笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第3章

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first　of　all　obliged　to　state　them。　　I　shall　only　say　in
general　that　all　that　is　said　by　the　atheist　against　the
existence　of　God；　always　depends　either　on　the　fact　that　we
ascribe　to　God　affections　which　are　human；　or　that　we
attribute　so　much　strength　and　wisdom　to　our　minds　that　we
even　have　the　presumption　to　desire　to　determine　and
understand　that　which　God　can　and　ought　to　do。　　In　this　way
all　that　they　allege　will　cause　us　no　difficulty；　provided
only　we　remember　that　we　must　consider　our　minds　as　things
which　are　finite　and　limited；　and　God　as　a　Being　who　is
inprehensible　and　infinite。
　　　　　Now　that　I　have　once　for　all　recognised　and　acknowledged
the　opinions　of　men；　I　at　once　begin　to　treat　of　God　and　the
Human　soul；　and　at　the　same　time　to　treat　of　the　whole　of　the
First　Philosophy；　without　however　expecting　any　praise　from
the　vulgar　and　without　the　hope　that　my　book　will　have　many
readers。　　On　the　contrary；　I　should　never　advise　anyone　to
read　it　excepting　those　who　desire　to　meditate　seriously　with
me；　and　who　can　detach　their　minds　from　affairs　of　sense；　and
deliver　themselves　entirely　from　every　sort　of　prejudice。　　I
know　too　well　that　such　men　exist　in　a　very　small　number。　　But
for　those　who；　without　caring　to　prehend　the　order　and
connections　of　my　reasonings；　form　their　criticisms　on
detached　portions　arbitrarily　selected；　as　is　the　custom　with
many；　these；　I　say；　will　not　obtain　much　profit　from　reading
this　Treatise。　　And　although　they　perhaps　in　several　parts
find　occasion　of　cavilling；　they　can　for　all　their　pains　make
no　objection　which　is　urgent　or　deserving　of　reply。
　　　　　And　inasmuch　as　I　make　no　promise　to　others　to　satisfy
them　at　once；　and　as　I　do　not　presume　so　much　on　my　own　powers
as　to　believe　myself　capable　of　foreseeing　all　that　can　cause
difficulty　to　anyone；　I　shall　first　of　all　set　forth　in　these
Meditations　the　very　considerations　by　which　I　persuade　myself
that　I　have　reached　a　certain　and　evident　knowledge　of　the
truth；　in　order　to　see　if；　by　the　same　reasons　which　persuaded
me；　I　can　also　persuade　others。　　And；　after　that；　I　shall
reply　to　the　objections　which　have　been　made　to　me　by　persons
of　genius　and　learning　to　whom　I　have　sent　my　Meditations　for
examination；　before　submitting　them　to　the　press。　　For　they
have　made　so　many　objections　and　these　so　different；　that　I
venture　to　promise　that　it　will　be　difficult　for　anyone　to
bring　to　mind　criticisms　of　any　consequence　which　have　not
been　already　touched　upon。　　This　is　why　I　beg　those　who　read
these　Meditations　to　form　no　judgment　upon　them　unless　they
have　given　themselves　the　trouble　to　read　all　the　objections
as　well　as　the　replies　which　I　have　made　to　them。6

　　　　　　　　　　Synopsis　of　the　Six　Following　Meditations。
　　　　　
　　　　　In　the　first　Meditation　I　set　forth　the　reasons　for　which
we　may；　generally　speaking；　doubt　about　all　things　and
especially　about　material　things；　at　least　so　long　as　we　have
no　other　foundations　for　the　sciences　than　those　which　we　have
hitherto　possessed。　　But　although　the　utility　of　a　Doubt　which
is　so　general　does　not　at　first　appear；　it　is　at　the　same　time
very　great；　inasmuch　as　it　delivers　us　from　every　kind　of
prejudice；　and　sets　out　for　us　a　very　simple　way　by　which　the
mind　may　detach　itself　from　the　senses；　and　finally　it　makes
it　impossible　for　us　ever　to　doubt　those　things　which　we　have
once　discovered　to　be　true。
　　　　　In　the　second　Meditation；　mind；　which　making　use　of　the
liberty　which　pertains　to　it；　takes　for　granted　that　all　those
things　of　whose　existence　it　has　the　least　doubt；　are　non…
existent；　recognises　that　it　is　however　absolutely　impossible
that　it　does　not　itself　exist。　　This　point　is　likewise　of　the
greatest　moment；　inasmuch　as　by　this　means　a　distinction　is
easily　drawn　between　the　things　which　pertain　to　mind　that　is
to　say　to　the　intellectual　nature　and　those　which　pertain　to
body。
　　　　　But　because　it　may　be　that　some　expect　from　me　in　this
place　a　statement　of　the　reasons　establishing　the　immortality
