personal memoirs-1-第41章

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Minty's　troops　directly　on　Spring　Hill；　with　a　view　to　making　some

reprisal；　but　Van　Dorn　had　no　intention　of　accommodating　us；　and

retired　from　Spring　Hill；　offering　but　little　resistance。　　He

continued　to　fall　back；　till　finally　he　got　behind　Duck　River；　where

operations　against　him　ceased；　for；　in　consequence　of　the　incessant

rains　of　the　season；　the　streams　had　become　almost　impassable。

Later；　I　returned　by　way　of　Franklin　to　my　old　camp　at　Murfreesboro'；

passing　over　on　this　march　the　ground　on　which　the　Confederate

General　Hood　met　with　such　disaster　the　following　year　in　his　attack

on　Stanley's　corps。



My　command　had　all　returned　from　the　Franklin　expedition　to

Murfreesboro'　and　gone　into　camp　on　the　Salem　pike　by　the　latter　part

of　March；　from　which　time　till　June　it　took　part　in　only　the　little

affairs　of　outposts　occurring　every　now　and　then　on　my　own　front。　　In

the　meanwhile　General　Rosecrans　had　been　materially　reinforced　by　the

return　of　sick　and　wounded　men；　his　army　had　become　well　disciplined；

and　was　tolerably　supplied；　and　he　was　repeatedly　pressed　by　the

authorities　at　Washington　to　undertake　offensive　operations。



During　the　spring　and　early　summer　Rosecrans　resisted；　with　a　great

deal　of　spirit　and　on　various　grounds；　these　frequent　urgings；　and

out　of　this　grew　up　an　acrimonious　correspondence　and　strained

feeling　between　him　and　General　Halleck。　　Early　in　June；　however；

stores　had　been　accumulated　and　other　preparations　made　for　a　move

forward；　Resecrans　seeming　to　have　decided　that　he　could　safely　risk

an　advance；　with　the　prospect　of　good　results。　　Before　finally

deciding；　he　called　upon　most　of　his　corps　and　division　commanders

for　their　opinions　on　certain　propositions　which　he　presented；　and

most　of　them　still　opposed　the　projected　movement；　I　among　the

number；　reasoning　that　while　General　Grant　was　operating　against

Vicksburg；　it　was　better　to　hold　Bragg　in　Middle　Tennessee　than　to

push　him　so　far　back　into　Georgia　that　interior　means　of

communication　would　give　the　Confederate　Government　the　opportunity

of　quickly　joining　a　part　of　his　force　to　that　of　General　Johnson　in

Mississippi。



At　this　stage；　and　in　fact　prior　to　it；　Rosecrans　seemed　to　manifest

special　confidence　in　me；　often　discussing　his　plans　with　me

independent　of　the　occasions　on　which　he　formally　referred　them　for

my　views。　　I　recollect　that　on　two　different　occasions　about　this

time　he　unfolded　his　designs　to　me　in　this　informal　way；　outlining

generally　how　he　expected　ultimately　to　force　Bragg　south　of　the

Tennessee　River；　and　going　into　the　details　of　the　contemplated　move

on　Tullahoma。　　His　schemes；　to　my　mind；　were　not　only　comprehensive；

but　exact；　and　showed　conclusively；　what　no　one　doubted　then；　that

they　were　original　with　him。　　I　found　in　them　very　little　to

criticise　unfavorably；　if　we　were　to　move　at　all；　and　Rosecrans

certainly　impressed　me　that　he　favored　an　advance　at　an　early　day；

though　many　of　his　generals　were　against　it　until　the　operations　on

the　Mississippi　River　should　culminate　in　something　definite。　　There

was　much；　fully　apparent　in　the　circumstances　about　his　headquarters；

leading　to　the　conviction　that　Rosecrans　originated　the　Tullahoma

campaign；　and　the　record　of　his　prior　performances　collaterally

sustains　the　visible　evidence　then　existing。　　In　my　opinion；　then；

based　on　a　clear　recollection　of　various　occurrences　growing　out　of

our　intimacy；　he　conceived　the　plan　of　the　Tullahoma　campaign　and　the

one　succeeding　it；　and　is　therefore　entitled　to　every　credit　that

attended　their　execution；　no　matter　what　may　be　claimed　for　others。



On　the　23d　of　June　Bragg　was　covering　his　position　north　of　Duck

River　with　a　front　extending　from　McMinnville；　where　his　cavalry

rested；　through　Wartrace　and　Shelbyville　to　Columbia；　his　depot　being

at　Tullahoma。　　Rosecrans；　thinking　that　Bragg　would　offer　strong

resistance　at　Shelbyvillewhich　was　somewhat　protected　by　a　spur　of

low　mountains　or　hills；　offshoots　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains

