philebus-第1章
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360 BC
PHILEBUS
by Plato
translated by Benjamin Jowett
PHILEBUS
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE： SOCRATES； PROTARCHUS； PHILEBUS。
Socrates。 Observe； Protarchus； the nature of the position which
you are now going to take from Philebus； and what the other position
is which I maintain； and which； if you do not approve of it； is to
be controverted by you。 Shall you and I sum up the two sides？
Protarchus。 By all means。
Soc。 Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight；
and the class of feelings akin to them； are a good to every living
being； whereas I contend； that not these； but wisdom and
intelligence and memory； and their kindred； right opinion and true
reasoning； are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are
able to partake of them； and that to all such who are or ever will
be they are the most advantageous of all things。 Have I not given；
Philebus； a fair statement of the two sides of the argument？
Philebus Nothing could be fairer； Socrates。
Soc。 And do you； the position which is assigned to you？
Pro。 I cannot do otherwise； since our excellent Philebus has left
the field。
Soc。 Surely the truth about these matters ought； by all means； to be
ascertained。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Shall we further agree…
Pro。 To what？
Soc。 That you and I must now try to indicate some state and
disposition of the soul； which has the property of making all men
happy。
Pro。 Yes； by all means。
Soc。 And you say that pleasure and I say that wisdom； is such a
state？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And what if there be a third state； which is better than
either？ Then both of us are vanquished…are we not？ But if this life；
which really has the power of making men happy； turn out to be more
akin to pleasure than to wisdom； the life of pleasure may still have
the advantage over the life of wisdom。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to
wisdom； then wisdom conquers； and pleasure is defeated；…do you agree？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And what do you say； Philebus？
Phi。 I say； and shall always say； that pleasure is easily the
conqueror； but you must decide for yourself； Protarchus。
Pro。 You； Philebus； have handed over the argument to me； and have no
longer a voice in the matter？
Phi。 True enough。 Nevertheless I would dear myself and deliver my
soul of you； and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do
so。
Pro。 You may appeal to us； we too be the witnesses of your words。
And now； Socrates； whether Philebus is pleased or displeased； we
will proceed with the argument。
Soc。 Then let us begin with the goddess herself； of whom Philebus
says that she is called Aphrodite； but that her real name is Pleasure。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 The awe which I always feel； Protarchus； about the names of the
gods is more than human…it exceeds all other fears。 And now I would
not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss； let her be called
what she pleases。 But Pleasure I know to be manifold； and with her； as
I was just now saying； we must begin； and consider what her nature is。
She has one name； and therefore you would imagine that she is one； and
yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms。 For do
we not say that the intemperate has pleasure； and that the temperate
has pleasure in his very temperance…that the fool is pleased when he
is full of foolish fancies and hopes； and that the wise man has
pleasure in his wisdom？ and how foolish would any one be who
affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike！
Pro。 Why； Socrates； they are opposed in so far as they spring from
opposite sources； but they are not in themselves opposite。 For must
not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure…that is；
like himself？
Soc。 Yes； my good friend； just as colour is like colour；…in so far
as colours are colours； there is no difference between them； and yet
we all know that black is not only unlike； but even absolutely opposed
to white： or again； as figure is like figure； for all figures are
comprehended under one class； and yet particular figures may be
absolutely opposed to one another； and there is an infinite
diversity of them。 And we might find similar examples in many other
things； therefore do not rely upon this argument； which would go to
prove the unity of the most extreme opposites。 And I suspect that we
shall find a similar opposition among pleasures。
Pro。 Very likely； but how will this invalidate the argument？
Soc。 Why； I shall reply； that dissimilar as they are； you apply to
them a now predicate； for you say that all pleasant things are good；
now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure； he may
argue； as we are doing； that pleasures are oftener bad than good；
but you call them all good； and at the same time are compelled； if you
are pressed； to acknowledge that they are unlike。 And so you must tell
us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad
pleasures； which makes。 you designate all of them as good。
Pro。 What do you mean； Socrates？ Do you think that any one who
asserts pleasure to be the good； will tolerate the notion that some
Pleasures are good and others bad？
Soc。 And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one
another； and sometimes opposed？
Pro。 Not in so far as they are pleasures。
Soc。 That is a return to the old position； Protarchus； and so we are
to say （are we？） that there is no difference in pleasures； but that
they are all alike； and the examples which have just been cited do not
pierce our dull minds； but we go on arguing all the same； like the
weakest and most inexperienced reasoners？
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 Why； I mean to say； that in self…defence I may； if I like；
follow your example； and assert boldly that the two things most unlike
are most absolutely alike； and the result will be that you and I
will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing； and the
argument will be blown away and lost。 Suppose that we put back； and
return to the old position； then perhaps we may come to an
understanding with one another。
Pro。 How do you mean？
Soc。 Shall I； Protarchus； have my own question asked of me by you？
Pro。 What question？
Soc。 Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind； and those other
qualities which I； when asked by you at first what is the nature of
the good； affirmed to be good； are not in the same case with the
pleasures of which you spoke。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 The sciences are a numerous class； and will be found to present
great differences。 But even admitting that； like the pleasures； they
are opposite as well as different； should I be worthy of the name of
dialectician if； in order to avoid this difficulty； I were to say
（as you are saying of pleasure） that there is no difference between
one science and another；…would not the argument founder and
disappear like an idle tale； although we might ourselves escape
drowning by clinging to a fallacy？
Pro。 May none of this befall us； except the deliverance！ Yet I
like the even…handed justice which is applied to both our arguments。
Let us assume； then； that there are many and diverse pleasures； and
many and different sciences。
Soc。 And let us have no concealment； Protarchus； of the
differences between my good and yours； but let us bring them to the
light in the hope that； in the process of testing them； they may
show whether pleasure is to be called the good； or wisdom； or some
third qual
