笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第7章
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and I inquire what I am； I whom I know to exist。 But it is
very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its
precise significance does not depend on things whose existence
is not yet known to me； consequently it does not depend on
those which I can feign in imagination。 And indeed the very
term feign in imagination10 proves to me my error； for I
really do this if I image myself a something； since to imagine
is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a
corporeal thing。 But I already know for certain that I am；
and that it may be that all these images； and； speaking
generally； all things that relate to the nature of body are
nothing but dreams ＇and chimeras＇。 For this reason I see
clearly that I have as little reason to say； 〃I shall
stimulate my imagination in order to know more distinctly what
I am；〃 than if I were to say； 〃I am now awake； and I perceive
somewhat that is real and true： but because I do not yet
perceive it distinctly enough； I shall go to sleep of express
purpose； so that my dreams may represent the perception with
greatest truth and evidence。〃 And； thus； I know for certain
that nothing of all that I can understand by means of my
imagination belongs to this knowledge which I have of myself；
and that it is necessary to recall the mind from this mode of
thought with the utmost diligence in order that it may be able
to know its own nature with perfect distinctness。
But what then am I？ A thing which thinks。 What is a
thing which thinks？ It is a thing which doubts； understands；
＇conceives＇； affirms； denies； wills； refuses； which also
imagines and feels。
Certainly it is no small matter if all these things
pertain to my nature。 But why should they not so pertain？ Am
I not that being who now doubts nearly everything； who
nevertheless understands certain things； who affirms that one
only is true； who denies all the others； who desires to know
more； is averse from being deceived； who imagines many things；
sometimes indeed despite his will； and who perceives many
likewise； as by the intervention of the bodily organs？ Is
there nothing in all this which is as true as it is certain
that I exist； even though I should always sleep and though he
who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving
me？ Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can
be distinguished from my thought； or which might be said to be
separated from myself？ For it is so evident of itself that it
is I who doubts； who understands； and who desires； that there
is no reason here to add anything to explain it。 And I have
certainly the power of imagining likewise； for although it may
happen （as I formerly supposed） that none of the things which
I imagine are true； nevertheless this power of imagining does
not cease to be really in use； and it forms part of my
thought。 Finally； I am the same who feels； that is to say；
who perceives certain things； as by the organs of sense； since
it truth I see light； I hear noise； I feel heat。 But it will
be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming。
Let it be so； still it is at least quite certain that it seems
to me that I see light； that I hear noise and that I feel
heat。 That cannot be false； properly speaking it is what is
in me called feeling；11 and used in this precise sense that is
no other thing than thinking。
From this time I begin to know what I am with a little
more clearness and distinction than before； but nevertheless
it still seems to me； and I cannot prevent myself from
thinking； that corporeal things； whose images are framed by
thought； which are tested by the senses； are much more
distinctly known than that obscure part of me which does not
e under the imagination。 Although really it is very
strange to say that I know and understand more distinctly
these things whose existence seems to me dubious； which are
unknown to me； and which do not belong to me； than others of
the truth of which I am convinced； which are known to me and
which pertain to my real nature； in a word； than myself。 But
I see clearly how the case stands： my mind loves to wander；
and cannot yet suffer itself to be retained within the just
limits of truth。 Very good； let us once more give it the
freest rein； so that； when afterwards we seize the proper
occasion for pulling up； it may the more easily be regulated
and controlled。
Let us begin by considering the monest matters； those
which we believe to be the most distinctly prehended； to
wit； the bodies which we touch and see； not indeed bodies in
general； for these general ideas are usually a little more
confused； but let us consider one body in particular。 Let us
take； for example； this piece of wax： it has been taken quite
freshly from the hive； and it has not yet lost the sweetness
of the honey which it contains； it still retains somewhat of
the odour of the flowers from which it has been culled； its
colour； its figure； its size are apparent； it is hard； cold；
easily handled； and if you strike it with the finger； it will
emit a sound。 Finally all the things which are requisite to
cause us distinctly to recognise a body； are met with in it。
But notice that while I speak and approach the fire what
remained of the taste is exhaled； the smell evaporates； the
colour alters； the figure is destroyed； the size increases； it
bees liquid； it heats； scarcely can one handle it； and when
one strikes it； now sound is emitted。 Does the same wax
remain after this change？ We must confess that it remains；
none would judge otherwise。 What then did I know so
distinctly in this piece of wax？ It could certainly be
nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice； since all
these things which fall under taste； smell； sight； touch； and
hearing； are found to be changed； and yet the same wax
remains。
Perhaps it was what I now think； viz。 that this wax was
not that sweetness of honey； nor that agreeable scent of
flowers； nor that particular whiteness； nor that figure； nor
that sound； but simply a body which a little while before
appeared tome as perceptible under these forms； and which is
now perceptible under others。 But what； precisely； is it that
I imagine when I form such conceptions？ Let us attentively
consider this； and； abstracting from all that does not belong
to the wax； let us see what remains。 Certainly nothing
remains excepting a certain extended thing which is flexible
and movable。 But what is the meaning of flexible and movable？
Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax being round is
capable of being square and of passing from a square to a
triangular figure？ No； certainly it is not that； since I
imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar changes； and I
nevertheless do not know how to pass the infinitude by my
imagination； and consequently this conception which I have of
the wax is not brought about by the faculty of imagination。
What now is this extension？ Is it not also unknown？ For it
bees greater when the wax is melted； greater when it is
boiled； and greater still when the heat increases； and I
should not conceive ＇clearly＇ according to truth what wax is；
if I did not think that even this piece that we are
considering is capable of receiving more variations in
extension than I have ever imagined。 We must then grant that
I could not even understand through the imagination what this
piece of wax is； and that it is my mind12 alone which
perceives it。 I say this piece of wax in particular； for as
to wax in general it is yet clearer。 But what is this piece
of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the
＇understanding or＇ mind？ It is certainly the same that I see；
touch； imagine； and finally it is the same which I have always
believed it to be from the beginning。 But what must
particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an
act of vision； nor of touch； nor of imagination； and has never
been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so； but
only an intuition13 of the mind； which may be imperfect and
confused as it was formerly； or clear and distinct as it is at
present； according as my attention is more or less d
