philebus-第3章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




　　Soc。　Sound　is　one　in　music　as　well　as　in　grammar？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　there　is　a　higher　note　and　a　lower　note；　and　a　note　of



equal　pitch：…may　we　affirm　so　much？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　But　you　would　not　be　a　real　musician　if　this　was　all　that　you



knew；　though　if　you　did　not　know　this　you　would　know　almost　nothing　of



music。



　　Pro。　Nothing。



　　Soc。　But　when　you　have　learned　what　sounds　are　high　and　what　low；



and　the　number　and　nature　of　the　intervals　and　their　limits　or



proportions；　and　the　systems　compounded　out　of　them；　which　our　fathers



discovered；　and　have　handed　down　to　us　who　are　their　descendants　under



the　name　of　harmonies；　and　the　affections　corresponding　to　them　in　the



movements　of　the　human　body；　which　when　measured　by　numbers　ought；



as　they　say；　to　be　called　rhythms　and　measures；　and　they　tell　us



that　the　same　principle　should　be　applied　to　every　one　and　many；…when；



I　say；　you　have　learned　all　this；　then；　my　dear　friend；　you　are



perfect；　and　you　may　be　said　to　understand　any　other　subject；　when　you



have　a　similar　grasp　of　it。　But　the；　infinity　of　kinds　and　the



infinity　of　individuals　which　there　is　in　each　of　them；　when　not



classified；　creates　in　every　one　of　us　a　state　of　infinite



ignorance；　and　he　who　never　looks　for　number　in　anything；　will　not



himself　be　looked　for　in　the　number　of　famous　men。



　　Pro。　I　think　that　what　Socrates　is　now　saying　is　excellent；



Philebus。



　　Phi。　I　think　so　too；　but　how　do　his　words　bear　upon　us　and　upon



the　argument？



　　Soc。　Philebus　is　right　in　asking　that　question　of　us；　Protarchus。



　　Pro。　Indeed　he　is；　and　you　must　answer　him。



　　Soc。　I　will；　but　you　must　let　me　make　one　little　remark　first



about　these　matters；　I　was　saying；　that　he　who　begins　with　any



individual　unity；　should　proceed　from　that；　not　to　infinity；　but　to



a　definite　number；　and　now　I　say　conversely；　that　he　who　has　to



begin　with　infinity　should　not　jump　to　unity；　but　he　should　look　about



for　some　number；　representing　a　certain　quantity；　and　thus　out　of



all　end　in　one。　And　now　let　us　return　for　an　illustration　of　our



principle　to　the　case　of　letters。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Some　god　or　divine　man；　who　in　the　Egyptian　legend　is　said　to



have　been　Theuth；　observing　that　the　human　voice　was　infinite；　first



distinguished　in　this　infinity　a　certain　number　of　vowels；　and　then



other　letters　which　had　sound；　but　were　not　pure　vowels　（i。e。；　the



semivowels）；　these　too　exist　in　a　definite　number；　and　lastly；　he



distinguished　a　third　class　of　letters　which　we　now　call　mutes；



without　voice　and　without　sound；　and　divided　these；　and　likewise　the



two　other　classes　of　vowels　and　semivowels；　into　the　individual



sounds；　told　the　number　of　them；　and　gave　to　each　and　all　of　them



the　name　of　letters；　and　observing　that　none　of　us　could　learn　any　one



of　them　and　not　learn　them　all；　and　in　consideration　of　this　common



bond　which　in　a　manner　united　them；　he　assigned　to　them　all　a　single



art；　and　this　he　called　the　art　of　grammar　or　letters。



　　Phi。　The　illustration；　Protarchus；　has　assisted　me　in



understanding　the　original　statement；　but　I　still　feel　the　defect　of



which　I　just　now　complained。



　　Soc。　Are　you　going　to　ask；　Philebus；　what　this　has　to　do　with　the



argument？



　　Phi。　Yes；　that　is　a　question　which　Protarchus　and　I　have　been　long



asking。



　　Soc。　Assuredly　you　have　already　arrived　at　the　answer　to　the



question　which；　as　you　say；　you　have　been　so　long　asking？



　　Phi。　How　so？



　　Soc。　Did　we　not　begin　by　enquiring　into　the　comparative



eligibility　of　pleasure　and　wisdom？



　　Phi。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　we　maintain　that　they　are　each　of　them　one？



