笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第17章
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mind were not pre…occupied with prejudices； and if my thought
did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual
pressure of sensible things； there would be nothing which I
could know more immediately and more easily than Him。 For is
there anything more manifest than that there is a God； that is
to say； a Supreme Being； to whose essence alone existence
pertains？21
And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need
of a strenuous application of mind； at present I not only feel
myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most
certain； but I also remark that the certainty of all other
things depends on it so absolutely； that without this
knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly。
For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I
understand anything very clearly and distinctly； I am
naturally impelled to believe it to be true； yet because I am
also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly
fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly； and
as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at
the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to
make it； it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present
themselves to me； which would easily cause me to change my
opinion； if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of
God； and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge； but
only vague and vacillating opinions。 Thus； for example； when
I consider the nature of a ＇rectilinear＇ triangle； I who have
some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise
quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right
angles； and it is not possible for me not to believe this so
long as I apply my mind to its demonstration； but so soon as I
abstain from attending to the proof； although I still
recollect having clearly prehended it； it may easily occur
that I e to doubt its truth； if I am ignorant of there
being a God。 For I can persuade myself of having been so
constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in
those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the
greatest evidence and certainty； especially when I recollect
that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain
which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be
altogether false。
But after I have recognised that there is a God￥because
at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend
upon Him； and that He is not a deceiver； and from that have
inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot
fail to be true￥although I no longer pay attention to the
reasons for which I have judged this to be true； provided that
I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no
contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause
me to doubt of its truth； and thus I have a true and certain
knowledge of it。 And this same knowledge extends likewise to
all other things which I recollect having formerly
demonstrated； such as the truths of geometry and the like； for
what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in
doubt？ Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me
to be frequently deceived？ But I already know that I cannot
be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly。
Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true
and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false？
But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these
things； and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure
myself of the truth； I had been impelled to give my assent
from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong
than I had at the time imagined them to be。 What further
objection can then be raised？ That possibly I am dreaming （an
objection I myself made a little while ago）； or that all the
thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies
of my dreams？ But even though I slept the case would be the
same； for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely
true。
And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and
truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the
true God； in so much that； before I knew Him； I could not have
a perfect knowledge of any other thing。 And now that I know
Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an
infinitude of things； not only of those which relate to God
Himself and other intellectual matters； but also of those
which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the
object of pure mathematics ＇which have no concern with whether
it exists or not＇。
Meditation VI。
Of the Existence of Material Things； and of the real
distinction between the Soul and Body of Man。
Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether
material things exist。 And certainly I at least know that
these may exist in so far as they are considered as the
objects of pure mathematics； since in this aspect I perceive
them clearly and distinctly。 For there is no doubt that God
possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of
perceiving with distinctness； and I have never deemed that
anything was impossible for Him； unless I found a
contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly。 Further；
the faculty of imagination which I possess； and of which；
experience tells me； I make use when I apply myself to the
consideration of material things； is capable of persuading me
of their existence； for when I attentively consider what
imagination is； I find that it is nothing but a certain
application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is
immediately present to it； and which therefore exists。
And to render this quite clear； I remark in the first
place the difference that exists between the imagination and
pure intellection ＇or conception23＇。 For example； when I
imagine a triangle； I do not conceive it only as a figure
prehended by three lines； but I also apprehend24 these
three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my
mind；25 and this is what I call imagining。 But if I desire to
think of a chiliagon； I certainly conceive truly that it is a
figure posed of a thousand sides； just as easily as I
conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides
only； but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a
chiliagon ＇as I do the three sides of a triangle＇； nor do I；
so to speak； regard them as present ＇with the eyes of my
mind＇。 And although in accordance with the habit I have
formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I
think of corporeal things； it may happen that in imagining a
chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure； yet it
is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon； since it
in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I
think of a myriagon or any other many…sided figure； nor does
it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to
form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons。
But if the question turns upon a pentagon； it is quite true
that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon
without the help of my imagination； but I can also imagine it
by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five
sides； and at the same time to the space which they enclose。
And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular
effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination； such
as I do not require in order to understand； and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference
which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26
I remark besides that this power of imagination which is
in one； inasmuch as it differs from the power of
understanding； is in no wise a necessary element in my nature；
or in ＇my essence； that is to say； in＇ the essence of my mind；
for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever
remain the same as I now am； from which it appears that we
might conclude that it depends on something which differs from
me。 And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which
my mind is conjoined and united in such a way tha
