笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第11章

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as　something　real　and　positive　will　not　be　improperly　termed
false；　and　the　same　holds　good　of　other　similar　ideas。
　　　　　To　these　it　is　certainly　not　necessary　that　I　should
attribute　any　author　other　than　myself。　　For　if　they　are
false；　i。e。　if　they　represent　things　which　do　not　exist；　the
light　of　nature　shows　me　that　they　issue　from　nought；　that　is
to　say；　that　they　are　only　in　me　so　far　as　something　is
lacking　to　the　perfection　of　my　nature。　　But　if　they　are　true；
nevertheless　because　they　exhibit　so　little　reality　to　me　that
I　cannot　even　clearly　distinguish　the　thing　represented　from
non…being；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　they　should　not　be
produced　by　myself。
　　　　　As　to　the　clear　and　distinct　idea　which　I　have　of
corporeal　things；　some　of　them　seem　as　though　I　might　have
derived　them　from　the　idea　which　I　possess　of　myself；　as　those
which　I　have　of　substance；　duration；　number；　and　such　like。
For　＇even＇　when　I　think　that　a　stone　is　a　substance；　or　at
least　a　thing　capable　of　existing　of　itself；　and　that　I　am　a
substance　also；　although　I　conceive　that　I　am　a　thing　that
thinks　and　not　one　that　is　extended；　and　that　the　stone　on　the
other　hand　is　an　extended　thing　which　does　not　think；　and　that
thus　there　is　a　notable　difference　between　the　two
conceptions￥they　seem；　nevertheless；　to　agree　in　this；　that
both　represent　substances。　　In　the　same　way；　when　I　perceive
that　I　now　exist　and　further　recollect　that　I　have　in　former
times　existed；　and　when　I　remember　that　I　have　various
thoughts　of　which　I　can　recognise　the　number；　I　acquire　ideas
of　duration　and　number　which　I　can　afterwards　transfer　to　any
object　that　I　please。　　But　as　to　all　the　other　qualities　of
which　the　ideas　of　corporeal　things　are　posed；　to　wit；
extension；　figure；　situation　and　motion；　it　is　true　that　they
are　not　formally　in　me；　since　I　am　only　a　thing　that　thinks；
but　because　they　are　merely　certain　modes　of　substance　＇and　so
to　speak　the　vestments　under　which　corporeal　substance　appears
to　us＇　and　because　I　myself　am　also　a　substance；　it　would　seem
that　they　might　be　contained　in　me　eminently。
　　　　　Hence　there　remains　only　the　idea　of　God；　concerning
which　we　must　consider　whether　it　is　something　which　cannot
have　proceeded　from　me　myself。　　By　the　name　God　I　understand　a
substance　that　is　infinite　＇eternal；　immutable＇；　independent；
all…knowing；　all…powerful；　and　by　which　I　myself　and
everything　else；　if　anything　else　does　exist；　have　been
created。　　Now　all　these　characteristics　are　such　that　the　more
diligently　I　attend　to　them；　the　less　do　they　appear　capable
of　proceeding　from　me　alone；　hence；　from　what　has　been　already
said；　we　must　conclude　that　God　necessarily　exists。
　　　　　For　although　the　idea　of　substance　is　within　me　owing　to
the　fact　that　I　am　substance；　nevertheless　I　should　not　have
the　idea　of　an　infinite　substance￥since　I　am　finite￥if　it　had
not　proceeded　from　some　substance　which　was　veritably
infinite。
　　　　　Nor　should　I　imagine　that　I　do　not　perceive　the　infinite
by　a　true　idea；　but　only　by　the　negation　of　the　finite；　just
as　I　perceive　repose　and　darkness　by　the　negation　of　movement
and　of　light；　for；　on　the　contrary；　I　see　that　there　is
manifestly　more　reality　in　infinite　substance　than　in　finite；
and　therefore　that　in　some　way　I　have　in　me　the　notion　of　the
infinite　earlier　then　the　finite￥to　wit；　the　notion　of　God
before　that　of　myself。　　For　how　would　it　be　possible　that　I
should　know　that　I　doubt　and　desire；　that　is　to　say；　that
something　is　lacking　to　me；　and　that　I　am　not　quite　perfect；
unless　I　had　within　me　some　idea　of　a　Being　more　perfect　than
myself；　in　parison　with　which　I　should　recognise　the
deficiencies　of　my　nature？
　　　　　And　we　cannot　say　that　this　idea　of　God　is　perhaps
materially　false　and　that　consequently　I　can　derive　it　from
nought　＇i。e。　that　possibly　it　exists　in　me　because　I　am
imperfect＇；　as　I　have　just　said　is　the　case　with　ideas　of
heat；　cold　and　other　such　things；　for；　on　the　contrary；　as
this　idea　is　very　clear　and　distinct　and　contains　within　it
