personal memoirs-1-第78章

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he　was　joined　by　Wilson's　mounted　division；　which　had　come　by　a　rapid

march　from　Snicker's　ferry。　　In　the　mean　time　Merritt；　after　his

handsome　engagement　with　Kershaw　near　Front　Royal；　had　been　ordered

back　to　the　neighborhood　of　White　Post；　so　that　my　cavalry　outposts

now　extended　from　this　last　point　around　to　the　west　of　Winchester。



During　all　these　operations　the　enemy　had　a　signal…station　on　Three

Top　Mountain；　almost　overhanging　Strasburg；　from　which　every　movement

made　by　our　troops　could　be　plainly　seen；　therefore；　early　on　the

morning　of　the　17th　he　became　aware　of　the　fact　that　we　were　retiring

down　the　valley；　and　at　once　made　after　us；　and　about　sundown　drove

Torbert　out　of　Winchester；　he　having　been　left　there…with　Wilson　and

Lowell；　and　the　Jersey　brigade　of　the　Sixth　Corps；　to　develop　the

character　of　the　enemy's　pursuit。　　After　a　severe　skirmish　Wilson　and

Lowell　fell　back　to　Summit　Point；　and　the　Jersey　brigade　joined　its

corps　at　the　crossing　of　the　Opequon。　　This　affair　demonstrated　that

Early's　whole　army　had　followed　us　from　Fisher's　Hill；　in　concert

with　Anderson　and　Fitzhugh　Lee　from　Front　Royal；　and　the　two　columns

joined　near　Winchester　the　morning　of　the　18th。



That　day　I　moved　the　Sixth　Corps　by　way　of　Clifton　to　Flowing　Spring；

two　and　a　half　miles　west　of　Charlestown；　on　the　Smithfield　pike；　and

Emory；　with　Dwight's　and　Grower's　divisions　（Grower's　having　joined

that　morning　from　Washington）；　to　a　position　about　the　same　distance

south　of　Charlestown；　on　the　Berryville　pike。　　Following　these

movements；　Merritt　fell　back　to　Berryville；　covering　the　Berryville

pike　crossing　of　the　Opequon；　and　Wilson　was　stationed　at　Summit

Point；　whence　he　held　a　line　along　the　Opequon　as　far　north　as　the

bridge　at　Smithfield。　　Crook　continued　to　hold　on　near　Clifton　until

the　next　day；　and　was　then　moved　into　place　on　the　left　of　Emory。



This　line　was　practically　maintained　till　the　21st；　when　the　enemy；

throwing　a　heavy　force　across　the　Opequon　by　the　bridge　at

Smithfield；　drove　in　my　cavalry　pickets　to　Summit　Point；　and　followed

up　with　a　rapid　advance　against　the　position　of　the　Sixth　Corps　near

Flowing　Spring。　　A　sharp　and　obstinate　skirmish　with　a　heavy　picket…

line　of　the　Sixth　Corps　grew　out　of　this　manoeuvre；　and　resulted　very

much　in　our　favor；　but　the　quick　withdrawal　of　the　Confederates　left

no　opportunity　for　a　general　engagement。　　It　seems　that　General　Early

thought　I　had　taken　position　near　Summit　Point；　and　that　by　moving

rapidly　around　through　Smithfield　he　could　fall　upon　my　rear　in

concert　with　an　attack　in　front　by　Anderson；　but　the　warm　reception

given　him　disclosed　his　error；　for　he　soon　discovered　that　my　line

lay　in　front　of　Charlestown　instead　of　where　he　supposed。



In　the　manoeuvre　Merritt　had　been　attacked　in　front　of　Berryville　and

Wilson　at　Summit　Point；　the　former　by　cavalry　and　the　latter　by

Anderson's　infantry。　　The　exposed　positions　of　Merritt　and　Wilson

necessitated　their　withdrawal　if　I　was　to　continue　to　act　on　the

defensive；　so；　after　the　army　had　moved　back　to　Halltown　the

preceding　night；　without　loss　or　inconvenience；　I　called　them　in　and

posted　them　on　the　right　of　the　infantry。



My　retrograde　move　from　Strasburg　to　Halltown　caused　considerable

alarm　in　the　North；　as　the　public　was　ignorant　of　the　reasons　for　it；

and　in　the　excited　state　of　mind　then　prevailing；　it　was　generally

expected　that　the　reinforced　Confederate　army　would　again　cross　the

Potomac；　ravage　Maryland　and　Pennsylvania；　and　possibly　capture

Washington。　　Mutterings　of　dissatisfaction　reached　me　from　many

sources；　and　loud　calls　were　made　for　my　removal；　but　I　felt

confident　that　my　course　would　be　justified　when　the　true　situation

was　understood；　for　I　knew　that　I　was　complying　with　my　instructions。

Therefore　I　paid　small　heed　to　the　adverse　criticisms　pouring　down

from　the　North　almost　every　day；　being　fully　convinced　that　the　best

