philebus-第11章

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again　appears。



　　Pro。　What　life？



　　Soc。　The　life　which　we　affirmed　to　be　devoid　either　of　pain　or　of



joy。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　We　may　assume　then　that　there　are　three　lives；　one　pleasant；



one　painful；　and　the　third　which　is　neither；　what　say　you？



　　Pro。　I　should　say　as　you　do　that　there　are　three　of　them。



　　Soc。　But　if　so；　the　negation　of　pain　will　not　be　the　same　with



pleasure。



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　Then　when　you　hear　a　person　saying；　that　always　to　live　without



pain　is　the　pleasantest　of　all　things；　what　would　you　understand　him



to　mean　by　that　statement？



　　Pro。　I　think　that　by　pleasure　he　must　mean　the　negative　of　pain。



　　Soc。　Let　us　take　any　three　things；　or　suppose　that　we　embellish　a



little　and　call　the　first　gold；　the　second　silver；　and　there　shall



be　a　third　which　is　neither。



　　Pro。　Very　good。



　　Soc。　Now；　can　that　which　is　neither　be　either　gold　or　silver？



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　No　more　can　that　neutral　or　middle　life　be　rightly　or



reasonably　spoken　or　thought　of　as　pleasant　or　painful。



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　And　yet；　my　friend；　there　are；　as　we　know；　persons　who　say



and　think　so。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　do　they　think　that　they　have　pleasure　when　they　are　free



from　pain？



　　Pro。　They　say　so。



　　Soc。　And　they　must　think　or　they　would　not　say　that　they　have



pleasure。



　　Pro。　I　suppose　not。



　　Soc。　And　yet　if　pleasure　and　the　negation　of　pain　are　of　distinct



natures；　they　are　wrong。



　　Pro。　But　they　are　undoubtedly　of　distinct　natures。



　　Soc。　Then　shall　we　take　the　view　that　they　are　three；　as　we　were



just　now　saying；　or　that　they　are　two　only…the　one　being　a　state　of



pain；　which　is　an　evil；　and　the　other　a　cessation　of　pain；　which　is　of



itself　a　good；　and　is　called　pleasant？



　　Pro。　But　why；　Socrates；　do　we　ask　the　question　at　all？　I　do　not



see　the　reason。



　　Soc。　You；　Protarchus；　have　clearly　never　heard　of　certain　enemies　of



our　friend　Philebus。



　　Pro。　And　who　may　they　be？



　　Soc。　Certain　persons　who　are　reputed　to　be　masters　in　natural



philosophy；　who　deny　the　very　existence　of　pleasure。



　　Pro。　Indeed。



　　Soc。　They　say　that　what　the　school　of　Philebus　calls　pleasures　are



all　of　them　only　avoidances　of　pain。



　　Pro。　And　would　you；　Socrates；　have　us　agree　with　them？



　　Soc。　Why；　no；　I　would　rather　use　them　as　a　sort　of　diviners；　who



divine　the　truth；　not　by　rules　of　art；　but　by　an　instinctive



repugnance　and　extreme　detestation　which　a　noble　nature　has　of　the



power　of　pleasure；　in　which　they　think　that　there　is　nothing　sound；



and　her　seductive　influence　is　declared　by　them　to　be　witchcraft；



and　not　pleasure。　This　is　the　use　which　you　may　make　of　them。　And　when



you　have　considered　the　various　grounds　of　their　dislike；　you　shall



hear　from　me　what　I　deem　to　be　true　pleasures。　Having　thus　examined



the　nature　of　pleasure　from　both　points　of　view；　we　will　bring　her



up　for　judgment。



　　Pro。　Well　said。



　　Soc。　Then　let　us　enter　into　an　alliance　with　these　philosophers



and　follow　in　the　track　of　their　dislike。　I　imagine　that　they　would



say　something　of　this　sort；　they　would　begin　at　the　beginning；　and　ask



whether；　if　we　wanted　to　know　the　nature　of　any　quality；　such　as



hardness；　we　should　be　more　likely　to　discover　it　by　looking　at　the



hardest　things；　rather　than　at　the　least　hard？　You；　Protarchus；



shall　answer　these　severe　gentlemen　as　you　answer　me。



　　Pro。　By　all　means；　and　I　reply　to　them；　that　you　should　look　at



the　greatest　instances。



　　Soc。　Then　if　we　want　to　see　the　true　nature　of　pleasures　as　a　class；



we　should　not　look　at　the　most　diluted　pleasures；　but　at　the　most



extreme　and　most　vehement？



　　Pro。　In　that　every　one　will　agree。



　　Soc。　And　the　obvious　instances　of　the　greatest　pleasures；　as　we　have



often　said；　are　the　pleasures　of　the　body？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　are　they　felt　by　us　to　be　or　become　greater；　when　we　are



