concerning civil government-第24章

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private　will；　he　degrades　himself；　and　is　but　a　single　private

person　without　power　and　without　will；　the　members　owing　no

obedience　but　to　the　public　will　of　the　society。

　　152。　The　executive　power　placed　anywhere　but　in　a　person　that　has

also　a　share　in　the　legislative　is　visibly　subordinate　and　accountable

to　it；　and　may　be　at　pleasure　changed　and　displaced；　so　that　it　is　not

the　supreme　executive　power　that　is　exempt　from　subordination；　but　the

supreme　executive　power　vested　in　one；　who　having　a　share　in　the

legislative；　has　no　distinct　superior　legislative　to　be　subordinate

and　accountable　to；　farther　than　he　himself　shall　join　and　consent；　so

that　he　is　no　more　subordinate　than　he　himself　shall　think　fit；

which　one　may　certainly　conclude　will　be　but　very　little。　Of　other

ministerial　and　subordinate　powers　in　a　commonwealth　we　need　not

speak；　they　being　so　multiplied　with　infinite　variety　in　the　different

customs　and　constitutions　of　distinct　commonwealths；　that　it　is

impossible　to　give　a　particular　account　of　them　all。　Only　thus　much

which　is　necessary　to　our　present　purpose　we　may　take　notice　of

concerning　them；　that　they　have　no　manner　of　authority；　any　of　them；

beyond　what　is　by　positive　grant　and　commission　delegated　to　them；　and

are　all　of　them　accountable　to　some　other　power　in　the　commonwealth。

　　153。　It　is　not　necessary…　no；　nor　so　much　as　convenient…　that　the

legislative　should　be　always　in　being；　but　absolutely　necessary　that

the　executive　power　should；　because　there　is　not　always　need　of　new

laws　to　be　made；　but　always　need　of　execution　of　the　laws　that　are

made。　When　the　legislative　hath　put　the　execution　of　the　laws　they

make　into　other　hands；　they　have　a　power　still　to　resume　it　out　of

those　hands　when　they　find　cause；　and　to　punish　for　any

mal…administration　against　the　laws。　The　same　holds　also　in　regard

of　the　federative　power；　that　and　the　executive　being　both　ministerial

and　subordinate　to　the　legislative；　which；　as　has　been　shown；　in　a

constituted　commonwealth　is　the　supreme；　the　legislative　also　in

this　case　being　supposed　to　consist　of　several　persons；　for　if　it　be　a

single　person　it　cannot　but　be　always　in　being；　and　so　will；　as

supreme；　naturally　have　the　supreme　executive　power；　together　with　the

legislative；　may　assemble　and　exercise　their　legislative　at　the

times　that　either　their　original　constitution　or　their　own　adjournment

appoints；　or　when　they　please；　if　neither　of　these　hath　appointed

any　time；　or　there　be　no　other　way　prescribed　to　convoke　them。　For　the

supreme　power　being　placed　in　them　by　the　people；　it　is　always　in

them；　and　they　may　exercise　it　when　they　please；　unless　by　their

original　constitution　they　are　limited　to　certain　seasons；　or　by　an

act　of　their　supreme　power　they　have　adjourned　to　a　certain　time；

and　when　that　time　comes　they　have　a　right　to　assemble　and　act　again。

　　154。　If　the　legislative；　or　any　part　of　it；　be　of　representatives；

chosen　for　that　time　by　the　people；　which　afterwards　return　into　the

ordinary　state　of　subjects；　and　have　no　share　in　the　legislative　but

upon　a　new　choice；　this　power　of　choosing　must　also　be　exercised　by

the　people；　either　at　certain　appointed　seasons；　or　else　when　they　are

summoned　to　it；　and；　in　this　latter　case；　the　power　of　convoking　the

legislative　is　ordinarily　placed　in　the　executive；　and　has　one　of

these　two　limitations　in　respect　of　time：…　that　either　the　original

constitution　requires　their　assembling　and　acting　at　certain

intervals；　and　then　the　executive　power　does　nothing　but　ministerially

issue　directions　for　their　electing　and　assembling　according　to　due

forms；　or　else　it　is　left　to　his　prudence　to　call　them　by　new

elections　when　the　occasions　or　exigencies　of　the　public　require　the

amendment　of　old　or　making　of　new　laws；　or　the　redress　or　prevention

of　any　inconveniencies　that　lie　on　or　threaten　the　people。

　　155。　It　may　be　demanded　here；　what　if　the　executive　power；　being

possessed　of　the　force　of　the　commonwealth；　shall　make　use　of　that

force　to　hinder　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　legislative；　when　the

