personal memoirs-1-第38章

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retrograde　movement　would　have　left　to　the　enemy　the　entire　battle…

field　of　Stone　River　and　ultimately　compelled　our　retreat　to

Nashville。



In　the　night　of　December　3rd　several　slight　demonstrations　were　made

on　my　front；　but　from　the　darkness　neither　party　felt　the　effect　of

the　other's　fire；　and　when　daylight　came　again　the　skirmishers　and

lines　of　battle　were　in　about　the　same　position　they　had　taken　up　the

evening　before。　　Soon　after　daybreak　it　became　evident　that　the

conflict　was　to　be　renewed；　and　a　little　later　the　enemy　resumed　the

offensive　by　an　attack　along　my　left　front；　especially　on　Walker's

brigade。　　His　attempt　was　ineffectual；　however；　and　so　easily

repulsed　as　to　demonstrate　that　the　desperate　character　of　his

assaults　the　day　before　had　nearly　exhausted　his　strength。　　About　3

o'clock　in　the　afternoon　he　made　another　feeble　charge　on　my　front；

but　our　fire　from　the　barricades　and　rifle…pits　soon　demoralized　his

advancing　lines；　which　fell　back　in　some　confusion；　thus　enabling　us

to　pick　up　about　a　hundred　prisoners。　　From　this　time　till　the

evening　of　January　3　Bragg's　left　remained　in　our　front；　and

continued　to　show　itself　at　intervals　by　weak　demonstrations；　which

we　afterward　ascertained　were　directly　intended　to　cover　the

desperate　assault　he　made　with　Breckenridge　on　the　left　of　Rosecrans；

an　assault　that　really　had　in　view　only　a　defensive　purpose；　for

unless　Bragg　dislodged　the　troops　which　were　now　massing　in　front　of

his　right　he　would　be　obliged　to　withdraw　General　Polk's　corps　behind

Stone　River　and　finally　abandon　Murfreesboro'。　　The　sequel　proved

this　to　be　the　case；　and　the　ill…judged　assault　led　by　Breckenridge

ending　in　entire　defeat；　Bragg　retired　from　Murfreesboro'　the　night

of　January　3。



General　Rosecrans　occupied　Murfreesboro'　on　the　4th　and　5th；　having

gained　a　costly　victory；　which　was　not　decisive　enough　in　its

character　to　greatly　affect　the　general　course　of　the　war；　though　it

somewhat　strengthened　and　increased　our　hold　on　Middle　Tennessee。

The　enemy　in　retiring　did　not　fall　back　very　faronly　behind　Duck

River　to　Shelbyville　and　Tullahomaand　but　little　endeavor　was　made

to　follow　him。　　Indeed；　we　were　not　in　condition　to　pursue；　even　if

it　had　been　the　intention　at　the　outset　of　the　campaign。



As　soon　as　possible　after　the　Confederate　retreat　I　went　over　the

battle…field　to　collect　such　of　my　wounded　as　had　not　been　carried

off　to　the　South　and　to　bury　my　dead。　　In　the　cedars　and　on　the

ground　where　I　had　been　so　fiercely　assaulted　when　the　battle　opened；

on　the　morning　of　the　31st；　evidences　of　the　bloody　struggle　appeared

on　every　hand　in　the　form　of　broken　fire…arms；　fragments　of

accoutrements；　and　splintered　trees。　　The　dead　had　nearly　all　been

left　unburied；　but　as　there　was　likelihood　of　their　mutilation　by

roving　swine；　the　bodies　had　mostly　been　collected　in　piles　at

different　points　and　inclosed　by　rail　fences。　　The　sad　duties　of

interment　and　of　caring　for　the　wounded　were　completed　by　the　5th；

and　on　the　6th　I　moved　my　division　three　miles；　south　of

Murfreesboro'　on　the　Shelbyville　pike；　going　into　camp　on　the　banks

of　Stone　River。　　Here　the　condition　of　my　command　was　thoroughly

looked　into；　and　an　endeavor　made　to　correct　such　defects　as　had　been

disclosed　by　the　recent　battle。



During　the　engagement　there　had　been　little　straggling；　and　my　list

of　missing　was　small　and　legitimate；　still；　it　was　known　that　a　very

few　had　shirked　their　duty；　and　an　example　was　necessary。　　Among　this

small　number　were　four　officers　who；　it　was　charged；　had　abandoned

their　colors　and　regiments。　　When　their　guilt　was　clearly

established；　and　as　soon　as　an　opportunity　occurred；　I　caused　the

whole　division　to　be　formed　in　a　hollow　square；　closed　in　mass；　and

had　the　four　officers　marched　to　the　centre；　where；　telling　them　that

I　would　not　humiliate　any　officer　or　soldier　by　requiring　him　to