sick　or　when　we　are　in　health？　And　here　we　must　be　careful　in　our



answer；　or　we　shall　come　to　grief。



　　Pro。　How　will　that　be？



　　Soc。　Why；　because　we　might　be　tempted　to　answer；　〃When　we　are　in



health。〃



　　Pro。　Yes；　that　is　the　natural　answer。



　　Soc。　Well；　but　are　not　those　pleasures　the　greatest　of　which　mankind



have　the　greatest　desires？



　　Pro。　True。





　　Soc。　And　do　not　people　who　are　in　a　fever；　or　any　similar　illness；



feel　cold　or　thirst　or　other　bodily　affections　more　intensely？　Am　I



not　right　in　saying　that　they　have　a　deeper　want　and　greater



pleasure　in　the　satisfaction　of　their　want？



　　Pro。　That　is　obvious　as　soon　as　it　is　said。



　　Soc。　Well；　then；　shall　we　not　be　right　in　saying；　that　if　a　person



would　wish　to　see　the　greatest　pleasures　he　ought　to　go　and　look；



not　at　health；　but　at　discase？　And　here　you　must　distinguish：…do　not



imagine　that　I　mean　to　ask　whether　those　who　are　very　ill　have　more



pleasures　than　those　who　are　well；　but　understand　that　I　am　speaking



of　the　magnitude　of　pleasure；　I　want　to　know　where　pleasures　are　found



to　be　most　intense。　For；　as　I　say；　we　have　to　discover　what　is



pleasure；　and　what　they　mean　by　pleasure　who　deny　her　very　existence。



　　Pro。　I　think　I　follow　you。



　　Soc。　You　will　soon　have　a　better　opportunity　of　showing　whether



you　do　or　not；　Protarchus。　Answer　now；　and　tell　me　whether　you　see；



I　will　not　say　more；　but　more　intense　and　excessive　pleasures　in



wantonness　than　in　temperance？　Reflect　before　you　speak。



　　Pro。　I　understand　you；　and　see　that　there　is　a　great　difference



between　them；　the　temperate　are　restrained　by　the　wise　man's



aphorism　of　〃Never　too　much；〃　which　is　their　rule；　but　excess　of



pleasure　possessing　the　minds　of　fools　and　wantons　becomes　madness　and



makes　them　shout　with　delight。



　　Soc。　Very　good；　and　if　this　be　true；　then　the　greatest　pleasures　and



pains　will　clearly　be　found　in　some　vicious　state　of　soul　and　body；



and　not　in　a　virtuous　state。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　Soc。　And　ought　we　not　to　select　some　of　these　for　examination；　and



see　what　makes　them　the　greatest？



　　Pro。　To　be　sure　we　ought。



　　Soc。　Take　the　case　of　the　pleasures　which　arise　out　of　certain



disorders。



　　Pro。　What　disorders？



　　Soc。　The　pleasures　of　unseemly　disorders；　which　our　severe　friends



utterly　detest。



　　Pro。　What　pleasures？



　　Soc。　Such；　for　example；　as　the　relief　of　itching　and　other



ailments　by　scratching；　which　is　the　only　remedy　required。　For　what　in



Heaven's　name　is　the　feeling　to　be　called　which　is　thus　produced　in



us？…Pleasure　or　pain？



　　Pro。　A　villainous　mixture　of　some　kind；　Socrates；　I　should　say。



　　Soc。　I　did　not　introduce　the　argument；　O　Protarchus；　with　any



personal　reference　to　Philebus；　but　because；　without　the　consideration



of　these　and　similar　pleasures；　we　shall　not　be　able　to　determine



the　point　at　issue。



　　Pro。　Then　we　had　better　proceed　to　analyze　this　family　of　pleasures。



　　Soe。　You　mean　the　pleasures　which　are　mingled　with　pain？



　　Pro。　Exactly。



　　Soc。　There　are　some　mixtures　which　are　of　the　body；　and　only　in



the　body；　and　others　which　are　of　the　soul；　and　only　in　the　soul；



while　there　are　other　mixtures　of　pleasures　with　pains；　common　both　to



soul　and　body；　which　in　their　composite　state　are　called　sometimes



pleasures　and　sometimes　pains。



　　Pro。　How　is　that？



　　Soc。　Whenever；　in　the　restoration　or　in　the　derangement　of　nature；　a



man　experiences　two　opposite　feelings；　for　example；　when　he　is　cold



and　is　growing　warm；　or　again；　when　he　is　hot　and　is　becoming　cool；



and　he　wants　to　have　the　one　and　be　rid　of　the　other；…the　sweet　has



a　bitter；　as　the　common　saying　is；　and　both　together　fasten　upon　him



and　create　irritation　and　in　time　drive　him　to　distraction。



　　Pro。　That　description　is　very　true　to　nature。



　　Soc。　And　in