democracy in america-1-第88章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Democratic republics liable to perish from a misuse of their power； and not by impotence … The Governments of the American republics are more centralized and more energetic than those of the monarchies of Europe … Dangers resulting from this … Opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson upon this point。
Governments usually fall a sacrifice to impotence or to tyranny。 In the former case their power escapes from them； it is wrested from their grasp in the latter。 Many observers； who have witnessed the anarchy of democratic States； have imagined that the government of those States was naturally weak and impotent。 The truth is； that when once hostilities are begun between parties； the government loses its control over society。 But I do not think that a democratic power is naturally without force or without resources： say； rather； that it is almost always by the abuse of its force and the misemployment of its resources that a democratic government fails。 Anarchy is almost always produced by its tyranny or its mistakes； but not by its want of strength。
It is important not to confound stability with force； or the greatness of a thing with its duration。 In democratic republics； the power which directs *e society is not stable； for it often changes hands and assumes a new direction。 But whichever way it turns； its force is almost irresistible。 The Governments of the American republics appear to me to be as much centralized as those of the absolute monarchies of Europe； and more energetic than they are。 I do not； therefore； imagine that they will perish from weakness。 *f
＇Footnote e： This power may be centred in an assembly； in which case it will be strong without being stable； or it may be centred in an individual； in which case it will be less strong； but more stable。＇
＇Footnote f： I presume that it is scarcely necessary to remind the reader here； as well as throughout the remainder of this chapter； that I am speaking； not of the Federal Government； but of the several governments of each State； which the majority controls at its pleasure。＇
If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed； that event may be attributed to the unlimited authority of the majority； which may at some future time urge the minorities to desperation； and oblige them to have recourse to physical force。 Anarchy will then be the result； but it will have been brought about by despotism。
Mr。 Hamilton expresses the same opinion in the 〃Federalist；〃 No。 51。 〃It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers； but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part。 Justice is the end of government。 It is the end of civil society。 It ever has been； and ever will be； pursued until it be obtained； or until liberty be lost in the pursuit。 In a society； under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker； anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature； where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger： and as in the latter state even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves； so in the former state will the more powerful factions be gradually induced by a like motive to wish for a government which will protect all parties； the weaker as well as the more powerful。 It can be little doubted that； if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself； the insecurity of right under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of the factious majorities； that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it。〃
Jefferson has also thus expressed himself in a letter to Madison： *g 〃The executive power in our Government is not the only； perhaps not even the principal； object of my solicitude。 The tyranny of the Legislature is really the danger most to be feared； and will continue to be so for many years to come。 The tyranny of the executive power will come in its turn； but at a more distant period。〃 I am glad to cite the opinion of Jefferson upon this subject rather than that of another； because I consider him to be the most powerful advocate democracy has ever sent forth。
＇Footnote g： March 15； 1789。＇
Chapter XVI： Causes Mitigating Tyranny In The United States … Part I
Chapter Summary
The national majority does not pretend to conduct all business … Is obliged to employ the town and county magistrates to execute its supreme decisions。
I have already pointed out the distinction which is to be made between a centralized government and a centralized administration。 The former exists in America； but the latter is nearly unknown there。 If the directing power of the American communities had both these instruments of government at its disposal； and united the habit of executing its own commands to the right of commanding； if； after having established the general principles of government； it descended to the details of public business； and if； having regulated the great interests of the country； it could penetrate into the privacy of individual interests； freedom would soon be banished from the New World。
But in the United States the majority； which so frequently displays the tastes and the propensities of a despot； is still destitute of the more perfect instruments of tyranny。 In the American republics the activity of the central Government has never as yet been extended beyond a limited number of objects sufficiently prominent to call forth its attention。 The secondary affairs of society have never been regulated by its authority； and nothing has hitherto betrayed its desire of interfering in them。 The majority is become more and more absolute； but it has not increased the prerogatives of the central government； those great prerogatives have been confined to a certain sphere； and although the despotism of the majority may be galling upon one point； it cannot be said to extend to all。 However the predominant party in the nation may be carried away by its passions； however ardent it may be in the pursuit of its projects； it cannot oblige all the citizens to comply with its desires in the same manner and at the same time throughout the country。 When the central Government which represents that majority has issued a decree； it must entrust the execution of its will to agents； over whom it frequently has no control； and whom it cannot perpetually direct。 The townships； municipal bodies； and counties may therefore be looked upon as concealed break…waters； which check or part the tide of popular excitement。 If an oppressive law were passed； the liberties of the people would still be protected by the means by which that law would be put in execution： the majority cannot descend to the details and （as I will venture to style them） the puerilities of administrative tyranny。 Nor does the people entertain that full consciousness of its authority which would prompt it to interfere in these matters； it knows the extent of its natural powers； but it is unacquainted with the increased resources which the art of government might furnish。
This point deserves attention； for if a democratic republic similar to that of the United States were ever founded in a country where the power of a single individual had previously subsisted； and the effects of a centralized administration had sunk deep into the habits and the laws of the people； I do not hesitate to assert； that in that country a more insufferable despotism would prevail than any which now exists in the monarchical States of Europe； or indeed than any which could be found on this side of the confines of Asia。
The Profession Of The Law In The United States Serves To Counterpoise The Democracy
Utility of discriminating the natural propensities of the members of the legal profession … These men called upon to act a prominent part in future society …In what manner the peculiar pursuits of lawyers give an aristocratic turn to their ideas … Acci
