philebus-第16章
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good。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Well then； by Zeus； let us proceed； and I will make what I
believe to be a fair summary of the argument。
Pro。 Let me hear。
Soc。 Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living
beings； at which all ought to aim； and moreover that it is the chief
good of all； and that the two names 〃good〃 and 〃pleasant〃 are
correctly given to one thing and one nature； Socrates； on the other
hand； begins by denying this； and further says； that in nature as in
name they are two； and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of
the good。 Is not and was not this what we were saying； Protarchus？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And is there not and was there not a further point which was
conceded between us？
Pro。 What was it？
Soc。 That the good differs from all other things。
Pro。 In what respect？
Soc。 In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in
all things has the most perfect sufficiency； and is never in need of
anything else。
Pro。 Exactly。
Soc。 And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of
wisdom and pleasure； assigning to each a distinct life； so that
pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom； and wisdom in like manner
had no part whatever in pleasure？
Pro。 We did。
Soc。 And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient？
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 And if we erred in any point； then let any one who will； take
up the enquiry again and set us right； and assuming memory and
wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class； let
him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire…I will
not say pleasure； however abundant or intense； if he has no real
perception that he is pleased； nor any consciousness of what he feels；
nor any recollection； however momentary； of the feeling；…but would
he desire to have anything at all； if these faculties were wanting
to him？ And about wisdom I ask the same question； can you conceive
that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of
pleasure； rather than with a certain degree of pleasure； or all
pleasure devoid of wisdom； rather than with a certain degree of
wisdom？
Pro。 Certainly not； Socrates； but why repeat such questions any
more？
Soc。 Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good
cannot possibly be either of them？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or
less accurately； in order； as we were saying； that the second place
may be duly assigned。
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 Have we not found a road which leads towards the good？
Pro。 What road？
Soc。 Supposing that a man had to be found； and you could discover in
what house he lived； would not that be a great step towards the
discovery of the man himself？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And now reason intimates to us； as at our first beginning； that
we should seek the good； not in the unmixed life but in the mixed。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in
the life which is well mixed than in that which is not？
Pro。 Far greater。
Soc。 Then now let us mingle； Protarchus； at the same time offering
up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus； or whoever is the god who
presides over the ceremony of mingling。
Pro。 By all means。
Soc。 Are not we the cup…bearers？ and here are two fountains which
are flowing at our side： one； which is pleasure； may be likened to a
fountain of honey； the other； wisdom； a sober draught in which no wine
mingles； is of water unpleasant but healthful； out of these we must
seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Tell me first；…should we be most likely to succeed if we
mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom？
Pro。 Perhaps we might。
Soc。 But I should be afraid of the risk； and I think that I can show
a safer plan。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another； and
one art to be more exact than another。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences； some of
them regarding only the transient and perishing； and others the
permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable； and when
judged by the standard of truth； the latter； as we thought； were truer
than the former。
Pro。 Very good and right。
Soc。 If； then； we were to begin by mingling the sections of each
class which have the most of truth； will not the union suffice to give
us the loveliest of lives； or shall we still want some elements of
another kind？
Pro。 I think that we ought to do what you suggest。
Soc。 Let us suppose a man who understands justice； and has reason as
well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other
things。
Pro。 We will suppose such a man。
Soc。 Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only
with the divine circle and sphere； and knows nothing of our human
spheres and circles； but uses only divine circles and measures in
the building of a house？
Pro。 The knowledge which is only superhuman； Socrates； is ridiculous
in man。
Soc。 What do you mean？ Do you mean that you are to throw into the
cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false
measure and the false circle？
Pro。 Yes； we must； if any of us is ever to find his way home。
Soc。 And am I to include music； which； as； I was saying just now； is
full of guesswork and imitation； and is wanting in purity？
Pro。 Yes； I think that you must； if human life is to be a life at
all。
Soc。 Well； then； suppose that I give way； and； like a doorkeeper who
is pushed and overborne by the mob； I open the door wide； and let
knowledge of every sort stream in； and the pure mingle with the
impure？
Pro。 I do not know； Socrates； that any great harm would come of
having them all； if only you have the first sort。
Soc。 Well； then； shall I let them all flow into what Homer
poetically terms 〃a meeting of the waters〃？
Pro。 By all means。
Soc。 There…I have let him in； and now I must return to the
fountain of pleasure。 For we were not permitted to begin by mingling
in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original
intention； but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the
sciences flow in together before the pleasures。
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And now the time has come for us to consider about the
pleasures also； whether we shall in like manner let them go all at
once； or at first only the true ones。
Pro。 It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones
first。
Soc。 Let them flow； then； and now； if there are any necessary
pleasures； as there were arts and sciences necessary； must we not
mingle them？
Pro。 Yes； the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to
mingle。
Soc。 The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent
and useful always； and if we say of pleasures in like manner that
all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times； we
must let them all mingle？
Pro。 What shall we say about them； and what course shall we take？
Soc。 Do not ask me； Protarchus； but ask the daughters of pleasure
and wisdom to answer for themselves。
Pro。 How？
Soc。 Tell us； O beloved…shall we call you pleasures or by some other
name？…would you rather live with or without wisdom？ I am of opinion
that they would certainly answer as follows：
Pro。 How？
Soc。 They would answer； as we said before； that for any single class
to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good； nor altogether
possible； and that if we are to make comparisons of one class
