memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第13章
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About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the enemy had passed around our left flank； evidently to strike this very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga。 I therefore reenforced the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville； and ordered forward from Huntsville； Alabama； the infantry division of General John E。 Smith； to hold Kingston securely。
While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw； General Grant had his hands full with Lee； in Virginia。 General Halleck was the chief of staff at Washington； and to him I communicated almost daily。 I find from my letter…book that on the 21st of June I reported to him tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day： 〃This is the nineteenth day of rain； and the prospect of fair weather is as far off as ever。 The roads are impassable； the fields and woods become quagmire's after a few wagons have crossed over。 Yet we are at work all the time。 The left flank is across Noonday Creek； and the right is across Nose's Creek。 The enemy still holds Kenesaw； a conical mountain； with Marietta behind it； and has his flanks retired； to cover that town and the railroad behind。 I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with any thing like life。〃
The weather has a wonderful effect on troops： in action and on the march； rain is favorable； but in the woods； where all is blind and uncertain； it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather。 Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness； aiming always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the enemy； while with the surplus force we felt forward； from one flank or the other； for his line of communication and retreat。 On the 22d of June I rode the whole line； and ordered General Thomas in person to advance his extreme right corps （Hooker's）； and instructed General Schofield； by letter； to keep his entire army； viz。； the Twenty…third Corps； as a strong right flank in close support of Hooker's deployed line。 During this day the sun came out； with some promise of clear weather； and I had got back to my bivouac about dark； when a signal message was received； dated…
KULP HOUSE； 5。30 P。M。
General SHERMAN： We have repulsed two heavy attacks； and feel confident； our only apprehension being from our extreme right flank。 Three entire corps are in front of us。
Major…General HOOKER。
Hooker's corps （the Twentieth） belonged to Thomas's army； Thomas's headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine； and Hooker； being an old army officer； knew that he should have reported this fact to Thomas and not to me； I was； moreover； specially disturbed by the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his right flank； when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that。 I first inquired of my adjutant； Dayton； if he were certain that General Schofield had received his orders； and he answered that the envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General Schofield himself。 I knew； therefore； that General Schofield must be near by； in close support of Hooker's right flank。 General Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General Hooker's disposition to 〃switch off；〃 leaving wide gaps in his line； so as to be independent； and to make glory on his own account。 I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of discipline and propriety。 The rebel army was only composed of three corps； I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines； found them everywhere strongly occupied； and therefore Hooker could not have encountered 〃three entire corps。〃 Both McPherson and Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army （Thomas's）； so as to come into closer contact with one or other of the wings； asserting that he was the senior by commission to both McPherson and Schofield； and that in the event of battle he should assume command over them； by virtue of his older commission。
They appealed to me to protect them。 I had heard during that day some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the 〃Kulp House；〃 which was about five miles southeast of where I was； but this was nothing unusual； for at the same moment there was firing along our lines full ten miles in extent。 Early the next day （23d） I rode down to the 〃Kulp House；〃 which was on a road leading from Powder Springs to Marietta； about three miles distant from the latter。 On the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps； which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of the day before； then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions； which occupied the field of battle； and the men were engaged in burying the dead。 I found General Schofield's corps on the Powder Springs road； its head of column abreast of Hooker's right； therefore constituting 〃a strong right flank；〃 and I met Generale Schofield and Hooker together。 As rain was falling at the moment； we passed into a little church standing by the road…side； and I there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal…message of the day before。 He was very angry； and pretty sharp words passed between them； Schofield saying that his head of column （Hascall's division） had been； at the time of the battle； actually in advance of Hooker's line； that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his troops before it did Hooker's； that General Hooker knew of it at the time； and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of his advance division （Hascall's） were lying farther out than any of Hooker's。 General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact。 I then asked him why he had called on me for help； until he had used all of his own troops； asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's division； and had learned from him that he had not been engaged the day before at all； and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have been made by one corps （Hood's）； in place of three； and that it had fallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions； which had repulsed the attack handsomely。 As we rode away from that church General Hooker was by my side； and I told him that such a thing must not occur again； in other words； I reproved him more gently than the occasion demanded； and from that time he began to sulk。 General Hooker had come from the East with great fame as a 〃fighter；〃 and at Chattanooga he was glorified by his 〃battle above the clouds；〃 which I fear turned his head。 He seemed jealous of all the army commanders； because in years； former rank； and experience； he thought he was our superior。
On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary； which I cannot again better state：
We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions。 The whole country is one vast fort； and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches； with abatis and finished batteries。 We gain ground daily； fighting all the time。 On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw； from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him； and the same day General T。 J。 Wood's division took a hill； which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success； leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground。 Yesterday the extreme right （Hooker and Schofield） advanced on the Powder Springs road to within three miles of Marietta。 The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away； but failed signally； leaving more than two hundred dead on the field。 Our lines are now in close contact； and the fighting is incessant； with a good deal of artillery…fire。 As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready； but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw； which is the key to the whole country。 The weather is now better； and the roads are drying up faSt。 Our losses are light； and； not… withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear； supplies are ample。
During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent； so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly； with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the g