more　objective　reality　than　any　other；　there　can　be　none　which
is　of　itself　more　true；　nor　any　in　which　there　can　be　less
suspicion　of　falsehood。　　The　idea；　I　say；　of　this　Being　who　is
absolutely　perfect　and　infinite；　is　entirely　true；　for
although；　perhaps；　we　can　imagine　that　such　a　Being　does　not
exist；　we　cannot　nevertheless　imagine　that　His　idea　represents
nothing　real　to　me；　as　I　have　said　of　the　idea　of　cold。　　This
idea　is　also　very　clear　and　distinct；　since　all　that　I
conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　of　the　real　and　the　true；　and
of　what　conveys　some　perfection；　is　in　its　entirety　contained
in　this　idea。　　And　this　does　not　cease　to　be　true　although　I
do　not　prehend　the　infinite；　or　though　in　God　there　is　an
infinitude　of　things　which　I　cannot　prehend；　nor　possibly
even　reach　in　any　way　by　thought；　for　it　is　of　the　nature　of
the　infinite　that　my　nature；　which　is　finite　and　limited；
should　not　prehend　it；　and　it　is　sufficient　that　I　should
understand　this；　and　that　I　should　judge　that　all　things　which
I　clearly　perceive　and　in　which　I　know　that　there　is　some
perfection；　and　possibly　likewise　an　infinitude　of　properties
of　which　I　am　ignorant；　are　in　God　formally　or　eminently；　so
that　the　idea　which　I　have　of　Him　may　bee　the　most　true；
most　clear；　and　most　distinct　of　all　the　ideas　that　are　in　my
mind。
　　　　　But　possibly　I　am　something　more　than　I　suppose　myself　to
be；　and　perhaps　all　those　perfections　which　I　attribute　to　God
are　in　some　way　potentially　in　me；　although　they　do　not　yet
disclose　themselves；　or　issue　in　action。　　As　a　matter　of　fact
I　am　already　sensible　that　my　knowledge　increases　＇and
perfects　itself＇　little　by　little；　and　I　see　nothing　which　can
prevent　it　from　increasing　more　and　more　into　infinitude；　nor
do　I　see；　after　it　has　thus　been　increased　＇or　perfected＇；
anything　to　prevent　my　being　able　to　acquire　by　its　means　all
the　other　perfections　of　the　Divine　nature；　nor　finally　why
the　power　I　have　of　acquiring　these　perfections；　if　it　really
exists　in　me；　shall　not　suffice　to　produce　the　ideas　of　them。
　　　　　At　the　same　time　I　recognise　that　this　cannot　be。　　For；
in　the　first　place；　although　it　were　true　that　every　day　my
knowledge　acquired　new　degrees　of　perfection；　and　that　there
were　in　my　nature　many　things　potentially　which　are　not　yet
there　actually；　nevertheless　these　excellences　do　not　pertain
to　＇or　make　the　smallest　approach　to＇　the　idea　which　I　have　of
God　in　whom　there　is　nothing　merely　potential　＇but　in　whom　all
is　present　really　and　actually＇；　for　it　is　an　infallible　token
of　imperfection　in　my　knowledge　that　it　increases　little　by
little。　　and　further；　although　my　knowledge　grows　more　and
more；　nevertheless　I　do　not　for　that　reason　believe　that　it
can　ever　be　actually　infinite；　since　it　can　never　reach　a
point　so　high　that　it　will　be　unable　to　attain　to　any　greater
increase。　　But　I　understand　God　to　be　actually　infinite；　so
that　He　can　add　nothing　to　His　supreme　perfection。　　And
finally　I　perceive　that　the　objective　being　of　an　idea　cannot
be　produced　by　a　being　that　exists　potentially　only；　which
properly　speaking　is　nothing；　but　only　by　a　being　which　is
formal　or　actual。
　　　　　To　speak　the　truth；　I　see　nothing　in　all　that　I　have　just
said　which　by　the　light　of　nature　is　not　manifest　to　anyone
who　desires　to　think　attentively　on　the　subject；　but　when　I
slightly　relax　my　attention；　my　mind；　finding　its　vision
somewhat　obscured　and　so　to　speak　blinded　by　the　images　of
sensible　objects；　I　do　not　easily　recollect　the　reason　why　the
idea　that　I　possess　of　a　being　more　perfect　then　I；　must
necessarily　have　been　placed　in　me　by　a　being　which　is　really
more　perfect；　and　this　is　why　I　wish　here　to　go　on　to　inquire
whether　I；　who　have　this　idea；　can　exist　if　no　such　being
exists。
　　　　　And　I　ask；　from　whom　do　I　then　derive　my　existence？
Perhaps　from　myself　or　from　my　parents；　or　from　some　other
source　less　perfect　than　God；　for　we　can　imagine　nothing　more
perfect　than　God；　or　even　as　perfect　as　He　is。
　　　　　But　＇were　I　independent　of　every　other　and＇　were　I　myself
the　author　of　my　being；　I　should　doubt　nothing　a