memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第33章
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t。 The course which you have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta； and in the exchange of prisoners； is fully approved by the War Department。 Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in removing these people； but I think it was your duty to your own army to do so。 Moreover； I am fully of opinion that the nature of your position； the character of the war； the conduct of the enemy （and especially of non…combatants and women of the territory which we have heretofore conquered and occupied）； will justify you in gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may require； both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your march farther into the enemy's country。 Let the disloyal families of the country； thus stripped； go to their husbands； fathers； and natural protectors； in the rebel ranks； we have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation； on the contrary； those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and within our lines。 The safety of our armies； and a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers； require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war。 We certainly are not required to treat the so…called non…combatant rebels better than they themselves treat each other。 Even herein Virginia； within fifty miles of Washington； they strip their own families of provisions； leaving them； as our army advances； to be fed by us； or to starve within our lines。 We have fed this class of people long enough。 Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel ranks； and if they won't go； we must send them to their friends and natural protectors。 I would destroy every mill and factory within reach which I did not want for my own use。 This the rebels have done； not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania； but also in Virginia and other rebel States； when compelled to fall back before our armies。 In many sections of the country they have not left a mill to grind grain for their own suffering families； lest we might use them to supply our armies。 We most do the same。
I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for the last two years。 You are almost the only one who has properly applied them。 I do not approve of General Hunter's course in burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property。 That is barbarous。 But I approve of taking or destroying whatever may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army。
Very respectfully； your obedient servant；
H。 W。 HALLECK； Major…General； Chief of Staff
In order to effect the exchange of prisoners； to facilitate the exodus of the people of Atlanta； and to keep open communication with the South； we established a neutral camp； at and about the railroad…station next south of Atlanta； known as 〃Rough and Ready；〃 to which point I dispatched Lieutenant…Colonel Willard Warner； of my staff； with a guard of one hundred men； and General Hood sent Colonel Clare； of his staff； with a similar guard； these officers and men harmonized perfectly； and parted good friends when their work was done。 In the mean time I also had reconnoitred the entire rebel lines about Atlanta； which were well built； but were entirely too extensive to be held by a single corps or division of troops； so I instructed Colonel Poe； United States Engineers； on my staff； to lay off an inner and shorter line； susceptible of defense by a smaller garrison。
By the middle of September all these matters were in progress； the reports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched to Washington； and our thoughts began to turn toward the future。 Admiral Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay； which resulted in the capture of Fort Morgan； so that General Canby was enabled to begin his regular operations against Mobile City； with a view to open the Alabama River to navigation。 My first thoughts were to concert operations with him； either by way of Montgomery； Alabama； or by the Appalachicula； but so long a line； to be used as a base for further operations eastward； was not advisable； and I concluded to await the initiative of the enemy； supposing that he would be forced to resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at the South on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta。
General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had a veranda with high pillars。 We were sitting there one evening； talking about things generally； when General Thomas asked leave to send his trains back to Chattanooga； for the convenience and economy of forage。 I inquired of him if he supposed we would be allowed much rest at Atlanta； and he said he thought we would； or that at all events it would not be prudent for us to go much farther into Georgia because of our already long line of communication； viz。； three hundred miles from Nashville。 This was true； but there we were； and we could not afford to remain on the defensive； simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety of its railroad。 I insisted on his retaining all trains； and on keeping all his divisions ready to move at a moment's warning。 All the army； officers and men； seemed to relax more or less； and sink into a condition of idleness。 General Schofield was permitted to go to Knoxville； to look after matters in his Department of the Ohio； and Generals Blair and Logan went home to look after politics。 Many of the regiments were entitled to； and claimed； their discharge； by reason of the expiration of their term of service； so that with victory and success came also many causes of disintegration。
The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee； threatening our railroads； and rumors came that Forrest was on his way from Mississippi to the same theatre； for the avowed purpose of breaking up our railroads and compelling us to fall back from our conqueSt。 To prepare for this； or any other emergency； I ordered Newton's division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga； and Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome； and instructed General Rousseau at Nashville； Granger at Decatur； and Steadman at Chattanooga； to adopt the most active measures to protect and insure the safety of our roads。
Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station； and； up to the 15th of September； had given no signs of his future plans； so that with this date I close the campaign of Atlanta； with the following review of our relative losses during the months of August and September； with a summary of those for the whole campaign； beginning May 6 and ending September 15； 1864。 The losses for August and September are added together； so as to include those about Jonesboro：
Killed and Missing Wounded Total Grand Aggregate。。。。。 1；408 3；731 5；139
Hood's losses； as reported for the same period； page 577； Johnston's 〃Narrative：〃
Killed Wounded Total 482 3；223 3；705
To which should be added：
Prisoners captured by us：。。。。。。。。。。。。 3；738
Giving his total loss 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 7；44
On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entire campaign； from May to September； inclusive； we have； in the Union army； as per table appended：
Killed 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 4；423 Wounded 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 22；822 Missing。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 4；442 Aggregate Loss 。。。。。。。。。 31；627
In the Southern army； according to the reports of Surgeon Foard （pp。 576； 577； Johnston's 〃Narrative 〃）
Total killed 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 3；044 Total killed and wounded。。。。。 21；996 Prisoners captured by us 。。。。 12；983
Aggregate loss to the Southern Army 。。。。。。。。。。 34；979
The foregoing figures are official； and are very nearly correct。 I see no room for error save in the cavalry； which was very much scattered； and whose reports are much less reliable than of the infantry and artillery； but as Surgeon Foard's tables do not embrace Wheeler's； Jackson's； and Martin's divisions of cavalry； I infer that the comparison； as to cavalry losses； is a 〃stand…off。〃
I have no doubt that the S