decided　to　turn　that　place；　consequently；　he　directed　the　mass　of　the

Union　army　on　the　enemy's　right　flank；　about　Manchester。



On　the　26th　of　June　McCook's　corps　advanced　toward　Liberty　Gap；　my

divisions　marching　on　the　Shelbyville　pike。　　I　had　proceeded　but　a

few　miles　when　I　encountered　the　enemy's　pickets；　who　fell　back　to

Christiana；　about　nine　miles　from　Murfreesboro'。　　Here　I　was　assailed

pretty　wickedly　by　the　enemy's　sharpshooters　and　a　section　of

artillery；　but　as　I　was　instructed　to　do　nothing　more　than　cover　the

road　from　Eagleville；　over　which　Brannan's　division　was　to　approach

Christiana；　I　made　little　reply　to　this　severe　annoyance；　wishing　to

conceal　the　strength　of　my　force。　　As　soon　as　the　head　of　Brannan's

column　arrived　I　marched　across…country　to　the　left；　and　encamped

that　night　at　the　little　town　of　Millersburg；　in　the　vicinity　of

Liberty　Gap。　　I　was　directed　to　move　from　Millersburg；　on　Hoover's

Gapa　pass　in　the　range　of　hills　already　referred　to；　through　which

ran　the　turnpike　from　Murfreesboro'　to　Manchesterbut　heavy　rains

had　made　the　country　roads　almost　impassable；　and　the　last　of　my

division　did　not　reach　Hoover's　Gap　till　the　morning　of　June　27；

after　its　abandonment　by　the　enemy。　　Continuing　on　to　Fairfield；　the

head　of　my　column　met；　south　of　that　place；　a　small　force　of

Confederate　infantry　and　cavalry；　which　after　a　slight　skirmish

Laiboldt's　brigade　drove　back　toward　Wartrace。　　The　next　morning　I

arrived　at　Manchester；　where　I　remained　quiet　for　the　day。　　Early　on

the　29th　I　marched　by　the　Lynchburg　road　for　Tullahoma；　where　the

enemy　was　believed　to　be　in　force；　and　came　into　position　about　six

miles　from　the　town。



By　the　31st　the　whole　army　had　been　concentrated；　in　spite　of　many

difficulties；　and　though；　on　account　of　the　heavy　rains　that　had

fallen　almost　incessantly　since　we　left　Murfreesboro'；　its　movements

had　been　slow　and　somewhat　inaccurate；　yet　the　precision　with　which

it　took　up　a　line　of　battle　for　an　attack　on　Tullahoma　showed　that

forethought　and　study　had　been　given　to　every　detail。　　The　enemy　had

determined　to　fall　back　from　Tullahoma　at　the　beginning　of　the

campaign；　however；　and　as　we　advanced；　his　evacuation　had　so　far

progressed　that　when；　on　July　1。　　We　reached　the　earthworks　thrown。

up　early　in　the　year　for　the　defense　of　the　place；　he　had　almost

wholly　disappeared；　carrying　off　all　his　stores　and　munitions　of　war

except　some　little　subsistence　and　eleven　pieces　of　artillery。　　A

strong　rearguard　remained　to　cover　the　retreat；　and　on　my　front　the

usual　encounters　between　advancing　and　retreating　forces　took　place。

Just　before　reaching　the　intrenchments　on　the　Lynchburg　road；　I　came

upon　an　open　space　that　was　covered　by　a　network　of　fallen　trees　and

underbrush；　which　had　been　slashed　all　along　in　front　of　the　enemy's

earthworks。　　This　made　our　progress　very　difficult；　but　I　shortly

became　satisfied　that　there　were　only　a　few　of　the　enemy　within　the

works；　so　moving　a　battalion　of　cavalry　that　had　joined　me　the　day

before　down　the　road　as　rapidly　as　the　obstructions　would　permit；　the

Confederate　pickets　quickly　departed；　and　we　gained　possession　of　the

town。　　Three　siege　guns；　four　caissons；　a　few　stores；　and　a　small

number　of　prisoners　fell　into　my　hands。



That　same　evening　orders　were　issued　to　the　army　to　push　on　from

Tullahoma　in　pursuit；　for；　as　it　was　thought　that　we　might　not　be

able　to　cross　Elk　River　on　account　of　its　swollen　condition；　we　could

do　the　enemy　some　damage　by　keeping　close　as　possible　at　his　heels。

I　marched　on　the　Winchester　road　at　3　o'clock　on　the　2d　of　July　and

about　8　o'clock　reached　Elk　River　ford。　　The　stream　was　for　the　time

truly　an　impassable　torrent；　and　all　hope　of　crossing　by　the

Winchester　ford　had　to　be　abandoned。　　Deeming　that　further　effort

should　be　made；　however；　under　guidance　of　Card；　I　turned　the　head　of

my　column　in