science of logic-第3章

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resolves　it　and　is　thus　dialectical。

But　it　does　not　stay　in　the　nothing　of　this　result　but　in　the　result　is　no　less　positive；　and　in　this　way　it
has　restored　what　was　at　first　simple；　but　as　a　universal　which　is　within　itself　concrete；　a　given
particular　is　not　subsumed　under　this　universal　but　in　this　determining；　this　positing　of　a　difference；
and　the　resolving　of　it；　the　particular　has　at　the　same　time　already　determined　itself。　This　spiritual
movement　which；　in　its　simple　undifferentiatedness；　gives　itself　its　own　determinateness　and　in　its
determinateness　its　equality　with　itself；　which　therefore　is　the　immanent　development　of　the　Notion；
this　movement　is　the　absolute　method　of　knowing　and　at　the　same　time　is　the　immanent。　soul　of　the
content　itself。　

I　maintain　that　it　is　this　self…construing　method　alone　which　enables　philosophy　to　be　an　objective；
demonstrated　science。？

It　is　in　this　way　that　I　have　tried　to　expound　consciousness　in　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit。
Consciousness　is　spirit　as　a　concrete　knowing；　a　knowing　too；　in　which　externality　is　involved；　but
the　development　of　this　object；　？like　the　development　of　all　natural　and　spiritual　life；　rests　solely
on　the　nature　of　the　pure　essentialities　which　constitute　the　content　of　logic。

Consciousness；　as　spirit　in　its　manifestation　which　in　its　progress　frees　itself　from　its　immediacy　and
external　concretion；　attains　to　the　pure　knowing　which　takes　as　its　object　those　same　pure
essentialities　as　they　are　in　and　for　themselves。　They　are　pure　thoughts；　spirit　thinking　its　own
essential　nature。　Their　self…movement　is　their　spiritual　life　and　is　that　through　which　philosophy
constitutes　itself　and　of　which　it　is　the　exposition。　

In　the　foregoing　there　is　indicated　the　relation　of　the　science　which　I　call　the　Phenomenology　of
Spirit；　to　logic。　As　regards　the　external　relation；　it　was　intended　that　the　first　part　of　the　System　of
Science　which　contains　the　Phenomenology　should　be　followed　by　a　second　part　containing　logic
and　the　two　concrete　＇realen＇　sciences；　the　Philosophy　of　Nature　and　the　Philosophy　of　Spirit；
which　would　complete　the　System　of　Philosophy。　But　the　necessary　expansion　which　logic　itself
has　demanded　has　induced　me　to　have　this　part　published　separately；　it　thus　forms　the　first　sequel
to　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit　in　an　expanded　arrangement　of　the　system。　It　will　later　be
followed　by　an　exposition　of　the　two　concrete　philosophical　sciences　mentioned。　This　first　volume
of　the　Logic　contains　as　Book　One　the　Doctrine　of　Being；　Book　Two；　the　Doctrine　of　Essence；
which　forms　the　second　part　of　the　first　volume；　is　already　in　the　press；　the　second　volume　will
contain　Subjective　Logic　or　the　Doctrine　of　the　Notion。

Nuremberg；　March　22；　1812。　



　


　　　　　　　　Preface　to　the　Second　Edition

When　I　undertook　this　fresh　elaboration　of　the　Science　of　Logic　of　which　this　is　the　first　volume；　I
was　fully　conscious…not　only　of　the　inherent　difficulty　of　the　subject　matter　and　of　its　exposition；　but
also　of　the　imperfection　of　its　treatment　in　the　first　edition；　earnestly　as　I　have　tried　after　many
years　of　further　occupation　with　this　science　to　remedy　this　imperfection；　I　feel　I　still　have　reason
enough　to　claim　the　indulgence　of　the　reader。　One　title　to　such　claim　in　the　first　instance　may　well
be　based　on　the　fact　that　in　the　main　there　was　available　for　the　contents　of　the　science　only
external　material　in　the　older　metaphysics　and　logic。　Though　these　two　sciences　have　been
universally　and　abundantly　cultivated；　the　latter　even　up　to　our　own　day；　the　interest　taken　in　the
speculative　side　has　been　only　slight；　in　fact；　on　the　whole；　the　same　material　has　been　just
repeated　over　and　over　again；　sometimes　being　thinned　out　to　the　point　of　being　trivial　and
superficial　and　sometimes　more　of　the　old　ballast　has　been　hauled　out　afresh　and　trailed　along　with
logic。　From　such　efforts；　often　purely　mechanical；　the　philosophical　import　of　the　science　could
gain　nothing。

