personal memoirs-1-第25章

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knowledge　of　the　section　in　which　we　were　operating；　so　as　to　be

prepared　to　encounter　an　enemy　already　indicating　recovery　from　the

disorganizing　effects　of　his　recent　retreat。



In　the　immediate　vicinity　of　Booneville　the　country　was　covered　with

heavy　forests；　with　here　and　there　clearings　or　intervening　fields

that　had　been　devoted　to　the　cultivation　of　cotton　and　corn。　　The

ground　was　of　a　low　character；　typical　of　northeastern　Mississippi；

and　abounded　in　small　creeks　that　went　almost　totally　dry　even　in

short　periods　of　drought；　but　became　flooded　with　muddy　water　under

the　outpouring　of　rain　peculiar　to　a　semi…tropical　climate。　　In　such

a　region　there　were　many　chances　of　our　being　surprised；　especially

by　an　enemy　who　knew　the　country　well；　and　whose　ranks　were　filled

with　local　guides；　and　great　precautions　as　well　as　the　fullest

information　were　necessary　to　prevent　disaster。　　I　therefore

endeavored　to　familiarize　all　with　our　surroundings；　but　scarcely　had

matters　begun　to　shape　themselves　as　I　desired　when　our　annihilation

was　attempted　by　a　large　force　of　Confederate　cavalry。



On　the　morning　of　July　1；　1862；　a　cavalry　command　of　between　five　and

six　thousand…men；　under　the　Confederate　General　James　R。　Chalmers；

advanced　on　two　roads　converging　near　Booneville。　　The　head　of　the

enemy's　column　on　the　Blackland　and　Booneville　road　came　in　contact

with　my　pickets　three　miles　and　a　half　west　of　Booneville。　　These

pickets；　under　Lieutenant　Leonidas　S。　Scranton；　of　the　Second

Michigan　Cavalry；　fell　back　slowly；　taking　advantage　of　every　tree　or

other　cover　to　fire　from　till　they　arrived　at　the　point　where　the

converging　roads　joined。　　At　this　junction　there　was　a　strong

position　in　the　protecting　timber；　and　here　Scranton　made　a　firm

stand；　being　reinforced　presently　by　the　few　men　he　had　out　as

pickets　on　the　road　to　his　left；　a　second　company　I　had　sent　him　from

camp；　and　subsequently　by　three　companies　more；　all　now　commanded　by

Captain　Campbell。　　This　force　was　dismounted　and　formed　in　line；　and

soon　developed　that　the　enemy　was　present　in　large　numbers。　　Up　to

this　time　Chalmers　had　shown　only　the　heads　of　his　columns；　and　we

had　doubts　as　to　his　purpose；　but　now　that　our　resistance　forced　him

to　deploy　two　regiments　on　the　right　and　left　of　the　road；　it　became

apparent　that　he　meant　business；　and　that　there　was　no　time　to　lose

in　preparing　to　repel　his　attack。



Full　information　of　the　situation　was　immediately　sent　me；　and　I

directed　Campbell　to　hold　fast；　if　possible；　till　I　could　support

him；　but　if　compelled　to　retire　he　was　authorized　to　do　so　slowly；

taking　advantage　of　every　means　that　fell　in　his　way　to　prolong　the

fighting。　　Before　this　I　had　stationed　one　battalion　of　the　Second

Iowa　in　Booneville；　but　Colonel　Edward　Hatch；　commanding　that

regiment；　was　now　directed　to　leave　one　company　for　the　protection　of

our　camp　a　little　to　the　north　of　the　station；　and　take　the　balance

of　the　Second　Iowa；　with　the　battalion　in　Booneville　except　two　sabre

companies；　and　form　the　whole　in　rear　of　Captain　Campbell；　to　protect

his　flanks　and　support　him　by　a　charge　should　the　enemy　break　his

dismounted　line。



While　these　preparations　were　being　made；　the　Confederates　attempted

to　drive　Campbell　from　his　position　by　a　direct　attack　through　an

open　field。　　In　this　they　failed；　however；　for　our　men；　reserving

their　fire　until　the　enemy　came　within　about　thirty　yards；　then

opened　on　him　with　such　a　shower　of　bullets　from　our　Colt's　rifles

that　it　soon　became　too　hot　for　him；　and　he　was　repulsed　with

considerable　loss。　　Foiled　in　this　move；　Chalmers　hesitated　to　attack

again　in　front；　but　began　overlapping　both　flanks　of　Campbell's　line

by　force　of　numbers；　compelling　Campbell　to　retire　toward　a　strong

position　I　had　selected　in　his　rear　for　a　line　on　which　to　make　our

main　resistance。　　As　soon　as　the　enemy　saw　this　withdrawing　he　again

