memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第5章

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I　have　sent　orders　to　Banks；　by　private　messenger；　to　finish　up　his　present　expedition　against　Shreveport　with　all　dispatch；　to　turn　over　the　defense　of　Red　River　to　General　Steels　and　the　navy；　and　to　return　your　troops　to　you；　and　his　own　to　New　Orleans；　to　abandon　all　of　Texas；　except　the　Rio　Grande；　and　to　hold　that　with　not　to　exceed　four　thousand　men；　to　reduce　the　number　of　troops　on　the　Mississippi　to　the　lowest　number　necessary　to　hold　it；　and　to　collect　from　his　command　not　less　than　twenty…five　thousand　men。　To　this　I　will　add　five　thousand　from　Missouri。　　With　this　force　he　is　to　commence　operations　against　Mobile　as　soon　as　he　can。　　It　will　be　impossible　for　him　to　commence　too　early。

Gillmore　joins　Butler　with　ten　thousand　men；　and　the　two　operate　against　Richmond　from　the　south　aide　of　James　River。　　This　will　give　Butler　thirty…three　thousand　men　to　operate　with；　W。　F。　Smith　commanding　the　right　wing　of　his　forces；　and　Gillmore　the　left　wing。　　I　will　stay　with　the　Army　of　the　Potomac；　increased　by　Burnside's　corps　of　not　less　than　twenty…five　thousand　effective　men；　and　operate　directly　against　Lee's　army；　wherever　it　may　be　found。

Sigel　collects　all　his　available　force　in　two　columns；　one；　under　Ord　and　Averill；　to　start　from　Beverly；　Virginia；　and　the　other；　under　Crook；　to　start　from　Charleston；　on　the　Kanawha；　to　move　against　the　Virginia　&　Tennessee　Railroad。

Crook　will　have　all　cavalry；　and　will　endeavor　to　get　in　about　Saltville；　and　move　east　from　there　to　join　Ord。　　His　force　will　be　all　cavalry；　while　Ord　will　have　from　ten　to　twelve　thousand　men　of　all　arms。

You　I　propose　to　move　against　Johnston's　army；　to　break　it　up；　and　to　get　into　the　interior　of　the　enemy's　country　as　far　as　you　can；　inflicting　all　the　damage　yon　can　against　their　war　resources。

I　do　not　propose　to　lay　down　for　you　a　plan　of　campaign；　but　simply　to　lay　down　the　work　it　is　desirable　to　have　done；　and　leave　you　free　to　execute　it　in　your　own　way。　　Submit　to　me；　however；　as　early　as　you　can；　your　plan　of　operations。

As　stated；　Banks　is　ordered　to　commence　operations　as　soon　as　he　can。　Gillmore　is　ordered　to　report　at　Fortress　Monroe　by　the　18th　inst。；　or　as　soon　thereafter　as　practicable。　　Sigel　is　concentrating　now。　　None　will　move　from　their　places　of　rendezvous　until　I　direct；　except　Banks。　　I　want　to　be　ready　to　move　by　the　25th　inst。；　if　possible；　but　all　I　can　now　direct　is　that　you　get　ready　as　soon　as　possible。　　I　know　you　will　have　difficulties　to　encounter　in　getting　through　the　mountains　to　where　supplies　are　abundant；　but　I　believe　you　will　accomplish　it。

》From　the　expedition　from　the　Department　of　West　Virginia　I　do　not　calculate　on　very　great　results；　but　it　is　the　only　way　I　can　take　troops　from　there。　　With　the　long　line　of　railroad　Sigel　has　to　protect；　he　can　spare　no　troops；　except　to　move　directly　to　his　front。　　In　this　way　he　must　get　through　to　inflict　great　damage　on　the　enemy；　or　the　enemy　must　detach　from　one　of　his　armies　a　large　force　to　prevent　it。　　In　other　words；　if　Sigel　can't　skin　himself；　he　can　hold　a　leg　while　some　one　else　skins。

I　am；　general；　very　respectfully；　your　obedient　servant；　U。　S。　GRANT；　Lieutenant…General。



HEADQUARTERS　MILITARY　DIVISION　OF　THE　MISSISSIPPI　NASHVILLE；　TENNESSEE；　April　10；　1864

Lieutenant…General　U。　S。　GRANT；　Commander…in…Chief；　Washington；　D。

DEAR　GENERAL：　Your　two　letters　of　April　4th　are　now　before　me；　and　afford　me　infinite　satisfaction。　　That　we　are　now　all　to　act　on　a　common　plan；　converging　on　a　common　centre；　looks　like　enlightened　war。

Like　yourself；　you　take　the　biggest　load；　and　from　me　you　shall　have　thorough　and　hearty　cooperation。　　I　will　not　let　side　issues　draw　me　off　from　your　main　plans　in　which　I　am　to　knock　Jos。　Johnston；　and　to　do　as　much　damage　to　the　resources　of　the　enemy　as　possible。　　I　have　heretofore　written　to　General　Rawlins　and　to　Colonel　Comstock　（of　your　staff）　somewhat　of　the　method　in　which　I　propose　to　act。　　I　have　seen　all　my　army；　corps；　and　division　commanders；　and　have　signified　only　to　the　former；　viz。；　Schofield；　Thomas；　and　McPherson；　our　general　plans；　which　I　inferred　from　the　purport　of　our　conversation　here　and　at　Cincinnati。