of　the　soul；　I　feel　that　I　should　here　make　known　to　them　that
having　aimed　at　writing　nothing　in　all　this　Treatise　of　which
I　do　not　possess　very　exact　demonstrations；　I　am　obliged　to
follow　a　similar　order　to　that　made　use　of　by　the　geometers；
which　is　to　begin　by　putting　forward　as　premises　all　those
things　upon　which　the　proposition　that　we　seek　depends；　before
ing　to　any　conclusion　regarding　it。　　Now　the　first　and
principal　matter　which　is　requisite　for　thoroughly
understanding　the　immortality　of　the　soul　is　to　form　the
clearest　possible　conception　of　it；　and　one　which　will　be
entirely　distinct　from　all　the　conceptions　which　we　may　have
of　body；　and　in　this　Meditation　this　has　been　done。　　In
addition　to　this　it　is　requisite　that　we　may　be　assured　that
all　the　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　are
true　in　the　very　way　in　which　we　think　them；　and　this　could
not　be　proved　previously　to　the　Fourth　Mediation。　　Further　we
must　have　a　distinct　conception　of　corporeal　nature；　which　is
given　partly　in　this　Second；　and　partly　in　the　Fifth　and　Sixth
Meditations。　　And　finally　we　should　conclude　from　all　this；
that　those　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　as
being　diverse　substances；　as　we　regard　mind　and　body　to　be；
are　really　substances　essentially　distinct　one　from　the　other；
and　this　is　the　conclusion　of　the　Sixth　Meditation。　　This　is
further　confirmed　in　this　same　Meditation　by　the　fact　that　we
cannot　conceive　of　body　excepting　in　so　far　as　it　is
divisible；　while　the　mind　cannot　be　conceived　of　excepting　as
indivisible。　　For　we　are　not　able　to　conceive　of　the　half　of　a
mind　as　we　can　do　of　the　smallest　of　all　bodies；　so　that　we
see　that　not　only　are　their　natures　different　but　even　in　some
respects　contrary　to　one　another。　　I　have　not　however　dealt
further　with　this　matter　in　this　treatise；　both　because　what　I
have　said　is　sufficient　to　show　clearly　enough　that　the
extinction　of　the　mind　does　not　follow　from　the　corruption　of
the　body；　and　also　to　give　men　the　hope　of　another　life　after
death；　as　also　because　the　premises　from　which　the　immortality
of　the　soul　may　be　deduced　depend　on　an　elucidation　of　a
plete　system　of　Physics。　　This　would　mean　to　establish　in
the　first　place　that　all　substances　generally　that　is　to　say
all　things　which　cannot　exist　without　being　created　by　God￥are
in　their　nature　incorruptible；　and　that　they　can　never　cease
to　exist　unless　God；　in　denying　to　them　his　concurrence；
reduce　them　to　nought；　and　secondly　that　body；　regarded
generally；　is　a　substance；　which　is　the　reason　why　it　also
cannot　perish；　but　that　the　human　body；　inasmuch　as　it　differs
from　other　bodies；　is　posed　only　of　a　certain　configuration
of　members　and　of　other　similar　accidents；　while　the　human
mind　is　not　similarly　posed　of　any　accidents；　but　is　a　pure
substance。　　For　although　all　the　accidents　of　mind　be　changed；
although；　for　instance；　it　think　certain　things；　will　others；
perceive　others；　etc。；　despite　all　this　it　does　not　emerge
from　these　changes　another　mind：　　the　human　body　on　the　other
hand　bees　a　different　thing　from　the　sole　fact　that　the
figure　or　form　of　any　of　its　portions　is　found　to　be　changed。
From　this　it　follows　that　the　human　body　may　indeed　easily
enough　perish；　but　the　mind　＇or　soul　of　man　（I　make　no
distinction　between　them）＇　is　owing　to　its　nature　immortal。
　　　　　In　the　third　Meditation　it　seems　to　me　that　I　have
explained　at　sufficient　length　the　principal　argument　of　which
I　make　use　in　order　to　prove　the　existence　of　God。　　But　none
the　less；　because　I　did　not　wish　in　that　place　to　make　use　of
any　parisons　derived　from　corporeal　things；　so　as　to
withdraw　as　much　as　I　could　the　minds　of　readers　from　the
senses；　there　may　perhaps　have　remained　many　obscurities
which；　however；　will；　I　hope；　be　entirely　removed　by　the
Replies　which　I　have　made　to　the　Objections　which　have　been
set　before　me。　　Amongst　others　there　is；　for　example；　this
one；　〃How　the　idea　in　us　of　a　being　supremely　perfect
possesses　so　much　objective　reality　＇that　is　to　say
participates　by　representation　in　so　many　degrees　of　being　and
perfection＇