philebus-第17章

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possible；　and　that　if　we　are　to　make　comparisons　of　one　class　with



another　and　choose；　there　is　no　better　companion　than　knowledge　of



things　in　general；　and　likewise　the　perfect　knowledge；　if　that　may　be；



of　ourselves　in　every　respect。



　　Pro。　And　our　answer　will　be：…In　that　ye　have　spoken　well。



　　Soc。　Very　true。　And　now　let　us　go　back　and　interrogate　wisdom　and



mind：　Would　you　like　to　have　any　pleasures　in　the　mixture？　And　they



will　reply：…〃What　pleasures　do　you　mean？〃



　　Pro。　Likely　enough。



　　Soc。　And　we　shall　take　up　our　parable　and　say：　Do　you　wish　to　have



the　greatest　and　most　vehement　pleasures　for　your　companions　in



addition　to　the　true　ones？　〃Why；　Socrates；〃　they　will　say；　〃how　can



we？　seeing　that　they　are　the　source　of　ten　thousand　hindrances　to



us；　they　trouble　the　souls　of　men；　which　are　our　habitation；　with



their　madness；　they　prevent　us　from　coming　to　the　birth；　and　are



commonly　the　ruin　of　the　children　which　are　born　to　us；　causing　them



to　be　forgotten　and　unheeded；　but　the　true　and　pure　pleasures；　of



which　you　spoke；　know　to　be　of　our　family；　and　also　those　pleasures



which　accompany　health　and　temperance；　and　which　every　Virtue；　like



a　goddess　has　in　her　train　to　follow　her　about　wherever　she



goes；…mingle　these　and　not　the　others；　there　would　be　great　want　of



sense　in　any　one　who　desires　to　see　a　fair　and　perfect　mixture；　and　to



find　in　it　what　is　the　highest　good　in　man　and　in　the　universe；　and　to



divine　what　is　the　true　form　of　good…there　would　be　great　want　of



sense　in　his　allowing　the　pleasures；　which　are　always　in　the　company



of　folly　and　vice；　to　mingle　with　mind　in　the　cup。〃…Is　not　this　a　very



rational　and　suitable　reply；　which　mind　has　made；　both　on　her　own



behalf；　as　well　as　on　the　behalf　of　memory　and　true　opinion？



　　Pro。　Most　certainly。



　　Soc。　And　still　there　must　be　something　more　added；　which　is　a



necessary　ingredient　in　every　mixture。



　　Pro。　What　is　that？



　　Soc。　Unless　truth　enter　into　the　composition；　nothing　can　truly　be



created　or　subsist。



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　Quite　impossible；　and　now　you　and　Philebus　must　tell　me　whether



anything　is　still　wanting　in　the　mixture；　for　to　my　way　of　thinking



the　argument　is　now　completed；　and　may　be　compared　to　an　incorporeal



law；　which　is　going　to　hold　fair　rule　over　a　living　body。



　　Pro。　I　agree　with　you；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　And　may　we　not　say　with　reason　that　we　are　now　at　the　vestibule



of　the　habitation　of　the　good？



　　Pro。　I　think　that　we　are。



　　Soc。　What；　then；　is　there　in　the　mixture　which　is　most　precious；　and



which　is　the　principal　cause　why　such　a　state　is　universally　beloved



by　all？　When　we　have　discovered　it；　we　will　proceed　to　ask　whether



this　omnipresent　nature　is　more　akin　to　pleasure　or　to　mind。



　　Pro。　Quite　right；　in　that　way　we　shall　be　better　able　to　judge。



　　Soc。　And　there　is　no　difficulty　in　seeing　the　cause　which　renders



any　mixture　either　of　the　highest　value　or　of　none　at　all。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Every　man　knows　it。



　　Pro。　What？



　　Soc。　He　knows　that　any　want　of　measure　and　symmetry　in　any　mixture



whatever　must　always　of　necessity　be　fatal；　both　to　the　elements　and



to　the　mixture；　which　is　then　not　a　mixture；　but　only　a　confused



medley　which　brings　confusion　on　the　possessor　of　it。



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　And　now　the　power　of　the　good　has　retired　into　the　region　of



the　beautiful；　for　measure　and　symmetry　are　beauty　and　virtue　all



the　world　over。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　Also　we　said　that　truth　was　to　form　an　element　in　the　mixture。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then；　if　we　are　not　able　to　hunt　the　good　with　one　idea　only；



