personal memoirs-1-第71章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
the cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or Charles
City road; but the continually increasing force of the enemy showed
this to be impracticable。 The long front presented by Hancock's
corps and the cavalry deceived General Lee; and he undoubtedly
thought that nearly all of Grant's army had been moved to the north
side of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred the
most of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary;
thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing us
on the Central and New Market roads。 This was what Grant hoped Lee
would do in case the operations of Hancock and myself became
impracticable; for Grant had an alternative plan for carrying
Petersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a mine
that had been driven under the enemy's works from the front of
Burnside's corps。
Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn the
enemy's left; our attention was directed to keeping up the deception
of Lee; and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock's corps withdrew to
a line nearer the head of the bridge; the cavalry drawing back to a
position on his right。 From now on; all sorts of devices and
stratagems were practicedanything that would tend to make the
Confederates believe we were being reinforced; while Hancock was
preparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time。 In
order to delude the enemy still more after night…fall of the 28th I
sent one of my divisions to the south side of the James; first
covering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tram of the horses
from being heard。 After daylight the next morning; I marched this
division back again on foot; in full view of the enemy; to create the
impression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to the
north side; while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with the
enemy on our extreme right。 These various artifices had the effect
intended; for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all his
infantry to the north bank of the James; except three divisions; and
all his cavalry save one。
The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine and
assault the enemy's works; so after dark on the evening of the 29th
Hancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side to
take part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion; and I
was directed to follow Hancock。 This left me on the north side of
the river confronting two…thirds of Lee's army in a perilous
position; where I could easily be driven into Curl's Neck and my
whole command annihilated。 The situation; therefore; was not a
pleasant one to contemplate; but it could not be avoided。 Luckily
the enemy did not see fit to attack; and my anxiety was greatly
relieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridge
shortly after daylight; having drawn in the different brigades
successively from my right。 By 10 o'clock on the morning of the 3oth
my leading division was well over toward the left of our army in
front of Petersburg; marching with the purpose to get around the
enemy's right flank during the operations that were to succeed the
mine explosion; but when I reached General Meade's headquarters I
found that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when the
enemy's works were blown up in the morning。 Blunder after blunder
had rendered the assault abortive; and all the opportunities opened
by our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost; so
General Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry。
In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command of Major…
General Hancock; who; by seniority; was to control my corps as well
as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on the Virginia
Central railroad。 If this opportunity was gained; I was to cut loose
and damage Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valley in such
manner as best suited the conditions; but my return was not to be
jeopardized nor long delayed。 This necessitated that Hancock's line
should extend to Bottom's bridge on the Chickahominy。 The enemy's
early discovery of the movement and his concentration of troops on
the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing the programme
laid out for him。 Its impracticability was demonstrated early on the
27th; and Hancock's soldierly instincts told him this the moment he
unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market and Charles
City roads。 To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw's position
was strong indeed; but if he carried it there would still remain the
dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safe return; so
with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to the alternative
propositionthe assault on Petersburgfor more significant results。
This was the only occasion during the war in which I was associated
with Hancock in campaign。 Up till then we had seldom met; and that
was the first opportunity I had to observe his quick apprehension;
his physical courage; and the soldierly personality which had long
before established his high reputation。
On the 1st of August; two days after the mine explosion; I was。
relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps; and ordered
to the Shenandoah Valley; where at a later date Torbert's and
Wilson's divisions joined me。 Practically; after I went to the
valley; my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely。
During the period of my immediate control of the corps; I tried to
carry into effect; as far as possible; the views I had advanced
before and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign; i。e。; 〃that
our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry; and our infantry the
enemy's infantry〃; for there was great danger of breaking the spirit
of the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compact
masses of foot…troops posted behind intrenchments; and unless there
was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained;
such a use of it would not be justified。 Immediately succeeding the
battles of the Wilderness; opportunity offered to put this plan into
execution to some extent; and from that time forwardfrom the battle
of Yellow Tavernour success was almost continuous; resulting
finally; before the close of the war; in the nearly total
annihilation of the enemy's cavalry。
The constant activity of the corps from May 5 till August 1 gave
little opportunity for the various division and brigade commanders to
record its work in detail; so there exists but meagre accounts of the
numerous skirmishes and graver conflicts in which; in addition to the
fights mentioned in this narrative; it engaged。 A detailed history
of its performances is not within the province of a work of this
nature; but in review; it can be said; without trespassing on the
reader's time; that the Cavalry Corps led the advance of the Army of
the Potomac into the Wilderness in the memorable campaign of 1864;
that on the expedition by way of Richmond to Haxall's it marked out
the army's line of march to the North Anna; that it again led the
advance to the Tolopotomy; and also to Cold Harbor; holding that
important strategic point at great hazard; and that by the Trevillian
expedition it drew away the enemy's cavalry from the south side of
the Chickahominy; and thereby assisted General Grant materially in
successfully marching to the James River and Petersburg。
Subsequently; Wilson made his march to Staunton bridge; destroying
railroads and supplies of inestimable value; and though this was
neutralized by his disaster near Ream's Station; the temporary set…
back there to one division was soon redeemed by victory over the
Confederate infantry at the battle of Darbytown。
In the campaign we were almost always on the march; night and day;
often unable to care properly for our wounded; and obliged to bury
our dead where they fell; and innumerable combats attest the part the
c