　　Phi。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　precise　question　to　which　the　previous　discussion



desires　an　answer　is；　how　they　are　one　and　also　many　＇i。e。；　how　they



have　one　genus　and　many　species＇；　and　are　not　at　once　infinite；　and



what　number　of　species　is　to　be　assigned　to　either　of　them　before　they



pass　into　infinity。



　　Pro。　That　is　a　very　serious　question；　Philebus；　to　which　Socrates



has　ingeniously　brought　us　round；　and　please　to　consider　which　of　us



shall　answer　him；　there　may　be　something　ridiculous　in　my　being　unable



to　answer；　and　therefore　imposing　the　task　upon　you；　when　I　have



undertaken　the　whole　charge　of　the　argument；　but　if　neither　of　us　were



able　to　answer；　the　result　methinks　would　be　still　more　ridiculous。



Let　us　consider；　then；　what　we　are　to　do：…Socrates；　if　I　understood



him　rightly；　is　asking　whether　there　are　not　kinds　of　pleasure；　and



what　is　the　number　and　nature　of　them；　and　the　same　of　wisdom。



　　Soc。　Most　true；　O　son　of　Callias；　and　the　previous　argument　showed



that　if　we　are　not　able　to　tell　the　kinds　of　everything　that　has



unity；　likeness；　sameness；　or　their　opposites；　none　of　us　will　be　of



the　smallest　use　in　any　enquiry。



　　Pro。　That　seems　to　be　very　near　the　truth；　Socrates。　Happy　would　the



wise　man　be　if　he　knew　all　things；　and　the　next　best　thing　for　him



is　that　he　should　know　himself。　Why　do　I　say　so　at　this　moment？　I　will



tell　you。　You；　Socrates；　have　granted　us　this　opportunity　of



conversing　with　you；　and　are　ready　to　assist　us　in　determining　what　is



the　best　of　human　goods。　For　when　Philebus　said　that　pleasure　and



delight　and　enjoyment　and　the　like　were　the　chief　good；　you



answered…No；　not　those；　but　another　class　of　goods；　and　we　are



constantly　reminding　ourselves　of　what　you　said；　and　very　properly；　in



order　that　we　may　not　forget　to　examine　and　compare　the　two。　And　these



goods；　which　in　your　opinion　are　to　be　designated　as　superior　to



pleasure；　and　are　the　true　objects　of　pursuit；　are　mind　and



knowledge　and　understanding　and　art　and　the　like。　There　was　a



dispute　about　which　were　the　best；　and　we　playfully　threatened　that



you　should　not　be　allowed　to　go　home　until　the　question　was　settled；



and　you　agreed；　and　placed　yourself　at　our　disposal。　And　now；　as



children　say；　what　has　been　fairly　given　cannot　be　taken　back；　cease



then　to　fight　against　us　in　this　way。



　　Soc。　In　what　way？



　　Phi。　Do　not　perplex　us；　and　keep　asking　questions　of　us　to　which



we　have　not　as　yet　any　sufficient　answer　to　give；　let　us　not　imagine



that　a　general　puzzling　of　us　all　is　to　be　the　end　of　our



discussion；　but　if　we　are　unable　to　answer；　do　you　answer；　as　you　have



promised。　Consider；　then；　whether　you　will　divide　pleasure　and



knowledge　according　to　their　kinds；　or　you　may　let　the　matter　drop；　if



you　are　able　and　willing　to　find　some　other　mode　of　clearing　up　our



controversy。



　　Soc。　If　you　say　that；　I　have　nothing　to　apprehend；　for　the　words　〃if



you　are　willing〃　dispel　all　my　fear；　and；　moreover；　a　god　seems　to



have　recalled　something　to　my　mind。



　　Phi。　What　is　that？



　　Soc。　I　remember　to　have　heard　long　ago　certain　discussions　about



pleasure　and　wisdom；　whether　awake　or　in　a　dream　I　cannot　tell；　they



were　to　the　effect　that　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　of　them　was



the　good；　but　some　third　thing；　which　was　different　from　them；　and



better　than　either。　If　this　be　clearly　established；　then　pleasure　will



lose　the　victory；　for　the　good　will　cease　to　be　identified　with



her：…Am　I　not　right？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　there　will　cease　to　be　any　need　of　distinguishing　the　kinds



of　pleasures；　as　I　am　inclined　to　think；　but　this　will　appear　more



clearly　as　we　proceed。



　　Pro。　Capital；　Socrates；　pray　go　on　as　you　propose。



　　Soc。　But；　let　us　first　agree　on　some　little　points。



　　Pro。　What　are　they？



　　Soc。　Is　the　good　perfect　or　imperfect？



　　Pro。　The　most　perfect；　Socrates；　of　all　things。



　　Soc。　And　is　the　good　sufficient？



　　Pro。　Yes；　certainly；　and　in　a　degree　surpassing　all　other　things。



　　Soc。　And　no　one　can　deny　that　all　percipient　beings　desire　and



hunt　after　good