To　exhibit　the　realm　of　thought　philosophically；　that　is；　in　its　own　immanent　activity　or　what　is　the
same；　in　its　necessary　development；？　had　therefore　to　be　a　fresh　undertaking；　one　that　had　to　be
started　right　from　the　beginning；　but　this　traditional　material；　the　familiar　forms　of　thought；　must　be
regarded　as　an　extremely　important　source；　indeed　as　a　necessary　condition　and　as　a
presupposition　to　be　gratefully　acknowledged　even　though　what　it　offers　is　only　here　and　there　a
meagre　shred　or　a　disordered　heap　of　dead　bones　？。　

The　forms　of　thought　are；　in　the　first　instance；　displayed　and　stored　as　human　language。
Nowadays　we　cannot　be　too　often　reminded　that　it　is　thinking　which　distinguishes　man　from　the
beasts。　Into　all　that　becomes　something　inward　for　men；　an　image　or　conception　as　such；　into　all
that　he　makes　his　own；　language　has　penetrated；　and　everything　that　he　has　transformed　into
language　and　expresses　in　it　contains　a　category…concealed；　mixed　with　other　forms　or　clearly
determined　as　such；　so　much　is　Logic　his　natural　element；　indeed　his　own　peculiar　nature。　If
nature　as　such；　as　the　physical　world；　is　contrasted　with　the　spiritual　sphere；　then　logic　must
certainly　be　said　to　be　the　supernatural　element　which　permeates　every　relationship　of　man　to
nature；　his　sensation；　intuition；　desire；　need；　instinct；　and　simply　by　so　doing　transforms　it　into
something　human；　even　though　only　formally　human；　into　ideas　and　purposes。　It　is　an　advantage
when　a　language　possesses　an　abundance　of　logical　expressions；　that　is；　specific　and　separate
expressions　for　the　thought　determinations　themselves；　many　prepositions　and　articles　denote
relationships　based　on　thought；　the　Chinese　language　is　supposed　not　to　have　developed　to　this
stage　or　only　to　an　inadequate　extent。　These　particles；　however；　play　quite　a　subordinate　part
having　only　a　slightly　more　independent　form　than　the　prefixes　and　suffixes；　inflections　and　the　like。
It　is　much　more　important　that　in　a　language　the　categories　should　appear　in　the　form　of
substantives　and　verbs　and　thus　be　stamped　with　the　form　of　objectivity。　In　this　respect　German
has　many　advantages　over　other　modern　languages；　some　of　its　words　even　possess　the　further
peculiarity　of　having　not　only　different　but　opposite　meanings　so　that　one　cannot　fail　to　recognise　a
speculative　spirit　of　the　language　in　them：　it　can　delight　a　thinker　to　come　across　such　words　and　to
find　the　union　of　opposites　naively　shown　in　the　dictionary　as　one　word　with　opposite　meanings；
although　this　result　of　speculative　thinking　is　nonsensical　to　the　understanding。　Philosophy　therefore
stands　in　no　need　of　a　special　terminology；　true；　some　words　have　to　be　taken　from　foreign
languages　but　these　have　already　acquired　through　usage　the　right　of　citizenship　in　the　philosophical
realm…and　an　affected　purism　would　be　most　inappropriate　where　it　was　the　distinctive　meaning
which　was　of　decisive　importance。　The　advance　of　culture　generally；　and　of　the　sciences　in
particular；　gradually　brings　into　use　higher　relationships　of　thought；　or　at　least　raises　them　to　greater
universality　and　they　have　thus　attracted　increased　attention。　This　applies　even　to　the　empirical　and
natural　sciences　which　in　general　employ　the　commonest　categories；　for　example；　whole　and　parts；
a　thing　and　its　properties；　and　the　like。

In　physics；　for　example；　the　category　of　force　has　become　predominant；　but　more　recently　the
category　of　polarity　which　is　the　determination　of　a　difference　in　which　the　different　terms　are
inseparably　conjoined；　has　played　the　leading　part　although　it　has　been　used　inordinately　in
connection　with　all　phenomena；　even　with　light。

It　is　a　matter　of　infinite　importance　that　in　this　way　an　advance　has　been　made　beyond　the　form　of
abstraction；　of　identity；　by　which　a　specific　concept；　as；　for　example；　force；　acquires　an
independent　self…subsistence；　and　that　prominence　and　currency　have　been　given　to　the
determinate　form；　the　difference；　which　is　at…the　same　time　an　inseparable　element　in　the　identity。
Because　of　the　fixed　reality　of　natural　objects　the　study　of　nature　compels　us　to　fix　the　categories
whic