First；　I　am　pushing　stores　to　the　front　with　all　possible　dispatch；　and　am　completing　the　army　organization　according　to　the　orders　from　Washington；　which　are　ample　and　perfectly　satisfactory。

It　will　take　us　all　of　April　to　get　in　our　furloughed　veterans；　to　bring　up　A。　J。　Smith's　command；　and　to　collect　provisions　and　cattle　on　the　line　of　the　Tennessee。　　Each　of　the　armies　will　guard；　by　detachments　of　its　own；　its　rear　communications。

At　the　signal　to　be　given　by　you；　Schofield；　leaving　a　select　garrison　at　Knoxville　and　London；　with　twelve　thousand　men　will　drop　down　to　the　Hiawassee；　and　march　against　Johnston's　right　by　the　old　Federal　road。　　Stoneman；　now　in　Kentucky；　organizing　the　cavalry　forces　of　the　Army　of　the　Ohio；　will　operate　with　Schofield　on　his　left　frontit　may　be；　pushing　a　select　body　of　about　two　thousand　cavalry　by　Ducktown　or　Elijah　toward　Athena；　Georgia。

Thomas　will　aim　to　have　forty…five　thousand　men　of　all　arms；　and　move　straight　against　Johnston；　wherever　he　may　be；　fighting　him　cautiously；　persistently；　and　to　the　best　advantage。　　He　will　have　two　divisions　of　cavalry；　to　take　advantage　of　any　offering。

McPherson　will　have　nine　divisions　of　the　Army　of　the　Tennessee；　if　A。　J。　Smith　gets　here；　in　which　case　he　will　have　full　thirty　thousand　of　the　best　men　in　America。　　He　will　cross　the　Tennessee　at　Decatur　and　Whitesburg；　march　toward　Rome；　and　feel　for　Thomas。　If　Johnston　falls　behind　the　Coosa；　then　McPherson　will　push　for　Rome；　and　if　Johnston　falls　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　as　I　believe　he　will；　then　McPherson　will　cross　over　and　join　Thomas。

McPherson　has　no　cavalry；　but　I　have　taken　one　of　Thomas's　divisions；　viz。；　Garrard's；　six　thousand　strong；　which　is　now　at　Colombia；　mounting；　equipping；　and　preparing。　　I　design　this　division　to　operate　on　McPheraon's　right；　rear；　or　front；　according　as　the　enemy　appears。　　But　the　moment　I　detect　Johnston　falling　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　I　propose　to　cast　off　the　effective　part　of　this　cavalry　division；　after　crossing　the　Coosa；　straight　for　Opelika；　West　Point；　Columbus；　or　Wetumpka；　to　break　up　the　road　between　Montgomery　and　Georgia。　　If　Garrard　can　do　this　work　well；　he　can　return　to　the　Union　army；　but　should　a　superior　force　interpose；　then　he　will　seek　safety　at　Pensacola　and　join　Banks；　or；　after　rest；　will　act　against　any　force　that　he　can　find　east　of　Mobile；　till　such　time　as　he　can　reach　me。

Should　Johnston　fall　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　I　will　feign　to　the　right；　but　pass　to　the　left　and　act　against　Atlanta　or　its　eastern　communications；　according　to　developed　facts。

This　is　about　as　far　ahead　as　I　feel　disposed；　to　look；　but　I　will　ever　bear　in　mind　that　Johnston　is　at　all　times　to　be　kept　so　busy　that　he　cannot　in　any　event　send　any　part　of　his　command　against　you　or　Banks。

If　Banks　can　at　the　same　time　carry　Mobile　and　open　up　the　Alabama　River；　he　will　in　a　measure　solve　the　moat　difficult　part　of　my　problem；　viz。；　〃provisions。〃　But　in　that　I　must　venture。　　Georgia　has　a　million　of　inhabitants。　　If　they　can　live；　we　should　not　starve。　　If　the　enemy　interrupt　our　communications；　I　will　be　absolved　from　all　obligations　to　subsist　on　our　own　resources；　and　will　feel　perfectly　justified　in　taking　whatever　and　wherever　we　oar　find。　I　will　inspire　my　command；　if　successful；　with　the　feeling　that　beef　and　salt　are　all　that　is　absolutely　necessary　to　life；　and　that　parched　corn　once　fed　General　Jackson's　army　on　that　very　ground。　As　ever；　your　friend　and　servant；

W。　T。　SHERMAN；　Major…General。




HEADQUARTERS　ARMIES　OF　THE　UNITED　STATES　CULPEPPER　COURT　HOUSE；　VIRGINIA；　April　19；　1864。

Major…General　W。　T。　SHERMAN；　commanding　Military　Division　of　the　Mississippi。

GENERAL：　Since　my　letter　to　you　of　April　4th　I　have　seen　no　reason　to　change　any　portion　of　the　general　plan　of　campaign；　if　the　enemy　remain　still　and　allow　us　to　take　the　initiative。　　Rain　has　continued　so　uninterruptedly　until　the　last　day　or　two　that　it　will　be　impossible　to　move；　howe