utilitarianism-第15章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
still lingers in a modified shape。 It would always give us pleasure； and chime in with our feelings of fitness； that acts which we deem unjust should be punished； though we do not always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals。 We forego that gratification on account of incidental inconveniences。 We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and injustice repressed； even in the minutest details； if we were not； with reason； afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power over individuals。 When we think that a person is bound in justice to do a thing； it is an ordinary form of language to say； that he ought to be compelled to do it。 We should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anybody who had the power。 If we see that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient； we lament the impossibility； we consider the impunity given to injustice as an evil； and strive to make amends for it by bringing a strong expression of our own and the public disapprobation to bear upon the offender。 Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating idea of the notion of justice； though undergoing several transformations before that notion； as it exists in an advanced state of society； becomes complete。 The above is； I think； a true account； as far as it goes； of the origin and progressive growth of the idea of justice。 But we must observe； that it contains； as yet； nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral obligation in general。 For the truth is； that the idea of penal sanction； which is the essence of law； enters not only into the conception of injustice； but into that of any kind of wrong。 We do not call anything wrong； unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it； if not by law； by the opinion of his fellow…creatures； if not by opinion； by the reproaches of his own conscience。 This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency。 It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms； that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it。 Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person； as one exacts a debt。 Unless we think that it may be exacted from him； we do not call it his duty。 Reasons of prudence； or the interest of other people； may militate against actually exacting it； but the person himself； it is clearly understood； would not be entitled to complain。 There are other things； on the contrary； which we wish that people should do； which we like or admire them for doing； perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing； but yet admit that they are not bound to do； it is not a case of moral obligation； we do not blame them； that is； we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment。 How we come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment； will appear； perhaps； in the sequel； but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong； that we call any conduct wrong； or employ； instead； some other term of dislike or disparagement； according as we think that the person ought； or ought not； to be punished for it； and we say； it would be right； to do so and so； or merely that it would be desirable or laudable； according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns； compelled； or only persuaded and exhorted； to act in that manner。*
* See this point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain； in an admirable chapter （entitled 〃The Ethical Emotions； or the Moral Sense〃）； of the second of the two treatises composing his elaborate and profound work on the Mind。
This； therefore； being the characteristic difference which marks off； not justice； but morality in general； from the remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness； the character is still to be sought which distinguishes justice from other branches of morality。 Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two classes； denoted by the ill…chosen expressions； duties of perfect and of imperfect obligation； the latter being those in which； though the act is obligatory； the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice； as in the case of charity or beneficence； which we are indeed bound to practise； but not towards any definite person； nor at any prescribed time。 In the more precise language of philosophic jurists； duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons； duties of imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right。 I think it will be found that this distinction exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and the other obligations of morality。 In our survey of the various popular acceptations of justice； the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right… a claim on the part of one or more individuals； like that which the law gives when it confers a proprietary or other legal right。 Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession； or in breaking faith with him； or in treating him worse than he deserves； or worse than other people who have no greater claims； in each case the supposition implies two things… a wrong done； and some assignable person who is wronged。 Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than others； but the wrong in this case is to his competitors； who are also assignable persons。 It seems to me that this feature in the case… a right in some person； correlative to the moral obligation… constitutes the specific difference between justice； and generosity or beneficence。 Justice implies something which it is not only right to do； and wrong not to do； but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right。 No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence； because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual。 And it will be found with respect to this； as to every correct definition； that the instances which seem to conflict with it are those which most confirm it。 For if a moralist attempts； as some have done； to make out that mankind generally； though not any given individual； have a right to all the good we can do them； he at once； by that thesis； includes generosity and beneficence within the category of justice。 He is obliged to say； that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow creatures； thus assimilating them to a debt； or that nothing less can be a sufficient return for what society does for us； thus classing the case as one of gratitute； both of which are acknowledged cases of justice。 Wherever there is right； the case is one of justice； and not of the virtue of beneficence： and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general； where we have now placed it； will be found to make no distinction between them at all； but to merge all morality in justice。
Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinctive elements which enter into the composition of the idea of justice； we are ready to enter on the inquiry； whether the feeling； which accompanies the idea； is attached to it by a special dispensation of nature； or whether it could have grown up； by any known laws； out of the idea itself； and in particular； whether it can have originated in considerations of general expediency。 I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise from anything which would commonly； or correctly； be termed an idea of expediency； but that though the sentiment does not； whatever is moral in it does。 We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are； the desire to punish a person who has done harm； and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done。 Now it appears to me； that the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments； both in the highest degree natural； and which either are or resemble instincts； the impulse of self…defence； and the feeling of sympathy。 It is natural to resent； and to repel or retaliate； any harm done or attempted against ourselves； or against those with whom we sympathise。 The orig
