democracy in america-1-第43章

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Accidental　Causes　Which　May　Increase　The　Influence　Of　The　Executive　Government

External　security　of　the　Union　…　Army　of　six　thousand　men　…　Few　ships　…　The　President　has　no　opportunity　of　exercising　his　great　prerogatives　…　In　the　prerogatives　he　exercises　he　is　weak。　

If　the　executive　government　is　feebler　in　America　than　in　France；　the　cause　is　more　attributable　to　the　circumstances　than　to　the　laws　of　the　country。

It　is　chiefly　in　its　foreign　relations　that　the　executive　power　of　a　nation　is　called　upon　to　exert　its　skill　and　its　vigor。　　If　the　existence　of　the　Union　were　perpetually　threatened；　and　if　its　chief　interests　were　in　daily　connection　with　those　of　other　powerful　nations；　the　executive　government　would　assume　an　increased　importance　in　proportion　to　the　measures　expected　of　it；　and　those　which　it　would　carry　into　effect。　　The　President　of　the　United　States　is　the　commander…in…chief　of　the　army；　but　of　an　army　composed　of　only　six　thousand　men；　he　commands　the　fleet；　but　the　fleet　reckons　but　few　sail；　he　conducts　the　foreign　relations　of　the　Union；　but　the　United　States　are　a　nation　without　neighbors。　　Separated　from　the　rest　of　the　world　by　the　ocean；　and　too　weak　as　yet　to　aim　at　the　dominion　of　the　seas；　they　have　no　enemies；　and　their　interests　rarely　come　into　contact　with　those　of　any　other　nation　of　the　globe。

The　practical　part　of　a　Government　must　not　be　judged　by　the　theory　of　its　constitution。　　The　President　of　the　United　States　is　in　the　possession　of　almost　royal　prerogatives；　which　he　has　no　opportunity　of　exercising；　and　those　privileges　which　he　can　at　present　use　are　very　circumscribed。　　The　laws　allow　him　to　possess　a　degree　of　influence　which　circumstances　do　not　permit　him　to　employ。

On　the　other　hand；　the　great　strength　of　the　royal　prerogative　in　France　arises　from　circumstances　far　more　than　from　the　laws。　　There　the　executive　government　is　constantly　struggling　against　prodigious　obstacles；　and　exerting　all　its　energies　to　repress　them；　so　that　it　increases　by　the　extent　of　its　achievements；　and　by　the　importance　of　the　events　it　controls；　without　modifying　its　constitution。　　If　the　laws　had　made　it　as　feeble　and　as　circumscribed　as　it　is　in　the　Union；　its　influence　would　very　soon　become　still　more　preponderant。

Why　The　President　Of　The　United　States　Does　Not　Require　The　Majority　Of　The　Two　Houses　In　Order　To　Carry　On　The　Government　　It　is　an　established　axiom　in　Europe　that　a　constitutional　King　cannot　persevere　in　a　system　of　government　which　is　opposed　by　the　two　other　branches　of　the　legislature。　　But　several　Presidents　of　the　United　States　have　been　known　to　lose　the　majority　in　the　legislative　body　without　being　obliged　to　abandon　the　supreme　power；　and　without　inflicting　a　serious　evil　upon　society。　I　have　heard　this　fact　quoted　as　an　instance　of　the　independence　and　the　power　of　the　executive　government　in　America：　a　moment's　reflection　will　convince　us；　on　the　contrary；　that　it　is　a　proof　of　its　extreme　weakness。

A　King　in　Europe　requires　the　support　of　the　legislature　to　enable　him　to　perform　the　duties　imposed　upon　him　by　the　Constitution；　because　those　duties　are　enormous。　　A　constitutional　King　in　Europe　is　not　merely　the　executor　of　the　law；　but　the　execution　of　its　provisions　devolves　so　completely　upon　him　that　he　has　the　power　of　paralyzing　its　influence　if　it　opposes　his　designs。　He　requires　the　assistance　of　the　legislative　assemblies　to　make　the　law；　but　those　assemblies　stand　in　need　of　his　aid　to　execute　it：　these　two　authorities　cannot　subsist　without　each　other；　and　the　mechanism　of　government　is　stopped　as　soon　as　they　are　at　variance。

In　America　the　President　cannot　prevent　any　law　from　being　passed；　nor　can　he　evade　the　obligation　of　enforcing　it。　　His　sincere　and　zealous　co…operation　is　no　doubt　useful；　but　it　is　not　indispensable；　in　the　carrying　on　of　public　affairs。　　All　his　important　acts　are　directly　or　indirectly　submitted　to　the　legislature；　and　of　his　own　free　authority　he　can　do　but　little。　　It　is　therefore　his　weakness；　and　not　his　power；　which　enables　him　to　remain　in　opposition　to　Congress。　　In　Europe；　harmony　must　reign　between　the　Crown　and　the　other　branches　of　the　legislature；　because　a　collision　between　them　may　prove　serious；　in　America；　this　harmony　is　not　indispensable；　because　such　a　collision　is　impossible。

