concerning civil government-第20章
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126。 Thirdly； in the state of Nature there often wants power to back
and support the sentence when right； and to give it due execution。
They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are
able by force to make good their injustice。 Such resistance many times
makes the punishment dangerous； and frequently destructive to those
who attempt it。
127。 Thus mankind； notwithstanding all the privileges of the state
of Nature； being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are
quickly driven into society。 Hence it comes to pass； that we seldom
find any number of men live any time together in this state。 The
inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular
and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others； make them take sanctuary under the
established laws of government； and therein seek the preservation of
their property。 It is this that makes them so willingly give up
every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such
alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them； and by such rules as
the community； or those authorised by them to that purpose； shall
agree on。 And in this we have the original right and rise of both
the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments
and societies themselves。
128。 For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of
innocent delights； a man has two powers。 The first is to do whatsoever
he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the
permission of the law of Nature； by which law； common to them all；
he and all the rest of mankind are one community； make up one
society distinct from all other creatures； and were it not for the
corruption and viciousness of degenerate men； there would be no need
of any other； no necessity that men should separate from this great
and natural community； and associate into lesser combinations。 The
other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish
the crimes committed against that law。 Both these he gives up when
he joins in a private； if I may so call it； or particular political
society； and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest
of mankind。
129。 The first power… viz。； of doing whatsoever he thought fit for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind； he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by the society； so far forth as the
preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require；
which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by
the law of Nature。
130。 Secondly； the power of punishing he wholly gives up； and
engages his natural force； which he might before employ in the
execution of the law of Nature； by his own single authority； as he
thought fit； to assist the executive power of the society as the law
thereof shall require。 For being now in a new state； wherein he is
to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour； assistance； and society
of others in the same community； as well as protection from its
whole strength； he is to part also with as much of his natural
liberty； in providing for himself； as the good； prosperity； and safety
of the society shall require； which is not only necessary but just；
since the other members of the society do the like。
131。 But though men when they enter into society give up the
equality； liberty； and executive power they had in the state of Nature
into the hands of the society； to be so far disposed of by the
legislative as the good of the society shall require； yet it being
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself；
his liberty and property （for no rational creature can be supposed
to change his condition with an intention to be worse）； the power of
the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed
to extend farther than the common good； but is obliged to secure every
one's property by providing against those three defects above
mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy。 And
so； whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
commonwealth； is bound to govern by established standing laws；
promulgated and known to the people； and not by extemporary decrees；
by indifferent and upright judges； who are to decide controversies
by those laws； and to employ the force of the community at home only
in the execution of such laws； or abroad to prevent or redress foreign
injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion。 And all
this to be directed to no other end but the peace； safety； and
public good of the people。
Chapter X
Of the Forms of a Commonwealth
132。 THE majority having； as has been showed； upon men's first
uniting into society； the whole power of the community naturally in
them； may employ all that power in making laws for the community
from time to time； and executing those laws by officers of their own
appointing； and then the form of the government is a perfect
democracy； or else may put the power of making laws into the hands
of a few select men； and their heirs or successors； and then it is
an oligarchy； or else into the hands of one man； and then it is a
monarchy； if to him and his heirs； it is a hereditary monarchy； if
to him only for life； but upon his death the power only of
nominating a successor； to return to them； an elective monarchy。 And
so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government；
as they think good。 And if the legislative power be at first given
by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives； or any
limited time； and then the supreme power to revert to them again； when
it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again anew into what
hands they please； and so constitute a new form of government； for the
form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power； which
is the legislative； it being impossible to conceive that an inferior
power should prescribe to a superior； or any but the supreme make
laws； according as the power of making laws is placed； such is the
form of the commonwealth。
133。 By 〃commonwealth〃 I must be understood all along to mean not
a democracy； or any form of government； but any independent
community which the Latins signified by the word civitas； to which the
word which best answers in our language is 〃commonwealth；〃 and most
properly expresses such a society of men which 〃community〃 does not
（for there may be subordinate communities in a government）； and 〃city〃
much less。 And therefore； to avoid ambiguity； I crave leave to use the
word 〃commonwealth〃 in that sense； in which sense I find the word used
by King James himself； which I think to be its genuine
signification； which； if anybody dislike； I consent with him to change
it for a better。
Chapter XI
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power
134。 THE great end of men's entering into society being the
enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety； and the great
instrument and means of that being the laws established in that
society； the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths
is the establishing of the legislative power； as the first and
fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative。
Itself is the preservation of the society and （as far as will
consist with the public good） of every person in it。 This
legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth； but
sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once
placed it。 Nor can any edict of anybody else； in what form soever
conceived； or by what power soever backed； have the force and
obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative
which the public has chosen and appointed； for without this the law
could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a
law； the consent of the society； over whom nobody can have a power
to make laws* but by their own consent and by authority received
from them； and therefore all the obedience；
