笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第21章

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some　truth。
　　　　　But　certainly　although　in　regard　to　the　dropsical　body　it
is　only　so　to　speak　to　apply　an　extrinsic　term　when　we　say
that　its　nature　is　corrupted；　inasmuch　as　apart　from　the　need
to　drink；　the　throat　is　parched；　yet　in　regard　to　the
posite　whole；　that　is　to　say；　to　the　mind　or　soul　united　to
this　body；　it　is　not　a　purely　verbal　predicate；　but　a　real
error　of　nature；　for　it　to　have　thirst　when　drinking　would　be
hurtful　to　it。　　And　thus　it　still　remains　to　inquire　how　the
goodness　of　God　does　not　prevent　the　nature　of　man　so　regarded
from　being　fallacious。
　　　　　In　order　to　begin　this　examination；　then；　I　here　say；　in
the　first　place；　that　there　is　a　great　difference　between　mind
and　body；　inasmuch　as　body　is　by　nature　always　divisible；　and
the　mind　is　entirely　indivisible。　　For；　as　a　matter　of　fact；
when　I　consider　the　mind；　that　is　to　say；　myself　inasmuch　as　I
am　only　a　thinking　thing；　I　cannot　distinguish　in　myself　any
parts；　but　apprehend　myself　to　be　clearly　one　and　entire；　and
although　the　whole　mind　seems　to　be　united　to　the　whole　body；
yet　if　a　foot；　or　an　arm；　or　some　other　part；　is　separated
from　my　body；　I　am　aware　that　nothing　has　been　taken　away　from
my　mind。　　And　the　faculties　of　willing；　feeling；　conceiving；
etc。　cannot　be　properly　speaking　said　to　be　its　parts；　for　it
is　one　and　the　same　mind　which　employs　itself　in　willing　and
in　feeling　and　understanding。　　But　it　is　quite　otherwise　with
corporeal　or　extended　objects；　for　there　is　not　one　of　these
imaginable　by　me　which　my　mind　cannot　easily　divide　into
parts；　and　which　consequently　I　do　not　recognise　as　being
divisible；　this　would　be　sufficient　to　teach　me　that　the　mind
or　soul　of　man　is　entirely　different　from　the　body；　if　I　had
not　already　learned　it　from　other　sources。
　　　　　I　further　notice　that　the　mind　does　not　receive　the
impressions　from　all　parts　of　the　body　immediately；　but　only
from　the　brain；　or　perhaps　even　from　one　of　its　smallest
parts；　to　wit；　from　that　in　which　the　mon　sense27　is　said
to　reside；　which；　whenever　it　is　disposed　in　the　same
particular　way；　conveys　the　same　thing　to　the　mind；　although
meanwhile　the　other　portions　of　the　body　may　be　differently
disposed；　as　is　testified　by　innumerable　experiments　which　it
is　unnecessary　here　to　recount。
　　　　　I　notice；　also；　that　the　nature　of　body　is　such　that　none
of　its　parts　can　be　moved　by　another　part　a　little　way　off
which　cannot　also　be　moved　in　the　same　way　by　each　one　of　the
parts　which　are　between　the　two；　although　this　more　remote
part　does　not　act　at　all。　　As；　for　example；　in　the　cord　ABCD
＇which　is　in　tension＇　if　we　pull　the　last　part　D；　the　first
part　A　will　not　be　moved　in　any　way　differently　from　what
would　be　the　case　if　one　of　the　intervening　parts　B　or　C　were
pulled；　and　the　last　part　D　were　to　remain　unmoved。　　And　in
the　same　way；　when　I　feel　pain　in　my　foot；　my　knowledge　of
physics　teaches　me　that　this　sensation　is　municated　by
means　of　nerves　dispersed　through　the　foot；　which；　being
extended　like　cords　from　there　to　the　brain；　when　they　are
contracted　in　the　foot；　at　the　same　time　contract　the　inmost
portions　of　the　brain　which　is　their　extremity　and　place　of
origin；　and　then　excite　a　certain　movement　which　nature　has
established　in　order　to　cause　the　mind　to　be　affected　by　a
sensation　of　pain　represented　as　existing　in　the　foot。　　But
because　these　nerves　must　pass　through　the　tibia；　the　thigh；
the　loins；　the　back　and　the　neck；　in　order　to　reach　from　the
leg　to　the　brain；　it　may　happen　that　although　their
extremities　which　are　in　the　foot　are　not　affected；　but　only
certain　ones　of　their　intervening　parts　＇which　pass　by　the
loins　or　the　neck＇；　this　action　will　excite　the　same　movement
in　the　brain　that　might　have　been　excited　there　by　a　hurt
received　in　the　foot；　in　consequence　of　which　the　mind　will
necessarily　feel　in　the　foot　the　same　pain　as　if　it　had
received　a　hurt。　　And　the　same　holds　good　of　all　the　other
perceptions　of　our　senses。
　　　　　I　notice　finally　that　since　each　of　the　movements　which
