笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第2章

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and　dependence　on　that　which　precedes）；　nevertheless；　because
they　are　somewhat　lengthy；　and　demand　a　mind　wholly　devoted
to　their　consideration；　they　are　only　taken　in　and　understood
by　a　very　limited　number　of　persons。　　Similarly；　although　I
judge　that　those　of　which　I　here　make　use　are　equal　to；　or
even　surpass　in　certainty　and　evidence；　the　demonstrations　of
Geometry；　I　yet　apprehend　that　they　cannot　be　adequately
understood　by　many；　both　because　they　are　also　a　little
lengthy　and　dependent　the　one　on　the　other；　and　principally
because　they　demand　a　mind　wholly　free　of　prejudices；　and　one
which　can　be　easily　detached　from　the　affairs　of　the　senses。
And；　truth　to　say；　there　are　not　so　many　in　the　world　who　are
fitted　for　metaphysical　speculations　as　there　are　for　those　of
Geometry。　　And　more　than　that；　there　is　still　this　difference；
that　in　Geometry；　since　each　one　is　persuaded　that　nothing
must　be　advanced　of　which　there　is　not　a　certain
demonstration；　those　who　are　not　entirely　adepts　more
frequently　err　in　approving　what　is　false；　in　order　to　give
the　impression　that　they　understand　it；　than　in　refuting　the
true。　　But　the　case　is　different　in　philosophy　where　everyone
believes　that　all　is　problematical；　and　few　give　themselves　to
the　search　after　truth；　and　the　greater　number；　in　their
desire　to　acquire　a　reputation　for　boldness　of　thought；
arrogantly　bat　the　most　important　of　truths3。
　　　　　　That　is　why；　whatever　force　there　may　be　in　my
reasonings；　seeing　they　belong　to　philosophy；　I　cannot　hope
that　they　will　have　much　effect　on　the　minds　of　men；　unless
you　extend　to　them　your　protection。　　But　the　estimation　in
which　you　pany　is　universally　held　is　so　great；　and　the
name　of　SORBONNE　carries　with　it　so　much　authority；　that；　next
to　the　Sacred　Councils；　never　has　such　deference　been　paid　to
the　judgment　of　any　Body；　not　only　in　what　concerns　the　faith；
but　also　in　what　regards　human　philosophy　as　well：　　everyone
indeed　believes　that　it　is　not　possible　to　discover　elsewhere
more　perspicacity　and　solidity；　or　more　integrity　and　wisdom
in　pronouncing　judgment。　　For　this　reason　I　have　no　doubt　that
if　you　deign　to　take　the　trouble　in　the　first　place　of
correcting　this　work　（for　being　conscious　not　only　of　my
infirmity；　but　also　of　my　ignorance；　I　should　not　dare　to
state　that　it　was　free　from　errors）；　and　then；　after　adding　to
it　these　things　that　are　lacking　to　it；　pleting　those　which
are　imperfect；　and　yourselves　taking　the　trouble　to　give　a
more　ample　explanation　of　those　things　which　have　need　of　it；
or　at　least　making　me　aware　of　the　defects　so　that　I　may　apply
myself　to　remedy　them　when　this　is　done　and　when　finally　the
reasonings　by　which　I　prove　that　there　is　a　God；　and　that　the
human　soul　differs　from　the　body；　shall　be　carried　to　that
point　of　perspicuity　to　which　I　am　sure　they　can　be　carried　in
order　that　they　may　be　esteemed　as　perfectly　exact
demonstrations；　if　you　deign　to　authorize　your　approbation　and
to　render　public　testimony　to　their　truth　and　certainty；　I　do
not　doubt；　I　say；　that　henceforward　all　the　errors　and　false
opinions　which　have　ever　existed　regarding　these　two　questions
will　soon　be　effaced　from　the　minds　of　men。　　For　the　truth
itself　will　easily　cause　all　men　of　mind　and　learning　to
subscribe　to　your　judgment；　and　your　authority　will　cause　the
atheists；　who　are　usually　more　arrogant　than　learned　or
judicious；　to　rid　themselves　of　their　spirit　of　contradiction
or　lead　them　possibly　themselves　to　defend　the　reasonings
which　they　find　being　received　as　demonstrations　by　all
persons　of　consideration；　lest　they　appear　not　to　understand
them。　　And；　finally；　all　others　will　easily　yield　to　such　a
mass　of　evidence；　and　there　will　be　none　who　dares　to　doubt
the　existence　of　God　and　the　real　and　true　distinction　between
the　human　soul　and　the　body。　　It　is　for　you　now　in　your
singular　wisdom　to　judge　of　the　importance　of　the
establishment　of　such　beliefs　＇you　who　see　the　disorders
produced　by　the　doubt　of　them＇5　。　　But　it　would　not　bee　me
