utilitarianism-第16章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
te； any harm done or attempted against ourselves； or against those with whom we sympathise。 The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss。 Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence； it is； we know； common to all animal nature； for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt； or who it thinks are about to hurt； itself or its young。 Human beings； on this point； only differ from other animals in two particulars。 First； in being capable of sympathising； not solely with their offspring； or； like some of the more noble animals； with some superior animal who is kind to them； but with all human； and even with all sentient； beings。 Secondly； in having a more developed intelligence； which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments； whether self…regarding or sympathetic。 By virtue of his superior intelligence； even apart from his superior range of sympathy； a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part； such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally； is threatening to his own； and calls forth his instinct （if instinct it be） of self…defence。 The same superiority of intelligence joined to the power of sympathising with human beings generally； enables him to attach himself to the collective idea of his tribe； his country； or mankind； in such a manner that any act hurtful to them； raises his instinct of sympathy； and urges him to resistance。 The sentiment of justice； in that one of its elements which consists of the desire to punish； is thus； I conceive； the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance； rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable to those injuries； that is； to those hurts； which wound us through； or in common with； society at large。 This sentiment； in itself； has nothing moral in it； what is moral is； the exclusive subordination of it to the social sympathies； so as to wait on and obey their call。 For the natural feeling would make us resent indiscriminately whatever any one does that is disagreeable to us； but when moralised by the social feeling； it only acts in the directions conformable to the general good： just persons resenting a hurt to society； though not otherwise a hurt to themselves； and not resenting a hurt to themselves； however painful； unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of。 It is no objection against this doctrine to say； that when we feel our sentiment of justice outraged； we are not thinking of society at large； or of any collective interest； but only of the individual case。 It is common enough certainly； though the reverse of commendable； to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain； but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling； that is； who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it… such a person； though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest of society； certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own。 If he is not feeling this… if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually… he is not consciously just； he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions。 This is admitted even by anti…utilitarian moralists。 When Kant （as before remarked） propounds as the fundamental principle of morals； 〃So act； that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings；〃 he virtually acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively； or at least of mankind indiscriminately； must be in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act。 Otherwise he uses words without a meaning： for； that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all rational beings… that there is any insuperable obstacle in the nature of things to its adoption… cannot be even plausibly maintained。 To give any meaning to Kant's principle； the sense put upon it must be； that we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest。 To recapitulate： the idea of justice supposes two things； a rule of conduct； and a sentiment which sanctions the rule。 The first must be supposed common to all mankind； and intended for their good。 The other （the sentiment） is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule。 There is involved； in addition； the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement； whose rights （to use the expression appropriated to the case） are violated by it。 And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be； the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself； or to those with whom one sympathises； widened so as to include all persons； by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy； and the human conception of intelligent self…interest。 From the latter elements； the feeling derives its morality； from the former； its peculiar impressiveness； and energy of self…assertion。 I have； throughout； treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person； and violated by the injury； not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment； but as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves。 These elements are； a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand； and a demand for punishment on the other。 An examination of our own minds； I think； will show； that these two things include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right。 When we call anything a person's right； we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it； either by the force of law； or by that of education and opinion。 If he has what we consider a sufficient claim； on whatever account； to have something guaranteed to him by society； we say that he has a right to it。 If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by right； we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him； but should leave him to chance； or to his own exertions。 Thus； a person is said to have a right to what he can earn in fair professional competition； because society ought not to allow any other person to hinder him from endeavouring to earn in that manner as much as he can。 But he has not a right to three hundred a…year； though he may happen to be earning it； because society is not called on to provide that he shall earn that sum。 On the contrary； if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent stock； he has a right to three hundred a…year； because society has come under an obligation to provide him with an income of that amount。 To have a right； then； is； I conceive； to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of。 If the objector goes on to ask； why it ought？ I can give him no other reason than general utility。 If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation； nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling； it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment； not a rational only； but also an animal element； the thirst for retaliation； and this thirst derives its intensity； as well as its moral justification； from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned。 The interest involved is that of security； to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests。 All other earthly benefits are needed by one person； not needed by another； and many of them can； if necessary； be cheerfully foregone； or replaced by something else； but security no human being can possibly do without on it we depend for all our immunity from evil； and for the whole value of all and every good； beyond the passing moment； since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us； if we could be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves。 Now this most indispensable of all necessaries； after physical nutriment； cannot be had； unless the
machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play。 Our notion； therefore； of the claim we