course　was　to　bide　my　time；　and　wait　till　I　could　get　the　enemy　into

a　position　from　which　he　could　not　escape　without　such　serious

misfortune　as　to　have　some　bearing　on　the　general　result　of　the　war。

Indeed；　at　this　time　I　was　hoping　that　my　adversary　would　renew　the

boldness　he　had　exhibited　the　early　part　of　the　month；　and　strike　for

the　north　side　of　the　Potomac；　and　wrote　to　General　Grant　on　the　20th

of　August　that　I　had　purposely　left　everything　in　that　direction　open

to　the　enemy。



On　the　22d　the　Confederates　moved　to　Charlestown　and　pushed　well　up

to　my　position　at　Halltown。　　Here　for　the　next　three　days　they

skirmished　with　my　videttes　and　infantry　pickets；　Emory　and　Cook

receiving　the　main　attention；　but　finding　that　they　could　make　no

impression；　and　judging　it　to　be　an　auspicious　time　to　intensify　the

scare　in　the　North；　on　the　25th　of　August　Early　despatched　Fitzhugh

Lee's　cavalry　to　Williamsport；　and　moved　all　the　rest　of　his　army　but

Anderson's　infantry　and　McCausland's　cavalry　to　Kerneysville。　　This

same　day　there　was　sharp　picket　firing　along　the　whole　front　of　my

infantry　line；　arising；　as　afterward　ascertained；　from　a　heavy

demonstration　by　Anderson。　　During　this　firing　I　sent　Torbert；　with

Merritt's　and　Wilson's　divisions；　to　Kerrteysville；　whence　he　was　to

proceed　toward　Leetown　and　learn　what　had　become　of　Fitz。　Lee。



About　a　mile　from　Leetown　Torbert　met　a　small　force　of　Confederate

cavalry；　and　soon　after　encountering　it；　stumbled　on　Breckenridge's

corps　of　infantry　on　the　march；　apparently　heading　for　Shepherdstown。

The　surprise　was　mutual；　for　Torbert　expected　to　meet　only　the

enemy's　cavalry；　while　the　Confederate　infantry　column　was

anticipating　an　unobstructed　march　to　the　Potomac。　　Torbert　attacked

with　such　vigor　as　at　first　to　double　up　the　head　of　Breckenridge's

corps　and　throw　it　into　confusion；　but　when　the　Confederates　realized

that　they　were　confronted　only　by　cavalry；　Early　brought　up　the　whole

of　the　four　infantry　divisions　engaged　in　his　manoeuvre；　and　in　a

sharp　attack　pushed　Torbert　rapidly　back。



All　the　advantages　which　Torbert　had　gained　by　surprising　the　enemy

were　nullified　by　this　counter…attack；　and　he　was　obliged　to　withdraw

Wilson's　division　toward　my　right；　to　the　neighborhood　of　Duffield's

Station；　Merritt　drawing　back　to　the　same　point　by　way　of　the

Shepherdstown　ford。　　Custer's　brigade　becoming　isolated　after　the

fight　while　assisting　the　rear　guard；　was　also　obliged　to　retire；

which　it　did　to　Shepherdstown　and　there　halted；　picketing　the　river

to　Antietam　ford。



When　Torbert　reported　to　me　the　nature　of　his　encounter；　and　that　a

part　of　Early's　infantry　was　marching　to　the　north；　while　Fitzhugh

Lee's　cavalry　had　gone　toward　Martinsburg；　I　thought　that　the

Confederate　general　meditated　crossing　his　cavalry　into　Maryland；　so

I　sent　Wilson　by　way　of　Harper's　Ferry　to　watch　his　movements　from

Boonesboro'；　and　at　the　same　time　directed　Averell；　who　had　reported

from　West　Virginia　some　days　before；　to　take　post　at　Williamsport　and

hold　the　crossing　there　until　he　was　driven　away。　　I　also　thought　it

possible　that　Early　might　cross　the　Potomac　with　his　whole　army；　but

the　doubts　of　a　movement　like　this　outweighed　the　probabilities

favoring　it。　　Nevertheless；　to　meet　such　a　contingency　I　arranged　to

throw　my　army　on　his　rear　should　the　occasion　arise；　and　deeming　my

position　at　Halltown　the　most　advantageous　in　which　to　await

developments；　my　infantry　was　retained　there。



If　General　Early　had　ever　intended　to　cross　the　Potomac；　Torbert's

discovery　of　his　manoeuvre　put　an　end　to　his　scheme　of　invasion；　for

he　well　knew　that　and　success　he　might　derive　from　such　a　course

would　depend　on　his　moving　with　celerity；　and　keeping　me　in　ignorance

of　his　march　till　it　should　be　well　under　way；　so　he　settled　all　the

present　uncertainties　by　retiring　with　all　his　troops　about

Kerneysville　to　his　old　position　at　Bunker　Hill　behind　the　Opequon；

and　on　the　night　of　the　2