original　constitution　or　the　public　exigencies　require　it？　I　say；

using　force　upon　the　people；　without　authority；　and　contrary　to　the

trust　put　in　him　that　does　so；　is　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；

who　have　a　right　to　reinstate　their　legislative　in　the　exercise　of

their　power。　For　having　erected　a　legislative　with　an　intent　they

should　exercise　the　power　of　making　laws；　either　at　certain　set　times；

or　when　there　is　need　of　it；　when　they　are　hindered　by　any　force

from　what　is　so　necessary　to　the　society；　and　wherein　the　safety　and

preservation　of　the　people　consists；　the　people　have　a　right　to　remove

it　by　force。　In　all　states　and　conditions　the　true　remedy　of　force

without　authority　is　to　oppose　force　to　it。　The　use　of　force　without

authority　always　puts　him　that　uses　it　into　a　state　of　war　as　the

aggressor；　and　renders　him　liable　to　be　treated　accordingly。

　　156。　The　power　of　assembling　and　dismissing　the　legislative；

placed　in　the　executive；　gives　not　the　executive　a　superiority　over

it；　but　is　a　fiduciary　trust　placed　in　him　for　the　safety　of　the

people　in　a　case　where　the　uncertainty　and　variableness　of　human

affairs　could　not　bear　a　steady　fixed　rule。　For　it　not　being

possible　that　the　first　framers　of　the　government　should　by　any

foresight　be　so　much　masters　of　future　events　as　to　be　able　to

prefix　so　just　periods　of　return　and　duration　to　the　assemblies　of　the

legislative；　in　all　times　to　come；　that　might　exactly　answer　all　the

exigencies　of　the　commonwealth；　the　best　remedy　could　be　found　for

this　defect　was　to　trust　this　to　the　prudence　of　one　who　was　always　to

be　present；　and　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　over　the　public　good。

Constant；　frequent　meetings　of　the　legislative；　and　long　continuations

of　their　assemblies；　without　necessary　occasion；　could　not　but　be

burdensome　to　the　people；　and　must　necessarily　in　time　produce　more

dangerous　inconveniencies；　and　yet　the　quick　turn　of　affairs　might

be　sometimes　such　as　to　need　their　present　help；　any　delay　of　their

convening　might　endanger　the　public；　and　sometimes；　too；　their

business　might　be　so　great　that　the　limited　time　of　their　sitting

might　be　too　short　for　their　work；　and　rob　the　public　of　that

benefit　which　could　be　had　only　from　their　mature　deliberation。

What；　then；　could　be　done　in　this　case　to　prevent　the　community　from

being　exposed　some　time　or　other　to　imminent　hazard　on　one　side　or　the

other；　by　fixed　intervals　and　periods　set　to　the　meeting　and　acting　of

the　legislative；　but　to　entrust　it　to　the　prudence　of　some　who；

being　present　and　acquainted　with　the　state　of　public　affairs；　might

make　use　of　this　prerogative　for　the　public　good？　And　where　else　could

this　be　so　well　placed　as　in　his　hands　who　was　entrusted　with　the

execution　of　the　laws　for　the　same　end？　Thus；　supposing　the　regulation

of　times　for　the　assembling　and　sitting　of　the　legislative　not　settled

by　the　original　constitution；　it　naturally　fell　into　the　hands　of

the　executive；　not　as　an　arbitrary　power　depending　on　his　good

pleasure；　but　with　this　trust　always　to　have　it　exercised　only　for　the

public　weal；　as　the　occurrences　of　times　and　change　of　affairs　might

require。　Whether　settled　periods　of　their　convening；　or　a　liberty　left

to　the　prince　for　convoking　the　legislative；　or　perhaps　a　mixture　of

both；　hath　the　least　inconvenience　attending　it；　it　is　not　my　business

here　to　inquire；　but　only　to　show　that；　though　the　executive　power　may

have　the　prerogative　of　convoking　and　dissolving　such　conventions　of

the　legislative；　yet　it　is　not　thereby　superior　to　it。

　　157。　Things　of　this　world　are　in　so　constant　a　flux　that　nothing

remains　long　in　the　same　state。　Thus　people；　riches；　trade；　power；

change　their　stations；　flourishing　mighty　cities　come　to　ruin；　and

prove　in　time　neglected　desolate　corners；　whilst　other　unfrequented

places　grow　into　populous　countries　filled　with　wealth　and

inhabitants。　But　things　not　always　changing　equally；　and　private

interest　often