personal memoirs-1-第31章
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to drive them in on the main body。 This was successfully done in a
few minutes; but in pushing them back to Chaplin River; we discovered
the Confederates forming a line of battle on the opposite bank; with
the apparent purpose of an attack in force; so I withdrew the brigade
to our intrenchments on the crest and there awaited the assault。
While this skirmishing was going on; General Gilbertthe corps
commanderwhose headquarters were located on a hill about a mile
distant to the rear; kept sending me messages by signal not to bring
on an engagement。 I replied to each message that I was not bringing
on an engagement; but that the enemy evidently intended to do so; and
that I believed I should shortly be attacked。 Soon after returning
to the crest and getting snugly fixed in the rifle…pits; my attention
was called to our left; the high ground we occupied affording me in
that direction an unobstructed view。 I then saw General A。 McD。
McCook's corpsthe First…advancing toward Chaplin River by the
Mackville road; apparently unconscious that the Confederates were
present in force behind the stream。 I tried by the use of signal
flags to get information of the situation to these troops; but my
efforts failed; and the leading regiments seemed to approach the
river indifferently prepared to meet the sudden attack that speedily
followed; delivered as it was from the chosen position of the enemy。
The fury of the Confederate assault soon halted this advance force;
and in a short time threw it into confusion; pushed it back a
considerable distance; and ultimately inflicted upon it such loss of
men and guns as to seriously cripple McCook's corps; and prevent for
the whole day further offensive movement on his part; though he
stoutly resisted the enemy's assaults until 4 o'clock in the
afternoon。
Seeing McCook so fiercely attacked; in order to aid him I advanced
Hescock's battery; supported by six regiments; to a very good
position in front of a belt of timber on my extreme left; where an
enfilading fire could be opened on that portion of the enemy
attacking the right of the First Corps; and also on his batteries
across Chaplin River。 But at this juncture he placed two batteries
on my right and began to mass troops behind them; and General
Gilbert; fearing that my intrenched position on the heights might be
carried; directed me to withdraw Hescock and his supports and return
them to the pits。 My recall was opportune; for I had no sooner got
back to my original line than the Confederates attacked me furiously;
advancing almost to my intrenchments; notwithstanding that a large
part of the ground over which they had to move was swept by a heavy
fire of canister from both my batteries。 Before they had quite
reached us; however; our telling fire made them recoil; and as they
fell back; I directed an advance of my whole division; bringing up my
reserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hills; Colonel William
P。 Carlin's brigade of Mitchell's division meanwhile moving forward
on my right to cover that flank。 This advance pressed the enemy to
Perryville; but he retired in such good order that we gained nothing
but some favorable ground that enabled me to establish my batteries
in positions where they could again turn their attention to the
Confederates in front of McCook; whose critical condition was shortly
after relieved; however; by a united pressure of Gilbert's corps
against the flank of McCook's assailants; compelling them to retire
behind Chaplin River。
The battle virtually ended about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; though
more or less desultory firing continued until dark。 Considering the
severity of the engagement on McCook's front; and the reverses that
had befallen him; I question if; from that part of the line; much
could have been done toward retrieving the blunders of the day; but
it did seem to me that; had the commander of the army been able to be
present on the field; he could have taken advantage of Bragg's final
repulse; and there would have remained in our hands more than the
barren field。 But no attempt was made to do anything more till next
morning; and then we secured little except the enemy's killed and
most severely wounded。
The operations of my division during the engagement pleased。 General
Gilbert very much; and he informed me that he would relax a rigidly
enforced order which General Buell had issued some days before;
sufficiently to permit my trains to come to the front and supply my
almost starving troops with rations。 The order in question was one
of those issued; doubtless with a good intent; to secure generally
the safety of our trains; but General Gilbert was not elastic; and on
the march he had construed the order so illiberally that it was next
to impossible to supply the men with food; and they were particularly
short in this respect on the eve of the battle。 I had then
endeavored to persuade him to modify his iron…clad interpretation of
the order; but without effect; and the only wagons we could bring up
from the general parks in rear were ambulances and those containing
ammunition。 So to gain access to our trains was a great boon; and at
that moment a more welcome result than would have been a complete
victory minus this concession。
When the battle ceased General Gilbert asked me to join him at
Buell's headquarters; which were a considerable distance to the rear;
so after making some dispositions for the evening I proceeded there
as requested。 I arrived just as Buell was about to sit down to his
supper; and noticing that he was lame; then learned that he had been
severely injured by a recent fall from his horse。 He kindly invited
me to join him at the table; an invitation which I accepted with
alacrity; enjoying the meal with a relish known only to a very…hungry
man; for I had eaten nothing since morning。 Of course the events of
the day were the chief topic of discussionas they were during my
stay at headquartersbut the conversation indicated that what had
occurred was not fully realized; and I returned to my troops
impressed with the belief that General Buell and his staff…officers
were unconscious of the magnitude of the battle that had just been
fought。
It had been expected by Buell that he would fight the enemy on the
9th of October; but the Confederates disposed of that proposition by
attacking us on the 8th; thus disarranging a tactical conception
which; with our superior numbers; would doubtless have proved
successful had it not been anticipated by an enterprising foe。
During the battle on the 8th the Second Corps; under General Thomas
L。 Crittenden; accompanied by General George H。 Thomas; lay idle the
whole day for want of orders; although it was near enough to the
field to take an active part in the fight; and; moreover; a large
part of Gilbert's corps was unengaged during the pressure on McCook。
Had these troops been put in on the enemy's left at any time after he
assaulted McCook; success would have been beyond question; but there
was no one on the ground authorized to take advantage of the
situation; and the battle of Perryville remains in history an example
of lost opportunities。 This was due in some measure probably to
General Buell's accident; but is mainly attributable to the fact that
he did not clearly apprehend Bragg's aim; which was to gain time to
withdraw behind Dick's River all the troops he had in Kentucky; for
the Confederate general had no idea of risking the fate of his army
on one general battle at a place or on a day to be chosen by the
Union commander。
Considering the number of troops actually engaged; the losses to
Buell were severe; amounting to something over five thousand in
killed; wounded; and missing。 Among the killed were two brigade
commanders of much promiseGeneral James S。 Jackson and General
William R。 Terrill。 McCook's corps lost twelve guns; some of which
were recovere