are　in　the　portion　of　the　brain　by　which　the　mind　is
immediately　affected　brings　about　one　particular　sensation
only；　we　cannot　under　the　circumstances　imagine　anything　more
likely　than　that　this　movement；　amongst　all　the　sensations
which　it　is　capable　of　impressing　on　it；　causes　mind　to　be
affected　by　that　one　which　is　best　fitted　and　most　generally
useful　for　the　conservation　of　the　human　body　when　it　is　in
health。　　But　　experience　makes　us　aware　that　all　the　feelings
with　which　nature　inspires　us　are　such　as　I　have　just　spoken
of；　and　there　is　therefore　nothing　in　them　which　does　not　give
testimony　to　the　power　and　goodness　of　the　God　＇who　has
produced　them28＇。　　Thus；　for　example；　when　the　nerves　which
are　in　the　feet　are　violently　or　more　than　usually　moved；
their　movement；　passing　through　the　medulla　of　the　spine29　to
the　inmost　parts　of　the　brain；　gives　a　sign　to　the　mind　which
makes　it　feel　somewhat；　to　wit；　pain；　as　though　in　the　foot；
by　which　the　mind　is　excited　to　do　its　utmost　to　remove　the
cause　of　the　evil　as　dangerous　and　hurtful　to　the　foot。　　It　is
true　that　God　could　have　constituted　the　nature　of　man　in　such
a　way　that　this　same　movement　in　the　brain　would　have　conveyed
something　quite　different　to　the　mind；　for　example；　it　might
have　produced　consciousness　of　itself　either　in　so　far　as　it
is　in　the　brain；　or　as　it　is　in　the　foot；　or　as　it　is　in　some
other　place　between　the　foot　and　the　brain；　or　it　might
finally　have　produced　consciousness　of　anything　else
whatsoever；　but　none　of　all　this　would　have　contributed　so
well　to　the　conservation　of　the　body。　　Similarly；　when　we
desire　to　drink；　a　certain　dryness　of　the　throat　is　produced
which　moves　its　nerves；　and　by　their　means　the　internal
portions　of　the　brain；　and　this　movement　causes　in　the　mind
the　sensation　of　thirst；　because　in　this　case　there　is　nothing
more　useful　to　us　than　to　bee　aware　that　we　have　need　to
drink　for　the　conservation　o　our　health；　and　the　same　holds
good　in　other　instances。
　　　　　From　this　it　is　quite　clear　that；　notwithstanding　the
supreme　goodness　of　God；　the　nature　of　man；　inasmuch　as　it　is
posed　of　mind　and　body；　cannot　be　otherwise　than　sometimes
a　source　of　deception。　　For　if　there　is　any　cause　which
excites；　not　in　the　foot　but　in　some　part　of　the　nerves　which
are　extended　between　the　foot　and　the　brain；　or　even　in　the
brain　itself；　the　same　movement　which　usually　is　produced　when
the　foot　is　detrimentally　affected；　pain　will　be　experienced
as　though　it　were　in　the　foot；　and　the　sense　will　thus
naturally　be　deceived；　for　since　the　same　movement　in　the
brain　is　capable　of　causing　but　one　sensation　in　the　mind；　and
this　sensation　is　much　more　frequently　excited　by　a　cause
which　hurts　the　foot　than　by　another　existing　in　some　other
quarter；　it　is　reasonable　that　it　should　convey　to　the　mind
pain　in　the　foot　rather　than　in　any　other　part　of　the　body。
And　although　the　parchedness　of　the　throat　does　not　always
proceed；　as　it　usually　does；　from　the　fact　that　drinking　is
necessary　for　the　health　of　the　body；　but　sometimes　es　from
quite　a　different　cause；　as　is　the　case　with　dropsical
patients；　it　is　yet　much　better　that　it　should　mislead　on　this
occasion　than　if；　on　the　other　hand；　it　were　always　to　deceive
us　when　the　body　is　in　good　health；　and　so　on　in　similar
cases。
　　　　　And　certainly　this　consideration　is　of　great　service　to
me；　not　only　in　enabling　me　to　recognise　all　the　errors　to
which　my　nature　is　subject；　but　also　in　enabling　me　to　avoid
them　or　to　correct　them　more　easily。　　for　knowing　that　all　my
senses　more　frequently　indicate　to　me　truth　than　falsehood
respecting　the　things　which　concern　that　which　is　beneficial
to　the　body；　and　being　able　almost　always　to　avail　myself　of
many　of　them　in　order　to　examine　one　particular　thing；　and；
besides　that；　being　able　to　make　use　of　my　memory　in　order　to
connect　the　present　with　the　past；　and　of　my　understanding
which　already　has　discovered　all　the　causes　of　my　errors；　I
ought　no　longer　to　fear　that　falsity　may　be　found　in　matters
every　day　presented　to　me　by　my　senses。　　And　I　ought　to　set
aside　all