with　three　we　may　catch　our　prey；　Beauty；　Symmetry；　Truth　are　the



three；　and　these　taken　together　we　may　regard　as　the　single　cause　of



the　mixture；　and　the　mixture　as　being　good　by　reason　of　the　infusion



of　them。



　　Pro。　Quite　right。



　　Soc。　And　now；　Protarchus；　any　man　could　decide　well　enough　whether



pleasure　or　wisdom　is　more　akin　to　the　highest　good；　and　more



honourable　among　gods　and　men。



　　Pro。　Clearly；　and　yet　perhaps　the　argument　had　better　be　pursued



to　the　end。



　　Soc。　We　must　take　each　of　them　separately　in　their　relation　to



pleasure　and　mind；　and　pronounce　upon　them；　for　we　ought　to　see　to



which　of　the　two　they　are　severally　most　akin。



　　Pro。　You　are　speaking　of　beauty；　truth；　and　measure？



　　Soc。　Yes；　Protarchus；　take　truth　first；　and；　after　passing　in　review



mind；　truth；　pleasure；　pause　awhile　and　make　answer　to　yourself…as



to　whether　pleasure　or　mind　is　more　akin　to　truth。



　　Pro。　There　is　no　need　to　pause；　for　the　difference　between　them　is



palpable；　pleasure　is　the　veriest　impostor　in　the　world；　and　it　is



said　that　in　the　pleasures　of　love；　which　appear　to　be　the　greatest；



perjury　is　excused　by　the　gods；　for　pleasures；　like　children；　have　not



the　least　particle　of　reason　in　them；　whereas　mind　is　either　the



same　as　truth；　or　the　most　like　truth；　and　the　truest。



　　Soc。　Shall　we　next　consider　measure；　in　like　manner；　and　ask　whether



pleasure　has　more　of　this　than　wisdom；　or　wisdom　than　pleasure？



　　Pro。　Here　is　another　question　which　may　be　easily　answered；　for　I



imagine　that　nothing　can　ever　be　more　immoderate　than　the　transports



of　pleasure；　or　more　in　conformity　with　measure　than　mind　and



knowledge。



　　Soc。　Very　good；　but　there　still　remains　the　third　test：　Has　mind　a



greater　share　of　beauty　than　pleasure；　and　is　mind　or　pleasure　the



fairer　of　the　two？



　　Pro。　No　one；　Socrates；　either　awake　or　dreaming；　ever　saw　or



imagined　mind　or　wisdom　to　be　in　aught　unseemly；　at　any　time；　past；



present；　or　future。



　　Soc。　Right。



　　Pro。　But　when　we　see　some　one　indulging　in　pleasures；　perhaps　in　the



greatest　of　pleasures；　the　ridiculous　or　disgraceful　nature　of　the



action　makes　us　ashamed；　and　so　we　put　them　out　of　sight；　and



consign　them　to　darkness；　under　the　idea　that　they　ought　not　to　meet



the　eye　of　day。



　　Soc。　Then；　Protarchus；　you　will　proclaim　everywhere；　by　word　of



mouth　to　this　company；　and　by　messengers　bearing　the　tidings　far　and



wide；　that　pleasure　is　not　the　first　of　possessions；　nor　yet　the



second；　but　that　in　measure；　and　the　mean；　and　the　suitable；　and　the



like；　the　eternal　nature　has　been　found。



　　Pro。　Yes；　that　seems　to　be　the　result　of　what　has　been　now　said。



　　Soc。　In　the　second　class　is　contained　the　symmetrical　and



beautiful　and　perfect　or　sufficient；　and　all　which　are　of　that　family。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　if　you　reckon　in　the　third　dass　mind　and　wisdom；　you　will



not　be　far　wrong；　if　I　divine　aright。



　　Pro。　I　dare　say。



　　Soc。　And　would　you　not　put　in　the　fourth　class　the　goods　which　we



were　affirming　to　appertain　specially　to　the　soul…sciences　and　arts



and　true　opinions　as　we　called　them？　These　come　after　the　third　class；



and　form　the　fourth；　as　they　are　certainly　more　akin　to　good　than



pleasure　is。



　　Pro。　Surely。



　　Soc。　The　fifth　class　are　the　pleasures　which　were　defined　by　us　as



painless；　being　the　pure　pleasures　of　the　soul　herself；　as　we　termed



them；　which　accompany；　some　the　sciences；　and　some　the　senses。



　　Pro。　Perhaps。



　　Soc。　And　now；　as　Orpheus　says；







　　　　　　With　the　sixth　generation　cease　the　glory　of　my　song。







Here；　at　the　sixth　award；　let　us　make　an　end；　all　that　remains　is　to



set　the　crown　on　our　discourse。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　Then　let　us　sum　up　and　reassert　what　has　been　said；　thus



offering　the　third　libation　to　the　saviour　Zeus。



　　Pro。　How？



　　Soc。　Philebus　affirmed　that　pleasure　was　always　and　absolutely　the



good。



　　Pro。　I　understand；　this　third　libation；　Socrates；　of　which　you



spoke；　meant　a　recapitulation。



　　Soc。　Yes；　but　listen　to　the　sequel；　convinced　of　what　I　have　just



been　saying；　and　f