democracy in america-1-第68章

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who　fail；　the　consequences　of　their　disappointed　ambition　may　prove　most　disastrous；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　the　legal　struggle　can　be　repeated　within　a　short　space　of　time；　the　defeated　parties　take　patience。　　When　elections　occur　frequently；　their　recurrence　keeps　society　in　a　perpetual　state　of　feverish　excitement；　and　imparts　a　continual　instability　to　public　affairs。　


Thus；　on　the　one　hand　the　State　is　exposed　to　the　perils　of　a　revolution；　on　the　other　to　perpetual　mutability；　the　former　system　threatens　the　very　existence　of　the　Government；　the　latter　is　an　obstacle　to　all　steady　and　consistent　policy。　　The　Americans　have　preferred　the　second　of　these　evils　to　the　first；　but　they　were　led　to　this　conclusion　by　their　instinct　much　more　than　by　their　reason；　for　a　taste　for　variety　is　one　of　the　characteristic　passions　of　democracy。　　An　extraordinary　mutability　has；　by　this　means；　been　introduced　into　their　legislation。　　Many　of　the　Americans　consider　the　instability　of　their　laws　as　a　necessary　consequence　of　a　system　whose　general　results　are　beneficial。　　But　no　one　in　the　United　States　affects　to　deny　the　fact　of　this　instability；　or　to　contend　that　it　is　not　a　great　evil。

Hamilton；　after　having　demonstrated　the　utility　of　a　power　which　might　prevent；　or　which　might　at　least　impede；　the　promulgation　of　bad　laws；　adds：　〃It　might　perhaps　be　said　that　the　power　of　preventing　bad　laws　includes　that　of　preventing　good　ones；　and　may　be　used　to　the　one　purpose　as　well　as　to　the　other。　　But　this　objection　will　have　little　weight　with　those　who　can　properly　estimate　the　mischiefs　of　that　inconstancy　and　mutability　in　the　laws　which　form　the　greatest　blemish　in　the　character　and　genius　of　our　governments。〃　（Federalist；　No。　73。）　And　again　in　No。　62　of　the　same　work　he　observes：　〃The　facility　and　excess　of　law…making　seem　to　be　the　diseases　to　which　our　governments　are　most　liable。　。　。　。　The　mischievous　effects　of　the　mutability　in　the　public　councils　arising　from　a　rapid　succession　of　new　members　would　fill　a　volume：　every　new　election　in　the　States　is　found　to　change　one…half　of　the　representatives。　　From　this　change　of　men　must　proceed　a　change　of　opinions　and　of　measures；　which　forfeits　the　respect　and　confidence　of　other　nations；　poisons　the　blessings　of　liberty　itself；　and　diminishes　the　attachment　and　reverence　of　the　people　toward　a　political　system　which　betrays　so　many　marks　of　infirmity。〃　

Jefferson　himself；　the　greatest　Democrat　whom　the　democracy　of　America　has　yet　produced；　pointed　out　the　same　evils。　　〃The　instability　of　our　laws；〃　said　he　in　a　letter　to　Madison；　〃is　really　a　very　serious　inconvenience。　　I　think　that　we　ought　to　have　obviated　it　by　deciding　that　a　whole　year　should　always　be　allowed　to　elapse　between　the　bringing　in　of　a　bill　and　the　final　passing　of　it。　　It　should　afterward　be　discussed　and　put　to　the　vote　without　the　possibility　of　making　any　alteration　in　it；　and　if　the　circumstances　of　the　case　required　a　more　speedy　decision；　the　question　should　not　be　decided　by　a　simple　majority；　but　by　a　majority　of　at　least　two…thirds　of　both　houses。〃

Public　Officers　Under　The　Control　Of　The　Democracy　In　America　　Simple　exterior　of　the　American　public　officers　…　No　official　costume　…　All　public　officers　are　remunerated　…　Political　consequences　of　this　system　…　No　public　career　exists　in　America　…　Result　of　this。

Public　officers　in　the　United　States　are　commingled　with　the　crowd　of　citizens；　they　have　neither　palaces；　nor　guards；　nor　ceremonial　costumes。　This　simple　exterior　of　the　persons　in　authority　is　connected　not　only　with　the　peculiarities　of　the　American　character；　but　with　the　fundamental　principles　of　that　society。　　In　the　estimation　of　the　democracy　a　government　is　not　a　benefit；　but　a　necessary　evil。　　A　certain　degree　of　power　must　be　granted　to　public　officers；　for　they　would　be　of　no　use　without　it。　　But　the　ostensible　semblance　of　authority　is　by　no　means　indispensable　to　the　conduct　of　affairs；　and　it　is　needlessly　offensive　to　the　susceptibility　of　the　public。　　The　public　officers　themselves　are　well　aware　that　they　only　enjoy　the　superiority　over　their　fellow…citizens　which　they　derive　from　their　authority　upon　condition　of　putting　themselves　on　a　level　with　the　whole　community　by　their　manners。　　A　public　officer　in　the　United　States　is　uniformly　civil；　accessible　to　all　the　world；　attentive　to　all　requests；　and　obliging　in　his　replies。　　I　was　pleased　by　these　characteristics　of　a　democratic　government；　and　I　was　struck　by　the　manly　independence　of　the　citizens；　who　respect　the　office　more　than　the　officer；　and　who　are　less　attached　to　the　emblems　of　authority　than　to　the　man　who　bears　them。

