笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第13章
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and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God； if
God did not veritably exist￥a God； I say； whose idea is in me；
i。e。 who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our
mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them
all； who is liable to no errors or defect ＇and who has none of
all those marks which denote imperfection＇。 From this it is
manifest that He cannot be a deceiver； since the light of
nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed
from some defect。
But before I examine this matter with more care； and pass
on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived
from it； it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to
contemplate God Himself； to ponder at leisure His marvellous
attributes； to consider； and admire； and adore； the beauty of
this light so resplendent； at least as far as the strength of
my mind； which is in some measure dazzled by the sight； will
allow me to do so。 For just as faith teaches us that the
supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this
contemplation of the Divine Majesty； so we continue to learn
by experience that a similar meditation； though inparably
less perfect； causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of
which we are capable in this life。
Meditation IV。
Of the True and the False。
I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my
mind from my senses； and I have accurately observed that there
are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting
corporeal objects； that there are many more which are known to
us respecting the human mind； and yet more still regarding God
Himself； so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract
my thoughts from the consideration of ＇sensible or＇ imaginable
objects； and carry them to those which； being withdrawn from
all contact with matter； are purely intelligible。 And
certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch
as it is a thinking thing； and not extended in length； width
and depth； nor participating in anything pertaining to body；
is inparably more distinct than is the idea of any
corporeal thing。 And when I consider that I doubt； that is to
say； that I am an inplete and dependent being； the idea of
a being that is plete and independent； that is of God；
presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and
clearness￥and from the fact alone that this idea is found in
me； or that I who possess this idea exist； I conclude so
certainly that God exists； and that my existence depends
entirely on Him in every moment of my life￥that I do not think
that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more
evidence and certitude。 And it seems to me that I now have
before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of
the true God （in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom
are contained） to the knowledge of the other objects of the
universe。
For； first of all； I recognise it to be impossible that
He should ever deceive me； for in all fraud and deception some
imperfection is to be found； and although it may appear that
the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power； yet the
desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or
feebleness； and accordingly cannot be found in God。
In the next place I experienced in myself a certain
capacity for judging which I have doubtless received from God；
like all the other things that I possess； and as He could not
desire to deceive me； it is clear that He has not given me a
faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright。
And no doubt respecting this matter could remain； if it
were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can
thus never be deceived； for if I hold all that I possess from
God； and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error； it
seems as though I could never fall into error。 And it is true
that when I think only of God ＇and direct my mind wholly to
Him＇；18 I discover ＇in myself＇ no cause of error； or falsity；
yet directly afterwards； when recurring to myself； experience
shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude of
errors； as to which； when we e to investigate them more
closely； I notice that not only is there a real and positive
idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection present to my
mind； but also； so to speak； a certain negative idea of
nothing； that is； of that which is infinitely removed from any
kind of perfection； and that I am in a sense something
intermediate between God and nought； i。e。 placed in such a
manner between the supreme Being and non…being； that there is
in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a
sovereign Being has formed me； but that； as I in some degree
participate likewise in nought or in non…being； i。e。 in so far
as I am not myself the supreme Being； and as I find myself
subject to an infinitude of imperfections； I ought not to be
astonished if I should fall into error。 Thus do I recognise
that error； in so far as it is such； is not a real thing
depending on God； but simply a defect； and therefore； in order
to fall into it； that I have no need to possess a special
faculty given me by God for this very purpose； but that I fall
into error from the fact that the power given me by God for
the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not
infinite。
Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me； for error is
not a pure negation ＇i。e。 is not the dimple defect or want of
some perfection which ought not to be mine＇； but it is a lack
of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess。 And
on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me
possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not
perfect of its kind； that is； which is wanting in some
perfection due to it。 For if it is true that the more skilful
the artizan； the more perfect is the work of his hands； what
can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things
that is not in all its parts perfect？ And certainly there is
no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never
have been subject to error； it is also certain that He ever
wills what is best； is it then better that I should be subject
to err than that I should not？
In considering this more attentively； it occurs to me in
the first place that I should not be astonished if my
intelligence is not capable of prehending why God acts as
He does； and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His
existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other
things besides this as to which I am able to understand
neither for what reason nor how God has produced them。 For；
in the first place； knowing that my nature is extremely feeble
and limited； and that the nature of God is on the contrary
immense； inprehensible； and infinite； I have no further
difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of
matter in His power； the causes of which transcend my
knowledge； and this reason suffices to convince me that the
species of cause termed final； finds no useful employment in
physical ＇or natural＇ things； for it does not appear to me
that I can without temerity seek to investigate the
＇inscrutable＇ ends of God。
It further occurs to me that we should not consider one
single creature separately； when we inquire as to whether the
works of God are perfect； but should regard all his creations
together。 For the same thing which might possibly seem very
imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself；
is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole
universe； and although； since I resolved to doubt all things；
I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that
of God； nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite
power of God； I cannot deny that He may have produced many
other things； or at least that He has the power of producing
them； so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great
universe。
Whereupon； regarding myself more closely； and considering
what are my errors （for they alone testify to there being any
imperfection in me）； I answer that they depend on a
