the querist-第18章
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251 Whether when a motion was made once upon a time to establish
a private bank in this kingdom by public authority； divers
gentlemen did not shew themselves forward to embark in that
design？
252 Whether it may not now be hoped that our patriots will be as
forward to examine and consider the proposal of a public bank
calculated only for the public good？
253 Whether any people upon earth shew a more early zeal for the
service of their country； greater eagerness to bear a part in the
legislature； or a more general parturiency with respect to
politics and public counsels？
254 Whether； nevertheless； a light and ludicrous vein be not the
reigning humour； but whether there was ever greater cause to be
serious？
Part III
13 Whether the whole city of Amsterdam would not have been
troubled to have brought together twenty thousand pounds in one
room？
14 Whether it be not absolutely necessary that there must be a
bank and must be a trust？ And； if so； whether it be not the most
safe and prudent course to have a national bank and trust the
legislature？
15 Whether objections against trust in general avail； when it is
allowed there must be a trust； and the only question is where to
place this trust； whether in the legislature or in private hands？
16 Whether it can be expected that private persons should have
more regard to the public than the public itself？
17 Whether； if there be hazards from mismanagement； those may not
be provided against in the framing of a pubic bank； but whether
any provision can be made against the mismanagement of private
banks that are under no check； control； or inspection？
18 Whatever may be said for the sake of objecting； yet； whether
it be not false in fact； that men would prefer a private security
to a public security？
19 Whether a national bank ought to be considered as a new
experiment； and whether it be not a motive to try this scheme
that it hath been already tried with success in other countries？
20 If power followeth money； whether this can be anywhere more
properly and securely placed； than in the same hands wherein the
supreme power is already placed？
21 Whether there be more danger of abuse in a private than in a
public management？
22 Whether the proper usual remedy for abuses of private banks be
not to bring them before Parliament； and subject them to the
inspection of a committee； and whether it be not more prudent to
prevent than to redress an evil？
24 Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof； and
whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath
not been attended with great advantage to the public？
25 Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not
much more to be apprehended from private banks； but whether men
by custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers；
which are therefore thought less than they really are？
26 Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense；
honesty； and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few
private men； and the public was not fit to be trusted？
27 Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should
be afraid to trust itself？
28 But； whether a private interest be not generally supported and
pursued with more zeal than a public？
30 Whether； nevertheless； the community of danger； which lulls
private men asleep； ought not to awaken the public？
31 Whether there be not less security where there are more
temptations and fewer checks？
32 If a man is to risk his fortune； whether it be more prudent to
risk it on the credit of private men； or in that of the great
assembly of the nation？
33 Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual
dealing； whether in a secret impenetrable recess； where credit
depends on secrecy； or in a public management regulated and
inspected by Parliament？
34 Whether a supine security be not catching； and whether numbers
running the same risk； as they lessen the caution； may not
increase the danger？
35 What real objection lies against a national bank erected by
the legislature； and in the management of public deputies；
appointed and inspected by the legislature？
36 What have we to fear from such a bank； which may not be as
well feared without it？
37 How； why； by what means； or for what end； should it become an
instrument of oppression？
38 Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we
are already？ Whether it be not in the power of any particular
person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign
parts？ or whether there can be any security in an estate of land
when the demands upon it are unknown？
39 Whether the establishing of a national bank； if we suppose a
concurrence of the government； be not very practicable？
40 But； whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable
and useful to the pubic； yet； if conceived to interfere with a
private interest； it be not forthwith in danger of appearing
doubtful； difficult； and impracticable？
41 Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power
to hurt； if they may be supposed capable of it； and whether a
bank would give them any new power？
42 What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself？
43 Whether； if the legislature destroyed the public； it would not
be felo de se； and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on
its own destruction？
44 Whether the objection to a pubic national bank； from want of
secrecy； be not in truth an argument for it？
45 Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing
that renders them so hazardous？ and whether； without that； there
could have been of late so many sufferers？
46 Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent
to answer surmises？
47 Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be
against any proposal they could not turn into a job？
48 Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private
banker； and regularly visited his books； would not money lodged
in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure？
49 In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be
trusted； what security can there be for trusting any one else？
50 If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find
cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers
are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited
value？
53 Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private
banks can be admitted as objections against a public one？
54 Whether that which is an objection to everything be an
objection to anything； and whether the possibility of an abuse be
not of that kind？
55 Whether； in fact； all things are not more or less abused； and
yet notwithstanding such abuse； whether many things are not upon
the whole expedient and useful？
56 Whether those things that are subject to the most general
inspection are not the least subject to abuse？
57 Whether； for private ends； it may not be sometimes expedient
to object novelty to things that have been often tried；
difficulty to the plainest things； and hazard to the safest？
58 Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question
was between money and credit； and not （as in fact it is） which
ought to be preferred； private credit or public credit？
59 Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt； or to
be feared； on one side？
60 Whether； therefore； those that would make an impartial
judgment ought not to be on their guard； keeping both prospects
always in view； balancing the inconveniencies on each side and
considering neither absolutely？
61 Whether wilful mistakes； examples without a likeness； and
general addresses to the passions are not often more successful
than arguments？
62 Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as
to explain obscure ones？
63 Whether private men are not often an over…match for the
public； want of weight being made up for by activity？
64 If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or
representatives； whether we are not already undone； and so have
nothing further to fear？
65 Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means
of a national bank； ye
