philebus-第13章
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Soc。 And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a
misfortune？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it？
Pro。 Clearly we feel pleasure。
Soc。 And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at
the misfortunes of friends？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of
our friends； pleasure； in mingling with envy； mingles with pain； for
envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain； and laughter is
pleasant； and so we envy and laugh at the same instant。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And the argument implies that there are combinations of
pleasure and pain in lamentations； and in tragedy and comedy； not only
on the stage； but on the greater stage of human life； and so in
endless other cases。
Pro。 I do not see how any one can deny what you say； Socrates；
however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion。
Soc。 I mentioned anger； desire； sorrow； fear； love； emulation； envy；
and similar emotions； as examples in which we should find a mixture of
the two elements so often named； did I not？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference
only to sorrow and envy and anger。
Pro。 I see。
Soc。 Then many other cases still remain？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the
admixture which takes place in comedy？ Why but to convince you that
there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love
and similar affections； and I thought that when I had given you the
illustration； you would have let me off； and have acknowledged as a
general truth that the body without the soul； and the soul without the
body； as well as the two united； are susceptible of all sorts of
admixtures of pleasures and pains； and so further discussion would
have been unnecessary。 And now I want to know whether I may depart； or
will you keep me here until midnight？ I fancy that I may obtain my
release without many words；…if I promise that to…morrow I will give
you an account of all these cases。 But at present I would rather
sail in another direction； and go to other matters which remain to
be settled； before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands。
Pro。 Very good； Socrates； in what remains take your own course。
Soc。 Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their
turn； this is the natural and necessary order。
Pro。 Excellent。
Soc。 These； in turn； then； I will now endeavour to indicate； for
with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation
of pain； I do not agree； but； as I was saying； I use them as
witnesses； that there are pleasures which seem only and are not； and
there are others again which have great power and appear in many
forms； yet are intermingled with pains； and are partly alleviations of
agony and distress； both of body and mind。
Pro。 Then what pleasures； Socrates； should we be right in conceiving
to be true？
Soc。 True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour
and form； and most of of those which arise from smells； those of
sound； again； and in general those of which the want is painless and
unconscious； and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and
pleasant and unalloyed with pain。
Pro。 Once more； Socrates； I must ask what you mean。
Soc。 My meaning is certainly not obvious； and I will endeavour to be
plainer。 I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of
animals or pictures； which the many would suppose to be my meaning；
but； says the argument； understand me to mean straight lines and
circles； and the plane solid figures which are formed out of them by
turning…lathes and rulers and measurers of angles； for these I
affirm to be not only relatively beautiful； like other things； but
they are eternally and absolutely beautiful； and they have peculiar
pleasures； quite unlike the pleasures of scratching。 And there are
colours which are of the same character； and have similar pleasures；
now do you understand my meaning？
Pro。 I am trying to understand； Socrates； and I hope that you will
try to make your meaning dearer。
Soc。 When sounds are smooth and clear； and have a single pure
tone； then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely
beautiful； and have natural pleasures associated with them。
Pro。 Yes； there are such pleasures。
Soc。 The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort； but they
have no necessary admixture of pain； and all pleasures； however and
wherever experienced； which are unattended by pains； I assign to an
analogous class。 Here then are two kinds of pleasures。
Pro。 I understand。
Soc。 To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge； if no
hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them。
Pro。 And this is the case。
Soc。 Well； but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his
knowledge； are there not pains of forgetting？
Pro。 Not necessarily； but there may be times of reflection； when
he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge。
Soc。 Yes； my friend； but at present we are enumerating only the
natural perceptions； and have nothing to do with reflection。
Pro。 In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge
is not attended with pain。
Soc。 These pleasures of knowledge； then； are unmixed with pain；
and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few。
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And now； having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those
which may be rightly termed impure； let us further add to our
description of them； that the pleasures which are in excess have no
measure； but that those which are not in excess have measure； the
great； the excessive； whether more or less frequent； we shall be right
in referring to the class of the infinite； and of the more and less；
which pours through body and soul alike； and the others we shall refer
to the class which has measure。
Pro。 Quite right； Socrates。
Soc。 Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 When you speak of purity and clearness； or of excess；
abundance； greatness and sufficiency； in what relation do these
terms stand to truth？
Pro。 Why do you ask； Socrates？
Soc。 Because； Protarchus； I should wish to test pleasure and
knowledge in every possible way； in order that if there be a pure
and impure element in either of them； I may present the pure element
for judgment； and then they will be more easily judged of by you and
by me and by all of us。
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 Let us investigate all the pure kinds； first selecting for
consideration a single instance。
Pro。 What instance shall we select？
Soc。 Suppose that we first of all take whiteness。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 How can there be purity in whiteness； and what purity？ Is
that purest which is greatest or most in quantity； or that which is
most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours？
Pro。 Clearly that which is most unadulterated。
Soc。 True； Protarchus； and so the purest white； and not the greatest
or largest in quantity； is to be deemed truest and most beautiful？
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure
white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed。
Pro。 Perfectly right。
Soc。 There is no need of adducing many similar examples in
illustration of the argument about pleasures； one such is sufficient
to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure； if
pure or unalloyed with pain。 is always pleasanter and truer and fairer
than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of an