I　am　inclined　to　believe　that　the　influence　which　costumes　really　exercise；　in　an　age　like　that　in　which　we　live；　has　been　a　good　deal　exaggerated。　　I　never　perceived　that　a　public　officer　in　America　was　the　less　respected　whilst　he　was　in　the　discharge　of　his　duties　because　his　own　merit　was　set　off　by　no　adventitious　signs。　　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　very　doubtful　whether　a　peculiar　dress　contributes　to　the　respect　which　public　characters　ought　to　have　for　their　own　position；　at　least　when　they　are　not　otherwise　inclined　to　respect　it。　　When　a　magistrate　（and　in　France　such　instances　are　not　rare）　indulges　his　trivial　wit　at　the　expense　of　the　prisoner；　or　derides　the　predicament　in　which　a　culprit　is　placed；　it　would　be　well　to　deprive　him　of　his　robes　of　office；　to　see　whether　he　would　recall　some　portion　of　the　natural　dignity　of　mankind　when　he　is　reduced　to　the　apparel　of　a　private　citizen。　

A　democracy　may；　however；　allow　a　certain　show　of　magisterial　pomp；　and　clothe　its　officers　in　silks　and　gold；　without　seriously　compromising　its　principles。　　Privileges　of　this　kind　are　transitory；　they　belong　to　the　place；　and　are　distinct　from　the　individual：　but　if　public　officers　are　not　uniformly　remunerated　by　the　State；　the　public　charges　must　be　entrusted　to　men　of　opulence　and　independence；　who　constitute　the　basis　of　an　aristocracy；　and　if　the　people　still　retains　its　right　of　election；　that　election　can　only　be　made　from　a　certain　class　of　citizens。　　When　a　democratic　republic　renders　offices　which　had　formerly　been　remunerated　gratuitous；　it　may　safely　be　believed　that　the　State　is　advancing　to　monarchical　institutions；　and　when　a　monarchy　begins　to　remunerate　such　officers　as　had　hitherto　been　unpaid；　it　is　a　sure　sign　that　it　is　approaching　toward　a　despotic　or　a　republican　form　of　government。　The　substitution　of　paid　for　unpaid　functionaries　is　of　itself；　in　my　opinion；　sufficient　to　constitute　a　serious　revolution。

I　look　upon　the　entire　absence　of　gratuitous　functionaries　in　America　as　one　of　the　most　prominent　signs　of　the　absolute　dominion　which　democracy　exercises　in　that　country。　　All　public　services；　of　whatsoever　nature　they　may　be；　are　paid；　so　that　every　one　has　not　merely　the　right；　but　also　the　means　of　performing　them。　　Although；　in　democratic　States；　all　the　citizens　are　qualified　to　occupy　stations　in　the　Government；　all　are　not　tempted　to　try　for　them。　　The　number　and　the　capacities　of　the　candidates　are　more　apt　to　restrict　the　choice　of　electors　than　the　coneitions　of　the　candidateship。

In　nations　in　which　the　principle　of　election　extends　to　every　place　in　the　State　no　political　career　can；　properly　speaking；　be　said　to　exist。　　Men　are　promoted　as　if　by　chance　to　the　rank　which　they　enjoy；　and　they　are　by　no　means　sure　of　retaining　it。　　The　consequence　is　that　in　tranquil　times　public　functions　offer　but　few　lures　to　ambition。　　In　the　United　States　the　persons　who　engage　in　the　perplexities　of　political　life　are　individuals　of　very　moderate　pretensions。　　The　pursuit　of　wealth　generally　diverts　men　of　great　talents　and　of　great　passions　from　the　pursuit　of　power；　and　it　very　frequently　happens　that　a　man　does　not　undertake　to　direct　the　fortune　of　the　State　until　he　has　discovered　his　incompetence　to　conduct　his　own　affairs。　The　vast　number　of　very　ordinary　men　who　occupy　public　stations　is　quite　as　attributable　to　these　causes　as　to　the　bad　choice　of　the　democracy。　　In　the　United　States；　I　am　not　sure　that　the　people　would　return　the　men　of　superior　abilit