charged　in　front；　but　was　again　as　gallantly　repelled　as　in　the　first

assault；　although　the　encounter　was　for　a　short　time　so　desperate　as

to　have　the　character　of　a　hand…to…hand　conflict；　several　groups　of

friend　and　foe　using　on　each　other　the　butts　of　their　guns。　　At　this

juncture　the　timely　arrival　of　Colonel　Hatch　with　the　Second　Iowa

gave　a　breathing…spell　to　Campbell；　and　made　the　Confederates　so

chary　of　further　direct　attacks　that　he　was　enabled　to　retire；　and　at

the　same　time　I　found　opportunity　to　make　disposition　of　the

reinforcement　to　the　best　advantage　possible；　placing　the　Second　Iowa

on　the　left　of　the　new　line　and　strengthening　Campbell　on　its　right

with　all　the　men　available。



In　view　of　his　numbers；　the　enemy　soon　regained　confidence　in　his

ability　to　overcome　us；　and　in　a　little　while　again　began　his

flanking　movements；　his　right　passing　around　my　left　flank　some

distance；　and　approaching　our　camp　and　transportation；　which　I　had

forbidden　to　be　moved　out　to　the　rear。　　Fearing　that　he　would　envelop

us　and　capture　the　camp　and　transportation；　I　determined　to　take　the

offensive。　　Remembering　a　circuitous　wood　road　that　I　had　become

familiar　with　while　making　the　map　heretofore　mentioned；　I　concluded

that　the　most　effective　plan　would　be　to　pass　a　small　column　around

the　enemy's　left；　by　way　of　this　road；　and　strike　his　rear　by　a

mounted　charge　simultaneously　with　an　advance　of　our　main　line　on　his

front。　　I　knew　that　the　attack　in　rear　would　be　a　most　hazardous

undertaking；　but　in　the　face　of　such　odds　as　the　enemy　had　the

condition　of　affairs　was　most　critical；　and　could　be　relieved；　only

by　a　bold　and　radical　change　in　our　tactics；　so　I　at　once　selected

four　sabre　companies；　two　from　the　Second　Michigan　and　two　from　the

Second　Iowa；　and　placing　Captain　Alger；　of　the　former　regiment；　in

command　of　them；　I　informed　him　that　I　expected　of　them　the　quick　and

desperate　work　that　is　usually　imposed　on　a　forlorn　hope。



To　carry　out　the　purpose　now　in　view；　I　instructed　Captain　Alger　to

follow　the　wood　road　as　it　led　around　the　left　of　the　enemy's

advancing　forces；　to　a　point　where　'it　joined　the　Blackland　road；

about　three　miles　from　Booneville；　and　directed　him；　upon　reaching

the　Blackland　road；　to　turn　up　it　immediately；　and　charge　the　rear　of

the　enemy's　line。　　Under　no　circumstances　was　he　to　deploy　the

battalion；　but　charge　in　column　right　through　whatever　he　came　upon；

and　report　to　me　in　front　of　Booneville；　if　at　all　possible　for　him

to　get　there。　　If　he　failed　to　break　through　the　enemy's　line；　he　was

to　go　ahead　as　far　as　he　could；　and　then　if　any　of　his　men　were　left；

and　he　was　able　to　retreat；　he　was　to　do　so　by　the　same　route　he　had

taken　on　his　way　out。　　To　conduct　him　on　this　perilous　service　I　sent

along　a　thin；　sallow；　tawny…haired　Mississippian　named　Beene；　whom　I

had　employed　as　a　guide　and　scout　a　few　days　before；　on　account　of

his　intimate　knowledge　of　the　roads；　from　the　public　thoroughfares

down　to　the　insignificant　by…paths　of　the　neighboring　swamps。　　With

such　guidance　I　felt　sure　that　the　column　would　get　to　the　desired

point　without　delay；　for　there　was　no　danger　of　its　being　lost　or

misled　by　taking　any　of　the　many　by…roads　which　traversed　the　dense

forests　through　which　it　would　be　obliged　to　pass。　　I　also　informed

Alger　that　I　should　take　the　reserve　and　join　the　main　line　in　front

of　Booneville　for　the　purpose　of　making　an　advance　of　my　whole　force；

and　that　as　a　signal　he　must　have　his　men　cheer　loudly　when　he　struck

the　enemy's　rear；　in　order　that　my　attack　might　be　simultaneous　with

his。



I　gave　him　one　hour　to　go　around　and　come　back　through　the　enemy；　and

when　he　started　I　moved　to　the　front　with　the　balance　of　the　reserve；

to　put　everything　I　had　into　the　fight。　　This　meant　an　inestimable

advantage　to　the　enemy　in　case　of　our　defeat；　but　our　own　safety

demanded　the　hazard。　　All　along　our　attenuated　line　the　fighting　was

now　sharp；　and　the　enemy's　firing　indicated　such　numeric