touch　their　disgraced　swords；　I　compelled　them　to　deliver　theirs　up

to　my　colored　servant；　who　also　cut　from　their　coats　every　insignia

of　rank。　　Then；　after　there　had　been　read　to　the　command　an　order

from　army　headquarters　dismissing　the　four　from　the　service；　the

scene　was　brought　to　a　close　by　drumming　the　cowards　out　of　camp。　　It

was　a　mortifying　spectacle；　but　from　that　day　no　officer　in　that

division　ever　abandoned　his　colors。



My　effective　force　in　the　battle　of　Stone　River　was　4；154　officers

and　men。　　Of　this　number　I　lost　1；633　killed；　wounded；　and　missing；

or　nearly　40　per　cent。　　In　the　remaining　years　of　the　war；　though

often　engaged　in　most　severe　contests；　I　never　experienced　in　any　of

my　commands　so　high　a　rate　of　casualties。　　The　ratio　of　loss　in　the

whole　of　Rosecrans's　army　was　also　high；　and　Bragg's　losses　were

almost　equally　great。　　Rosecrans　carried　into　the　action　about　42；000

officers　and　men。　　He　lost　13；230；　or　31　per　cent。　　Bragg's　effective

force　was　37；800　officers　and　men；　he　lost　10；306；　or　nearly　28　per

cent。



Though　our　victory　was　dearly　bought；　yet　the　importance　of　gaining

the　day　at　any　price　was　very　great；　particularly　when　we　consider

what　might　have　been　the　result　had　not　the　gallantry　of　the　army　and

the　manoeuvring　during　the　early　disaster　saved　us　from　ultimate

defeat。　　We　had　started　out　from　Nashville　on　an　offensive　campaign；

probably　with　no　intention　of　going　beyond　Murfreesboro'；　in

midwinter；　but　still　with　the　expectation　of　delivering　a　crushing

blow　should　the　enemy　accept　our　challenge　to　battle。　　He　met　us　with

a　plan　of　attack　almost　the　counterpart　of　our　own。　　In　the　execution

of　his　plan　he　had　many　advantages；　not　the　least　of　which　was　his

intimate　knowledge　of　the　ground；　and　he　came　near　destroying　us。

Had　he　done　so；　Nashville　would　probably　have　fallen；　at　all　events；

Kentucky　would　have　been　opened　again　to　his　incursions；　and　the

theatre　of　war　very　likely　transferred　once　more　to　the　Ohio　River。

As　the　case　now　stood；　however；　Nashville　was　firmly　established　as　a

base　for　future　operations；　Kentucky　was　safe　from　the　possibility　of

being　again　overrun；　and　Bragg；　thrown　on　the　defensive；　was

compelled　to　give　his　thoughts　to　the　protection　of　the　interior　of

the　Confederacy　and　the　security　of　Chattanooga；　rather　than　indulge

in　schemes　of　conquest　north　of　the　Cumberland　River。　　While　he　still

held　on　in　Middle　Tennessee　his　grasp　was　so　much　loosened　that　only

slight　effort　would　be　necessary　to　push　him　back　into　Georgia；　and

thus　give　to　the　mountain　region　of　East　Tennessee　an　opportunity　to

prove　its　loyalty　to　the；　Union。



The　victory　quieted　the　fears　of　the　West　and　Northwest；　destroyed

the　hopes　of　the　secession　element　in　Kentucky；　renewed　the　drooping

spirits　of　the　East　Tennesseans；　and　demoralized　the　disunionists　in

Middle　Tennessee；　yet　it　was　a　negative　victory　so　far　as　concerned

the　result　on　the　battle…field。　　Rosecrans　seems　to　have　planned　the

battle　with　the　idea　that　the　enemy　would　continue　passive；　remain

entirely　on　the　defensive；　and　that　it　was　necessary　only　to　push

forward　our　left　in　order　to　force　the　evacuation　of　Murfreesboro'；

and　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　on　the　afternoon　of　December　30

McCook　received　information　that　the　right　of　Johnson's　division。

resting　near　the　Franklin　pike；　extended　only　to　about　the　centre　of

the　Confederate　army；　it　does　not　appear　that　attack　from　that

quarter　was　at　all　apprehended　by　the　Union　commanders。



The　natural　line　of　retreat　of　the　Confederates　was　not　threatened　by

the　design　of　Rosecrans；　and　Bragg；　without　risk　to　his

communications；　anticipated　it　by　a　counter…attack　of　like　character

from　his　own　left；　and　demolished　his　adversary's　plan　the　moment　we

were　thrown　on　the　defensive。　　Had　Bragg　followed　up　with　the　spirit

which　characterized　its　beginning　the　successful　attack　by　Hardee　on

our　right　wingand　there　seems　no　reason　why　he　should　not　have　done

sothe　army　of　Rosec