alcibiades i-第3章

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about　any　particular　art；　but　about　politicswhen　to　fight　and　when　to

make　peace。　　Now；　men　should　fight　and　make　peace　on　just　grounds；　and

therefore　the　question　of　justice　and　injustice　must　enter　into　peace　and

war；　and　he　who　advises　the　Athenians　must　know　the　difference　between

them。　　Does　Alcibiades　know？　　If　he　does；　he　must　either　have　been　taught

by　some　master；　or　he　must　have　discovered　the　nature　of　them　himself。　　If

he　has　had　a　master；　Socrates　would　like　to　be　informed　who　he　is；　that　he

may　go　and　learn　of　him　also。　　Alcibiades　admits　that　he　has　never　learned。　

Then　has　he　enquired　for　himself？　　He　may　have；　if　he　was　ever　aware　of　a

time　when　he　was　ignorant。　　But　he　never　was　ignorant；　for　when　he　played

with　other　boys　at　dice；　he　charged　them　with　cheating；　and　this　implied　a

knowledge　of　just　and　unjust。　　According　to　his　own　explanation；　he　had

learned　of　the　multitude。　　Why；　he　asks；　should　he　not　learn　of　them　the

nature　of　justice；　as　he　has　learned　the　Greek　language　of　them？　　To　this

Socrates　answers；　that　they　can　teach　Greek；　but　they　cannot　teach　justice；

for　they　are　agreed　about　the　one；　but　they　are　not　agreed　about　the　other：　

and　therefore　Alcibiades；　who　has　admitted　that　if　he　knows　he　must　either

have　learned　from　a　master　or　have　discovered　for　himself　the　nature　of

justice；　is　convicted　out　of　his　own　mouth。



Alcibiades　rejoins；　that　the　Athenians　debate　not　about　what　is　just；　but

about　what　is　expedient；　and　he　asserts　that　the　two　principles　of　justice

and　expediency　are　opposed。　　Socrates；　by　a　series　of　questions；　compels

him　to　admit　that　the　just　and　the　expedient　coincide。　　Alcibiades　is　thus

reduced　to　the　humiliating　conclusion　that　he　knows　nothing　of　politics；

even　if；　as　he　says；　they　are　concerned　with　the　expedient。



However；　he　is　no　worse　than　other　Athenian　statesmen；　and　he　will　not　need

training；　for　others　are　as　ignorant　as　he　is。　　He　is　reminded　that　he　has

to　contend；　not　only　with　his　own　countrymen；　but　with　their　enemieswith

the　Spartan　kings　and　with　the　great　king　of　Persia；　and　he　can　only　attain

this　higher　aim　of　ambition　by　the　assistance　of　Socrates。　　Not　that

Socrates　himself　professes　to　have　attained　the　truth；　but　the　questions

which　he　asks　bring　others　to　a　knowledge　of　themselves；　and　this　is　the

first　step　in　the　practice　of　virtue。



The　dialogue　continues：We　wish　to　become　as　good　as　possible。　　But　to　be

good　in　what？　　Alcibiades　replies'Good　in　transacting　business。'　　But

what　business？　　'The　business　of　the　most　intelligent　men　at　Athens。'　　The

cobbler　is　intelligent　in　shoemaking；　and　is　therefore　good　in　that；　he　is

not　intelligent；　and　therefore　not　good；　in　weaving。　　Is　he　good　in　the

sense　which　Alcibiades　means；　who　is　also　bad？　　'I　mean；'　replies

Alcibiades；　'the　man　who　is　able　to　command　in　the　city。'　　But　to　command

whathorses　or　men？　and　if　men；　under　what　circumstances？　　'I　mean　to　say；

that　he　is　able　to　command　men　living　in　social　and　political　relations。'　

