personal memoirs-1-第56章
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custom of using the cavalry for the protection of trains and the
establishment of cordons around the infantry corps; and so far
subordinating its operations to the movements of the main army that
in name only was it a corps at all; but still I thought it my duty to
try。
At first General Meade would hardly listen to my proposition; for he
was filled with the prejudices that; from the beginning of the war;
had pervaded the army regarding the importance and usefulness of
cavalry; General Scott then predicting that the contest would be
settled by artillery; and thereafter refusing the services of
regiment after regiment of mounted troops。 General Meade deemed
cavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty; and wanted to
know what would protect the transportation trains and artillery
reserve; cover the front of moving infantry columns; and secure his
flanks from intrusion; if my policy were pursued。 I told him that if
he would let me use the cavalry as I contemplated; he need have
little solicitude in these respects; for; with a mass of ten thousand
mounted men; it was my belief that I could make it so lively for the
enemy's cavalry that; so far as attacks from it were concerned; the
flanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require little or no
defense; and claimed; further; that moving columns of infantry should
take care of their own fronts。 I also told him that it was my object
to defeat the enemy's cavalry in a general combat; if possible; and
by such a result establish a feeling of confidence in my own troops
that would enable us after awhile to march where we pleased; for the
purpose of breaking General Lee's communications and destroying the
resources from which his army was supplied。
The idea as here outlined was contrary to Meade's convictions; for
though at different times since he commanded the Army of the Potomac
considerable bodies of the cavalry had been massed for some special
occasion; yet he had never agreed to the plan as a permanency; and
could not be bent to it now。 He gave little encouragement;
therefore; to what I proposed; yet the conversation was immediately
beneficial in one way; for when I laid before him the true condition
of the cavalry; he promptly relieved it from much of the arduous and
harassing picket service it was performing; thus giving me about two
weeks in which to nurse the horses before the campaign opened。
The interview also disclosed the fact that the cavalry commander
should be; according to General Meade's views; at his headquarters
practically as one of his staff; through whom he would give detailed
directions as; in his judgment; occasion required。 Meade's ideas and
mine being so widely divergent; disagreements arose between us later
during the battles of the Wilderness; which lack of concord ended in
some concessions on his part after the movement toward Spottsylvania
Court House began; and although I doubt that his convictions were
ever wholly changed; yet from that date on; in the organization of
the Army of the Potomac; the cavalry corps became more of a compact
body; with the same privileges and responsibilities that attached to
the other corpsconditions that never actually existed before。
On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee; who was
occupying a defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan。
After detailing the various detachments which I was obliged to supply
for escorts and other mounted duty; I crossed the river with an
effective force of about 10;000 troopers。 In the interval succeeding
my assignment to the command of the cavalry; I had taken the pains to
study carefully the topography of the country in eastern Virginia;
and felt convinced that; under the policy Meade intended I should
follow; there would be little opportunity for mounted troops to
acquit themselves well in a region so thickly wooded; and traversed
by so many almost parallel streams; but conscious that he would be
compelled sooner or later either to change his mind or partially give
way to the pressure of events; I entered on the campaign with the
loyal determination to aid zealously in all its plans。
General Lee's army was located in its winter quarters behind
intrenchments that lay along the Rapidan for a distance of about
twenty miles; extending from Barnett's to Morton's ford。 The fords
below Morton's were watched by a few small detachments of Confederate
cavalry; the main body of which; however; was encamped below
Hamilton's crossing; where it could draw supplies from the rich
country along the Rappahannock。 Only a few brigades of Lee's
infantry guarded the works along the river; the bulk of it being so
situated that it could be thrown to either flank toward which the
Union troops approached。
General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank; with the
purpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchments
along Mine Run and fight on equal terms。 Grant knew well the
character of country through which he would have to pass; but he was
confident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly wooded
region of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facility
with which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and by
the fact that as he would thus cover Washington; there would be
little or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from his
force at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city。
In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance;
Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford and Wilson at Germania ford。
Torbert's division remained in the rear to cover the trains and
reserve artillery; holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper; and
thence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River。 Gregg crossed
the Rapidan before daylight; in advance of the Second Corps; and when
the latter reached Ely's ford; he pushed on to Chancellorsville;
Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford; and when it reached
the river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by Wilderness
Tavern; as far as Parker's Store; from which point he sent a heavy
reconnoissance toward Mine Run; the rest of his division bivouacking
in a strong position。 I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville and
fixed my headquarters at that place; whereon the 5th I was joined by
Torbert's division。
Meanwhile; General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established his
headquarters not far from Germania ford。 From that point he was in
direct communication with Wilson; whose original instructions from me
carried him only as far as Parker's Store; but it being found; during
the night of the 4th; that the enemy was apparently unacquainted with
the occurrences of the day; Meade directed Wilson to advance in the
direction of Craig's Meeting House; leaving one regiment to hold
Parker's Store。 Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser's
brigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House; and drove it back
rapidly a distance of about two miles; holding it there till noon;
while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson's
Run near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker's Store roads。
Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the Fifth
Corps; and the situation becoming threatening; he withdrew the second
brigade to the position occupied by the first; but scarcely had he
done so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon the
enemy's infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker's Store and cut
off his communication with General Meade。 Surprised at this; he
determined to withdraw to Todd's Tavern; but before his resolution
could be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with a
heavy force; and at the same time began pushing troops down the
Catharpen road。 Wilson was now in a perplexing situation; sandwiched
between the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker's
store and those occu