to　say　more　in　consideration　of　the　cause　of　God　and　religion
to　those　who　have　always　been　the　most　worthy　supports　of　the
Catholic　Church。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Preface　to　the　Reader
　　　　　
　　　　　I　have　already　slightly　touched　on　these　two　questions　of
God　and　the　human　soul　in　the　Discourse　on　the　Method　of
rightly　conducting　the　Reason　and　seeking　truth　in　the
Sciences；　published　in　French　in　the　year　1637。　　Not　that　I
had　the　design　of　treating　these　with　any　thoroughness；　but
only　so　to　speak　in　passing；　and　in　order　to　ascertain　by　the
judgment　of　the　readers　how　I　should　treat　them　later　on。　　For
these　questions　have　always　appeared　to　me　to　be　of　such
importance　that　I　judged　it　suitable　to　speak　of　them　more
than　once；　and　the　road　which　I　follow　in　the　explanation　of
them　is　so　little　trodden；　and　so　far　removed　from　the
ordinary　path；　that　I　did　not　judge　it　to　be　expedient　to　set
it　forth　at　length　in　French　and　in　a　Discourse　which　might　be
read　by　everyone；　in　case　the　feebler　minds　should　believe
that　it　was　permitted　to　them　to　attempt　to　follow　the　same
path。
　　　　　But；　having　in　this　Discourse　on　Method　begged　all　those
who　have　found　in　my　writings　somewhat　deserving　of　censure　to
do　me　the　favour　of　acquainting　me　with　the　grounds　of　it；
nothing　worthy　of　remark　has　been　objected　to　in　them　beyond
two　matters：　　to　these　two　I　wish　here　to　reply　in　a　few　words
before　undertaking　their　more　detailed　discussion。
　　　　　The　first　objection　is　that　it　does　not　follow　from　the
fact　that　the　human　mind　reflecting　on　itself　does　not
perceive　itself　to　be　other　than　a　thing　that　thinks；　that　its
nature　or　its　essence　consists　only　in　its　being　a　thing　that
thinks；　in　the　sense　that　this　word　only　excludes　all　other
things　which　might　also　be　supposed　to　pertain　to　the　nature
of　the　soul。　　To　this　objection　I　reply　that　it　was　not　my
intention　in　that　place　to　exclude　these　in　accordance　with
the　order　that　looks　to　the　truth　of　the　matter　（as　to　which　I
was　not　then　dealing）；　but　only　in　accordance　with　the　order
of　my　thought　＇perception＇；　thus　my　meaning　was　that　so　far　as
I　was　aware；　I　knew　nothing　clearly　as　belonging　to　my
essence；　excepting　that　I　was　a　thing　that　thinks；　or　a　thing
that　has　in　itself　the　faculty　of　thinking。　　But　I　shall　show
hereafter　how　from　the　fact　that　I　know　no　other　thing　which
pertains　to　my　essence；　it　follows　that　there　is　no　other
thing　which　really　does　belong　to　it。
　　　　　The　second　objection　is　that　it　does　not　follow　from　the
fact　that　I　have　in　myself　the　idea　of　something　more　perfect
than　I　am；　that　this　idea　is　more　perfect　than　I；　and　much
less　that　what　is　represented　by　this　idea　exists。　　But　I
reply　that　in　this　term　idea　there　is　here　something
equivocal；　for　it　may　either　be　taken　materially；　as　an　act　of
my　understanding；　and　in　this　sense　it　cannot　be　said　that　it
is　more　perfect　than　I；　or　it　may　be　taken　objectively；　as　the
thing　which　is　represented　by　this　act；　which；　although　we　do
not　suppose　it　to　exist　outside　of　my　understanding；　may；　none
the　less；　be　more　perfect　than　I；　because　of　its　essence。　　And
in　following　out　this　Treatise　I　shall　show　more　fully　how；
from　the　sole　fact　that　I　have　in　myself　the　idea　of　a　thing
more　perfect　than　myself；　it　follows　that　this　thing　truly
exists。
　　　　　In　addition　to　these　two　objections　I　have　also　seen　two
fairly　lengthy　works　on　this　subject；　which；　however；　did　not
so　much　impugn　my　reasonings　as　my　conclusions；　and　this　by
arguments　drawn　from　the　ordinary　atheistic　sources。　　But；
because　such　arguments　cannot　make　any　impression　on　the　minds
of　those　who　really　understand　my　reasonings；　and　as　the
judgments　of　many　are　so　feeble　and　irrational　that　they　very
often　allow　themselves　to　be　persuaded　by　the　opinions　which
they　have　first　formed；　however　false　and　far　removed　from
reason　they　may　be；　rather　than　by　a　true　and　solid　but
subsequently　received　refutation　of　these　opinions；　I　do　not
desire　to　reply　here　to　their　criticisms　in　case　of　being
first　of　all　obliged　to　state　them。　　I　shall　only　say　in
general　that　all　th