And　what　is　their　aim？　　'The　better　preservation　of　the　city。'　　But　when　is

a　city　better？　　'When　there　is　unanimity；　such　as　exists　between　husband

and　wife。'　　Then；　when　husbands　and　wives　perform　their　own　special　duties；

there　can　be　no　unanimity　between　them；　nor　can　a　city　be　well　ordered　when

each　citizen　does　his　own　work　only。　　Alcibiades；　having　stated　first　that

goodness　consists　in　the　unanimity　of　the　citizens；　and　then　in　each　of

them　doing　his　own　separate　work；　is　brought　to　the　required　point　of　self…

contradiction；　leading　him　to　confess　his　own　ignorance。



But　he　is　not　too　old　to　learn；　and　may　still　arrive　at　the　truth；　if　he　is

willing　to　be　cross…examined　by　Socrates。　　He　must　know　himself；　that　is　to

say；　not　his　body；　or　the　things　of　the　body；　but　his　mind；　or　truer　self。

The　physician　knows　the　body；　and　the　tradesman　knows　his　own　business；　but

they　do　not　necessarily　know　themselves。　　Self…knowledge　can　be　obtained

only　by　looking　into　the　mind　and　virtue　of　the　soul；　which　is　the　diviner

part　of　a　man；　as　we　see　our　own　image　in　another's　eye。　　And　if　we　do　not

know　ourselves；　we　cannot　know　what　belongs　to　ourselves　or　belongs　to

others；　and　are　unfit　to　take　a　part　in　political　affairs。　　Both　for　the

sake　of　the　individual　and　of　the　state；　we　ought　to　aim　at　justice　and

temperance；　not　at　wealth　or　power。　　The　evil　and　unjust　should　have　no

power；they　should　be　the　slaves　of　better　men　than　themselves。　　None　but

the　virtuous　are　deserving　of　freedom。



And　are　you；　Alcibiades；　a　freeman？　　'I　feel　that　I　am　not；　but　I　hope；

Socrates；　that　by　your　aid　I　may　become　free；　and　from　this　day　forward　I

will　never　leave　you。'



The　Alcibiades　has　several　points　of　resemblance　to　the　undoubted　dialogues

of　Plato。　　The　process　of　interrogation　is　of　the　same　kind　with　that　which

Socrates　practises　upon　the　youthful　Cleinias　in　the　Euthydemus；　and　he

characteristically　attributes　to　Alcibiades　the　answers　which　he　has

elicited　from　him。　　The　definition　of　good　is　narrowed　by　successive

questions；　and　virtue　is　shown　to　be　identical　with　knowledge。　　Here；　as

elsewhere；　Socrates　awakens　the　consciousness　not　of　sin　but　of　ignorance。

Self…humiliation　is　the　first　step　to　knowledge；　even　of　the　commonest

things。　　No　man　knows　how　ignorant　he　is；　and　no　man　can　arrive　at　virtue

and　wisdom　who　has　not　once　in　his　life；　at　least；　been　convicted　of　error。　

The　process　by　which　the　soul　is　elevated　is　not　unlike　that　which

religious　writers　describe　under　the　name　of　'conversion；'　if　we　substitute

the　sense　of　ignorance　for　the　consciousness　of　sin。



In　some　respects　the　dialogue　differs　from　any　other　Platonic　composition。

The　aim　is　more　directly　ethical　and　hortatory；　the　process　by　which　the

antagonist　is　undermined　is　simpler　than　in　other　Platonic　writings；　and

the　conclusion　more　decided。　　There　is　a　good　deal　of　humour　in　the　manner

in　which　the　pride　of　Alcibiades；　and　of　the　Greeks　generally；　is　supposed

to　be　taken　down　by　the　Spartan　and　Persian　queens；　and　the　dialogue　has

considerable　dialectical　merit。　　But　we　have　a　difficulty　in　supposing　that

the　same　writer；　who　has　given　so　profound　and　complex　a　notion　of　the

characters　both　of　Alcibiades　and　Socrates　in　the　Symposium；　should　have

treated　them　in　so　thin　and　superficial　a　manner　in　the　Alcibiades；　or　that

he　would　have　ascribed　to　the　ironical　Socrates　the　rather　unmeaning　boast

that　Alcibiades　could　not　attain　the　objects　of　his　ambition　without　his

help；　or　that　he　should　have　imagined　that　a　mighty　nature　like　his　could

have　been　reformed　by　a　few　not　very　conclusive　words　of　Socrates。　　For　the

arguments　by　which　Alcibiades　is　reformed　are　not　convincing；　the　writer　of

the　dialogue；　whoever　he　was；　arrives　at　his　idealism　by　crooked　and

tortuous　paths；　in　which　many　pitfalls　are　concealed。　　The　anachronism　of

making　Alcibiades　about　twenty　years　old　during　the　life　of　his　uncle；

Pericles；　may　be　noted；　and　the　repetition　of　the　favourite　observation；

which　occurs　also　in　the　Laches　and　Protagoras；　that　great　Athenian

statesmen；　like　Pericles；　failed　in　the　education　of　their　sons。　　There　is

none　of　the　undoubted　dialogues　of　Plato　in　which　there　is　so　little

dramatic　verisimilitude。





ALCIBIADES　I



by



Plato　（see　Appendix　I　above）



Translated　by　Benjamin　Jowett





PERSONS　OF　THE　DIALOGUE：　　Alcibiades；　Socrates。





SOCRATES：　　I　dare　say　that　you　may　be　surprised　to　find；　O　son　of　Cleinias；

that　I；　who　am　your　first　lover；　not　having　spoken　to　you　for　many　years；

when　the　rest　of　the　world　were　wearying　you　with　their　attentions；　am　the

last　of　your　lovers　who　still　speaks　to　you。　　The　cause　of　my　silence　has

been　that　I　was　hindered　by　a　power　more　than　human；　of　which　I　will　some

day　explain　to　you　the　nature；　this　impediment　has　now　been　removed；　I

therefore　here　present　myself　before　you；　and　I　greatly　hope　that　no