Election　Of　The　President


Dangers　of　the　elective　system　increase　in　proportion　to　the　extent　of　the　prerogative　…　This　system　possible　in　America　because　no　powerful　executive　authority　is　required　…　What　circumstances　are　favorable　to　the　elective　system　…　Why　the　election　of　the　President　does　not　cause　a　deviation　from　the　principles　of　the　Government　…　Influence　of　the　election　of　the　President　on　secondary　functionaries。

The　dangers　of　the　system　of　election　applied　to　the　head　of　the　executive　government　of　a　great　people　have　been　sufficiently　exemplified　by　experience　and　by　history；　and　the　remarks　I　am　about　to　make　refer　to　America　alone。　　These　dangers　may　be　more　or　less　formidable　in　proportion　to　the　place　which　the　executive　power　occupies；　and　to　the　importance　it　possesses　in　the　State；　and　they　may　vary　according　to　the　mode　of　election　and　the　circumstances　in　which　the　electors　are　placed。　The　most　weighty　argument　against　the　election　of　a　chief　magistrate　is；　that　it　offers　so　splendid　a　lure　to　private　ambition；　and　is　so　apt　to　inflame　men　in　the　pursuit　of　power；　that　when　legitimate　means　are　wanting　force　may　not　unfrequently　seize　what　right　denied。　

It　is　clear　that　the　greater　the　privileges　of　the　executive　authority　are；　the　greater　is　the　temptation；　the　more　the　ambition　of　the　candidates　is　excited；　the　more　warmly　are　their　interests　espoused　by　a　throng　of　partisans　who　hope　to　share　the　power　when　their　patron　has　won　the　prize。　The　dangers　of　the　elective　system　increase；　therefore；　in　the　exact　ratio　of　the　influence　exercised　by　the　executive　power　in　the　affairs　of　State。　The　revolutions　of　Poland　were　not　solely　attributable　to　the　elective　system　in　general；　but　to　the　fact　that　the　elected　monarch　was　the　sovereign　of　a　powerful　kingdom。　　Before　we　can　discuss　the　absolute　advantages　of　the　elective　system　we　must　make　preliminary　inquiries　as　to　whether　the　geographical　position；　the　laws；　the　habits；　the　manners；　and　the　opinions　of　the　people　amongst　whom　it　is　to　be　introduced　will　admit　of　the　establishment　of　a　weak　and　dependent　executive　government；　for　to　attempt　to　render　the　representative　of　the　State　a　powerful　sovereign；　and　at　the　same　time　elective；　is；　in　my　opinion；　to　entertain　two　incompatible　designs。　To　reduce　hereditary　royalty　to　the　condition　of　an　elective　authority；　the　only　means　that　I　am　acquainted　with　are　to　circumscribe　its　sphere　of　action　beforehand；　gradually　to　diminish　its　prerogatives；　and　to　accustom　the　people　to　live　without　its　protection。　　Nothing；　however；　is　further　from　the　designs　of　the　republicans　of　Europe　than　this　course：　as　many　of　them　owe　their　hatred　of　tyranny　to　the　sufferings　which　they　have　personally　undergone；　it　is　oppression；　and　not　the　extent　of　the　executive　power；　which　excites　their　hostility；　and　they　attack　the　former　without　perceiving　how　nearly　it　is　connected　with　the　latter。　

Hitherto　no　citizen　has　shown　any　disposition　to　expose　his　honor　and　his　life　in　order　to　become　the　President　of　the　United　States；　because　the　power　of　that　office　is　temporary；　limited；　and　subordinate。　　The　prize　of　fortune　must　be　great　to　encourage　adventurers　in　so　desperate　a　game。　　No　candidate　has　as　yet　been　able　to　arouse　the　dangerous　enthusiasm　or　the　passionate　sympathies　of　the　people　in　his　favor；　for　the　very　simple　reason　that　when　he　is　at　the　head　of　the　Government　he　has　but　little　power；　but　little　wealth；　and　but　little　glory　to　share　amongst　his　friends；　and　his　influence　in　the　State　is　too　small　for　the　success　or　the　ruin　of　a　faction　to　depend　upon　the　elevation　of　an　individual　to　power。

The　great　advantage　of　hereditary　monarchies　is；　that　as　the　private　interest　of　a　family　is　always　intimately　connected　with　the　interests　of　the　State；　the　executive　government　is　never　sus