memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第12章
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out the base of this hill between the lines； and I estimated the distance to the battery on the crest at about eight hundred yards。 Near it； in plain view； stood a group of the enemy； evidently observing us with glasses。 General Howard； commanding the Fourth Corps； was near by； and I called his attention to this group； and ordered him to compel it to keep behind its cover。 He replied that his orders from General Thomas were to spare artillery…ammunition。 This was right； according to the general policy； but I explained to him that we must keep up the morale of a bold offensive； that he must use his artillery； force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive； and ordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys。 I continued to ride down our line； and soon heard； in quick succession； the three volleys。 The next division in order was Geary's； and I gave him similar orders。 General Polk； in my opinion； was killed by the second volley fired from the first battery referred to。
In a conversation with General Johnston； after the war； he explained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta to Pine Mountain； held by Bates's division； and was accompanied by Generals Hardee and Polk。 When on Pine Mountain； reconnoitring； quite a group of soldiers； belonging to the battery close by； clustered about him。 He noticed the preparations of our battery to fire； and cautioned these men to scatter。 They did so； and he likewise hurried behind the parapet； from which he had an equally good view of our position but General Polk； who was dignified and corpulent； walked back slowly； not wishing to appear too hurried or cautious in the presence of the men； and was struck across the breast by an unexploded shell； which killed him instantly。 This is my memory of the conversation； and it is confirmed by Johnston himself in his 〃Narrative；〃 page 337； except that he calculated the distance of our battery at six hundred yards； and says that Polk was killed by the third shot； I know that our guns fired by volley； and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley。 It has been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk； and that I knew it was directed against that general。 The fact is； at that distance we could not even tell that the group were officers at all； I was on horseback； a couple of hundred yards off； before my orders to fire were executed； had no idea that our shot had taken effect； and continued my ride down along the line to Schofield's extreme flank； returning late in the evening to my head…quarters at Big Shanty； where I occupied an abandoned house。 In a cotton…field back of that house was our signal…station； on the roof of an old gin…house。 The signal…officer reported that by studying the enemy's signals he had learned the key； and that he could read their signals。 He explained to me that he had translated a signal about noon； from Pine Mountain to Marietta； 〃Send an ambulance for General Polk's body；〃 and later in the day another； 〃Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk？〃 From this we inferred that General Polk had been killed； but how or where we knew not； and this inference was confirmed later in the same day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured。
On the 15th we advanced our general lines； intending to attack at any weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain； but Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned； and Johnston had contracted his front somewhat； on a direct line； connecting Kenesaw with Lost Mountain。 Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about two miles of most difficult； country； and McPherson's left lapped well around the north end of Kenesaw。 We captured a good many prisoners； among them a whole infantry regiment； the Fourteenth Alabama； three hundred and twenty strong。
On the 16th the general movement was continued； when Lost Mountain was abandoned by the enemy。 Our right naturally swung round； so as to threaten the railroad below Marietta； but Johnston had still further contracted and strengthened his lines； covering Marietta and all the roads below。
On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents； making army movements impossible； but we devoted the time to strengthening our positions； more especially the left and centre； with a view gradually to draw from the left to add to the right； and we had to hold our lines on the left extremely strong； to guard against a sally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty。 Garrard's division of cavalry was kept busy on our left； McPherson had gradually extended to his right； enabling Thomas to do the same still farther； but the enemy's position was so very strong； and everywhere it was covered by intrenchments； that we found it as dangerous to assault as a permanent fort。 We in like manner covered our lines of battle by similar works； and even our skirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and best forms of defensive works； such as rails or logs； piled in the form of a simple lunette； covered on the outside with earth thrown up at night。
The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle…trench； varied according to the nature of the ground； viz。： the trees and bushes were cut away for a hundred yards or more in front； serving as an abatis or entanglement； the parapets varied from four to six feet high； the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered way inside； and this parapet was surmounted by a 〃head…log；〃 composed of the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt； lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting in notches cut in other trunks which extended back； forming an inclined plane； in case the head…log should be knocked inward by a cannon…shot。 The men of both armies became extremely skillful in the construction of these works； because each man realized their value and importance to himself； so that it required no orders for their construction。 As soon as a regiment or brigade gained a position within easy distance for a sally； it would set to work with a will； and would construct such a parapet in a single night； but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor by authorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmen who escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men； who were fed out of the regular army supplies； and I promised them ten dollars a month； under an existing act of Congress。 These pioneer detachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war； for they could work at night while our men slept； they in turn were not expected to fight； and could therefore sleep by day。 Our enemies used their slaves for a similar purpose； but usually kept them out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify and strengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in their general retrograde。 During this campaign hundreds if not thousands of miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies； and； as a rule； whichever party attacked got the worst of it。
On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks； to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to the Chattahoochee River； fifteen miles distant； but as we pressed forward we were soon undeceived； for we found it still more concentrated； covering Marietta and the railroad。 These successive contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him； but were doubtless justified by sound reasons。 On the 20th Johnston's position was unusually strong。 Kenesaw Mountain was his salient； his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by Noonday and Nose's Creeks。 His left flank was his weak point； so long as he acted on the 〃defensive；〃 whereas； had he designed to contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in reserve a force with which to strike 〃offensively〃 from his right； he would have done a wise act； and I was compelled to presume that such was his object： We were also so far from Nashville and Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our railroad and depots； so that the left （MePherson） was held very strong。
About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the enemy had passed around our left flank； evidently to strike thi
