the.world.is.flat-第34章
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Japan； being right next door to China； has taken a very aggressive approach to
internalizing the China challenge。 Osamu Watanabe； chairman of the Japan External
Trade Organization （JETRO）； Japan's official organ for promoting exports； told me
in Tokyo； 〃China is developing very rapidly and making the shift from low…grade
products to high…grade； high…tech ones。〃 As a result； added Watanabe； Japanese
companies； to remain globally competitive； have had to shift some production and a
lot of assembly of middle…range products to China； while shifting at home to making
〃even higher value…added products。〃 So China and Japan 〃are becoming part of the same
supply chain。〃 After a prolonged recession； Japan's economy started to bounce back
in 2003； due to the sale of thousands of tons of machinery； assembly robots； and other
critical components in China。 In 2003； China replaced the United States as the biggest
importer of Japanese products。 Still； the Japanese government is urging its companies
to be careful not to overinvest in China。 It encourages them to practice what Watanabe
called a 〃China plus one〃 strategy： to keep one production leg in China but the other
in
a different Asian country…just in case political turmoil unflattens China one day。
This China flattener has been wrenching for certain manufacturing workers around the
world； but a godsend for all consumers。 Fortune magazine （October 4； 2004） quoted
a study by Morgan Stanley estimating that since the mid…1990s alone； cheap imports
from China have saved U。S。 consumers roughly 600 billion and have saved U。S。
manufacturers untold billions in cheaper parts for their products。 This savings； in
turn； Fortune noted； has helped the Federal Reserve to hold down interest rates longer；
giving more Americans a chance to buy homes or refinance the ones they have； and giving
businesses more capital to invest in new innovations。
In an effort to better understand how offshoring to China works； I sat down in Beijing
with Jack Perkowski of ASIMCO； a pioneer in this form of collaboration。 If they ever
have a category in the Olympics called 〃extreme capitalism；〃 bet on Perkowski to win
the gold。 In 1988 he stepped down as a top investment banker at Paine Webber and went
to a leverage buyout firm； but two years later； at age forty…two； decided it was time
for a new challenge。 With some partners； he raised 150 million to buy companies in
China and headed off for the adventure of his life。 Since then he has lost and remade
millions of dollars； learned every lesson the hard way； but survived to become a
powerful example of what offshoring to China is all about and what a powerful
collaborative tool it can become。
〃When I first startedback in1992…1993； everyone thoughtthe hard part was toactually
find and gain access to opportunities in China；〃 recalled Perkowski。 It turned out
that there were opportunities aplenty but a critical shortage of Chinese managers
who understood how to run an auto parts factory along capitalist lines； with an
emphasis on exports and making world…class products for the Chinese market。 As
Perkowski put it； the easy part was setting up shop in China。 The hard part was getting
the right local managers who could run the store。 So when he initially started buying
majority ownership in Chinese auto parts companies； Perkowski began by importing
managers from abroad。 Bad idea。 It was too expensive； and operating in China was just
too foreign for foreigners。 Scratch plan A。
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〃So we sent all the expats home； which gave me problems with my investor base； and
went to plan B；〃 he said。 〃We then tried to convert the 'Old China' managers who
typically came along with the plants we bought； but that didn't work either。 They
were simply too used to working in a planned economy where they never had to deal
with the marketplace； just deliver their quotas。 Those managers who did have an
entrepreneurial flair got drunk on their first sip of capitalism and were ready to
try anything。
〃The Chinese are very entrepreneurial；〃 said Perkowski； 〃but back then； before China
joined the WTO； there was no rule of law and no bond or stock market to restrain this
entrepreneurialism。 Your only choices were managers from the state…owned sector； who
were very bureaucratic； or managers from the first wave of private companies； who
were practicing cowboy capitalism。 Neither is where you want to be。 If your managers
are too bureaucratic； you can't get anything done…they just give excuses about how
China is different…and if they are too entrepreneurial； you can't sleep at night；
because you have no idea what they are going to do。〃 Perkowski had a lot of sleepless
nights。
One of his first purchases in China was an interest in a company making rubber parts。
When he subsequently reached an agreement with his Chinese partner to purchase his
shares in the company； the Chinese partner signed a noncompete clause as part of the
transaction。 As soon as the deal closed； however； the Chinese partner went out and
opened a new factory。 〃Noncompete〃 did not quite translate into Mandarin。 Scratch
plan B。
Meanwhile； Perkowski's partnership was hemorrhaging money… Perkowski's tuition for
learning how to do business in China…and he found himself owning a string of Chinese
auto parts factories。 〃Around 1997 was the low point；〃 he said。 〃Our company as a
whole was shrinking and we were not profitable。 While some of our companies were doing
okay； we were generally in tough shape。 Although we had majority ownership and could
theoretically put anyone on the field that we wanted； I looked at my ＇managerial＇
bench and I had no one to put in the game。〃 Time for plan C。
〃We essentially concluded that； while we liked China； we wanted no
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part of'Old China；' and instead wanted to place our bets on 'New China' managers；〃
said Perkowski。 〃We began looking for a new breed of Chinese managers who were
open…minded and had gotten some form of management training。 We were looking for
individuals who were experienced at operating in China and yet were familiar with
how the rest of the world operated and knew where China had to go。 So between 1997
and 1999； we recruited a whole team of'New China' managers； typically mainland Chinese
who had worked for multinationals； and as these managers came on board； we began one
by one to replace the 'Old China' managers at our companies。〃
Once the new generation of Chinese managers； who understood global markets and
customers and could be united around a shared company vision…and knew China…was in
place； ASIMCO started making a profit。 Today ASIMCO has sales of about 350 million
a year in auto parts from thirteen Chinese factories in nine provinces。 The company
sells to customers in the United States； and it also has thirty…six sales offices
throughout China servicing automakers in that country too。
From this base； Perkowski made his next big move…taking the profits from offshoring
back onshore in America。 〃In April of 2003； we bought the North American camshaft
operations of Federal…Mogul Corporation； an old…line components company that is now
in bankruptcy；〃 said Perkowski。 〃We bought the business first to get access to its
customers； which were primarily the Big Three automakers； plus Caterpillar and
Cummins。 While we have had long…standing relationships with Cat and Cummins … and
this acquisition enhanced our position with them… the camshaft sales to the Big Three
were our first。 The second reason to make the acquisition was to obtain technology
which we could bring back to China。 Like most of the technology that goes into modern
passenger cars and trucks； people take camshaft technology for granted。 However；
camshafts ＇the part of the engine that controls how the pistons go up and down＇ are
highly engineered products which are critical to the performance of the engine。 The
acquisition of this business essentially gave us the know…how and technology that
we could use to become the camshaft leader in China。 As a result； we now have the
best camshaft technology and a customer base both in China
