
a　contingency；　that　the　cognition　that　truly　comprehends　the　object　is　the　cognition　of　it　as　it　is　in
and　for　itself；　and　that　the　Notion　is　its　very　objectivity。　

But；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　equally　maintained　that　we　cannot　after　all；　know　things　as　they
truly　are　in　themselves　and　that　truth　is　inaccessible　to　the　cognitive　powers　of　reason；　that
the　aforesaid　truth　which　consists　in　the　unity　of　the　object　and　the　Notion　is；　after　all；　only
Appearance；　and　this　time；　again　on　the　ground　that　the　content　is　only　the　manifold　of　intuition。
On　this　point　we　have　already　remarked　that；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　precisely　in　the　Notion　that　this
manifoldness；　in　so　far　as　it　pertains　to　intuition　in　contrast　to　the　Notion；　is　sublated　and　that
through　the　Notion　the　object　is　reduced　to　its　non…contingent　essential　nature。　The　latter　enters
into　the　sphere　of　Appearance　and　for　that　very　reason　the　Appearance　is　not　devoid　of　essential
being；　but　is　a　manifestation　of　essence。　But　the　completely　liberated　manifestation　of　essence　is
the　Notion　

These　propositions　of　which　we　here　remind　the　reader　are　not　dogmatic　assertions；　for　the　reason
that　they　are　results　that　have　issued　from　the　entire　immanent　development　of　essence。　The
present　standpoint　to　which　this　development　has　led　is　that　the　form　of　the　absolute　which　is
higher　than　being　and　essence　is　the　Notion。　Regarded　from　this　aspect；　the　Notion　has
subjugated　being　and　essence；　which　from　other　starting　points　include　also　feeling　and　intuition
and　representation；　and　which　appeared　as　its　antecedent　conditions；　and　has　proved　itself　to　be
their　unconditioned　ground。　There　now　remains　the　second　aspect；　to　the　treatment　of　which　this
Third　Book　of　the　Logic　is　devoted；　namely　the　exposition　of　how　the　Notion　builds　up　in　and
from　itself　the　reality　that　has　vanished　in　it。　It　has　therefore　been　freely　admitted　that　the　cognition
that　stops　short　at　the　Notion　purely　as　such；　is　still　incomplete　and　has　only　as　yet　arrived　at
abstract　truth。　But　its　incompleteness　does　not　lie　in　its　lack　of　that　presumptive　reality　given　in
feeling　and　intuition　but　rather　in　the　fact　that　the　Notion　has　not　yet　given　itself　a　reality　of　its　own；
a　reality　produced　from　its　own　resources。　The　demonstrated　absoluteness　of　the　Notion　relatively
to　the　material　of　experience　and；　more　exactly；　to　the　categories　and　concepts　of　reflection；
consists　in　this；　that　this　material　as　it　appears　apart　from　and　prior　to　the　Notion　has　no　truth；
this　it　has　solely　in　its　ideality　or　its　identity　with　the　Notion。　The　derivation　of　the　real　from　it　if
we　want　to　call　it　derivation；　consists　in　the　first　place　essentially　in　this；　that　the　Notion　in　its
formal　abstraction　reveals　itself　as　incomplete　and　through　its　own　immanent　dialectic　passes　over
into　reality；　but　it　does　not　fall　back　again　onto　a　ready…made　reality　confronting　it　and　take　refuge
in　something　which　has　shown　itself　to　be　the　unessential　element　of　Appearance　because；　having
looked　around　for　something　better；　it　has　failed　to　find　it；　on　the　contrary；　it　produces　the　reality
from　its　own　resources。　It　will　always　stand　out　as　a　marvel　how　the　Kantian　philosophy
recognised　the　relation　of　thought　to　sensuous　reality；　beyond　which　it　did　not　advance；　as　only　a
relative　relation　of　mere　Appearance；　and　perfectly　well　recognised　and　enunciated　a　higher　unity
of　both　in　the　Idea　in　general　and；　for　example；　in　the　Idea　of　an　intuitive　understanding；　and　yet
stopped　short　at　this　relative　relation　and　the　assertion　that　the　Notion　is　and　remains　utterly
separate　from　reality　thus　asserting　as　truth　what　it　declared　to　be　finite　cognition；　and　denouncing
as　an　unjustified　extravagance　and　a　figment　of　thought　what　it　recognised　as　truth　and　of　which　it
established　the　specific　notion。　

Since　it　is　primarily　logic　and　not　science　generally　with　whose　relation　to　truth　we　are　here
concerned；　it　must　further　be　conceded　that　logic　as　the　formal　science　cannot　and　should　not
contain　that　reality　which　is　the　content　of　the　further　parts　of　philosophy；　namely；　the　philosophical
sciences　of　nature　and　of　spirit。　These　concrete　sciences　do；　of　course；　present　themselves　in　a
more　real　form　of　the　Idea　than　logic　does；　but　this　is　not　by　turning　back　again　to　the　reality
abandoned　by　the　consciousness　which　has　risen　above　its　mode　as　Appearance　to　the　level　of
science；　nor　by　reverting　to　the　use　of　forms　such　as　the　categories　and　concepts　of　reflection；
whose　finitude　and　untruth　have　been　demonstrated　in　the　logic。　On　the　contrary；　logic　exhibits　the
elevation　of　the　Idea　to　that　level　from　which　it　becomes　the　creator　of　nature　and　passes　over　to
the　form　of　a　concrete　immediacy　whose　Notion；　however；　breaks　up　this　shape　again　in　order　to
realise　itself　as　concrete　spirit。　As　contrasted　with　these　concrete　sciences　（although　these　have
and　retain　as　their　inner　formative　principle　that　same　logical　element；　or　the　Notion；　which　had
served　is　their　archetype）；　logic　is　of　course　a　formal　science；　but　it　is　the　science　of　the　absolute
form　which　is　within　itself　a　totality　and　contains　the　pure　Idea　of　truth　itself。　This　absolute　form
has　in　its　own　self　its　content　or　reality；　the　Notion；　not　being　a　trivial；　empty　identity；　possesses　in
its　moment　of　negativity　or　of　absolute　determining；　the　differentiated　determinations；　the　content　is
simply　and　solely　these　determinations　of　the　absolute　form　and　nothing　else　a　content　posited　by
the　absolute　form　itself　and　consequently　also　adequate　to　it。　For　this　reason；　this　form　is　of　quite
ano