bentham-第7章

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r　its　own　sake；　the　conformity　of　his　own　character　to　his　standard　of　excellence；　without　hope　of　good　or　fear　of　evil　from　other　source　than　his　own　inward　consciousness。　Even　in　the　more　limited　form　of　Conscience；　this　great　fact　in　human　nature　escapes　him。　Nothing　is　more　curious　than　the　absence　of　recognition　in　any　of　his　writings　of　the　existence　of　conscience；　as　a　thing　distinct　from　philanthropy；　from　affection　for　God　or　man；　and　from　self…interest　in　this　world　or　in　the　next。　There　is　a　studied　abstinence　from　any　of　the　phrases　which；　in　the　mouths　of　others；　import　the　acknowledgment　of　such　a　fact。　If　we　find　the　words　'Conscience'；　'Principle'；　'Moral　Rectitude'；　'Moral　Duty'；　in　his　Table　of　the　Springs　of　Action；　it　is　among　the　synonymes　of　the　'love　of　reputation'。　with　an　intimation　as　to　the　two　former　phrases；　that　they　are　also　sometimes　synonymous　with　the　religious　motive；　or　the　motive　of　sympathy。　The　feeling　of　moral　approbation　or　disapprobation　properly　so　called；　either　towards　ourselves　or　our　fellow…creatures；　he　seems　unaware　of　the　existence　of；　and　neither　the　word　self…respect；　nor　the　idea　to　which　that　word　is　appropriated；　occurs　even　once；　so　far　as　our　recollection　serves　us；　in　his　whole　writings。　　　　　Nor　is　it　only　the　moral　part　of　man's　nature；　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term　　the　desire　of　perfection；　or　the　feeling　of　an　approving　or　of　an　accusing　conscience　　that　he　overlooks；　he　but　faintly　recognizes；　as　a　fact　in　human　nature；　the　pursuit　of　any　other　ideal　end　for　its　own　sake。　The　sense　of　honour；　and　personal　dignity　　that　feeling　of　personal　exaltation　and　degradation　which　acts　independently　of　other　people's　opinion；　or　even　in　defiance　of　it；　the　love　of　beauty；　the　passion　of　the　artist；　the　love　of　order；　of　congruity；　of　consistency　in　all　things；　and　conformity　to　their　end；　the　love　of　power；　not　in　the　limited　form　of　power　over　other　human　beings；　but　abstract　power；　the　power　of　making　our　volitions　effectual；　the　love　of　action；　the　thirst　for　movement　and　activity；　a　principle　scarcely　of　less　influence　in　human　life　than　its　opposite；　the　love　of　ease：　None　of　these　powerful　constituents　of　human　nature　are　thought　worthy　of　a　place　among　the　'Springs　of　Action'；　and　though　there　is　possibly　no　one　of　them　of　the　existence　of　which　an　acknowledgment　might　not　be　found　in　some　corner　of　Bentham's　writings；　no　conclusions　are　ever　founded　on　the　acknowledgment。　Man；　that　most　complex　being；　is　a　very　simple　one　in　his　eyes。　Even　under　the　head　of　sympathy；　his　recognition　does　not　extend　to　the　more　complex　forms　of　the　feeling　　the　love　of　loving；　the　need　of　a　sympathizing　support；　or　of　objects　of　admiration　and　reverence。　If　he　thought　at　all　of　any　of　the　deeper　feelings　of　human　nature；　it　was　but　as　idiosyncrasies　of　taste；　with　which　the　moralist　no　more　than　the　legislator　had　any　concern；　further　than　to　prohibit　such　as　were　mischievous　among　the　actions　to　which　they　might　chance　to　lead。　To　say　either　that　man　should；　or　that　he　should　not；　take　pleasure　in　one　thing；　displeasure　in　another；　appeared　to　him　as　much　an　act　of　despotism　in　the　moralist　as　in　the　political　ruler。　　　　　It　would　be　most　unjust　to　Bentham　to　surmise　（as　narrow…minded　and　passionate　adversaries　are　apt　in　such　cases　to　do）　that　this　picture　of　human　nature　was　copied　from　himself；　that　all　those　constituents　of　humanity　which　he　rejected　from　his　table　of　motives；　were　wanting　in　his　own　breast。　The　unusual　strength　of　his　early　feelings　of　virtue；　was；　as　we　have　seen；　the　original　cause　of　all　his　speculations；　and　a　noble　sense　of　morality；　and　especially　of　justice；　guides　and　pervades　them　all。　But　having　been　early　accustomed　to　keep　before　his　mind's　eye　the　happiness　of　mankind　（or　rather　of　the　whole　sentient　world）；　as　the　only　thing　desirable　in　itself；　or　which　rendered　anything　else　desirable；　he　confounded　all　disinterested　feelings　which　he　found　in　himself；　with　the　desire　of　general　happiness：　just　as　some　religious　writers；　who　loved　virtue　for　its　own　sake　as　much　perhaps　as　men　could　do；　habitually　confounded　their　love　of　virtue　with　their　fear　of　hell。　It　would　have　required　greater　subtlety　than　Bentham　possessed；　to　distinguish　from　each　other；　feelings　which；　from　long　habit；　always　acted　in　the　same　direction；　and　his　want　of　imagination　prevented　him　from　reading　the　distinction；　where　it　is　legible　enough；　in　the　hearts　of　others。　　　　　Accordingly；　he　has　not　been　followed　in　this　grand　oversight　by　any　of　the　able　men　who；　from　the　extent　of　their　intellectual　obligations　to　him；　have　been　regarded　as　his　disciples。　They　may　have　followed　him　in　his　doctrine　of　utility；　and　in　his　rejection　of　a　moral　sense　as　the　test　of　right　and　wrong：　but　while　repudiating　it　as　such；　they　have；　with　Hartley；　acknowledged　it　as　a　fact　in　human　nature；　they　have　endeavoured　to　account　for　it；　to　assign　its　laws：　nor　are　they　justly　chargeable　either　with　undervaluing　this　part　of　our　nature；　or　with　any　disposition　to　throw　it　into　the　background　of　their　speculations。　If　any　part　of　the　influence　of　this　cardinal　error　has　extended　itself　to　them；　it　is　circuitously；　and　through　the　effect　on　their　minds　of　other　parts　of　Bentham's　doctrines。　　　　　Sympathy；　the　only　disinterested　motive　which　Bentham　recognized；　he　felt　the　inadequacy　of；　except　in　certain　limited　cases；　as　a　security　for　virtuous　action。　Personal　affection；　he　well　knew；　is　as　liable　to　operate　to　the　injury　of　third　parties；　and　requires　as　much　to　be　kept　under　government；　as　any　other　feeling　whatever：　and　general　philanthropy；　considered　as　a　motive　influencing　mankind　in　general；　he　estimated　at　its　true　value　when　divorced　from　the　feeling　of　duty　　as　the　very　weakest　and　most　unsteady　of　all　feelings。　There　remained；　as　a　motive　by　which　mankind　are　influenced；　and　by　which　they　may　be　guided　to　their　good；　only　personal　interest。　Accordingly；　Bentham's　idea　of　the　world　is　that　of　a　collection　of　persons　pursuing　each　his　separate　interest　or　pleasure；　and　the　prevention　of　whom　from　jostling　one　another　more　than　is　unavoidable；　may　be　attempted　by　hopes　and　fears　derived　from　three　sources　　the　law；　religion　and　public　opinion。　To　these　three　powers；　considered　as　binding　human　conduct；　he　gave　the　name　of　sanctions。　the　political　sanction；　operating　by　the　rewards　and　penalties　of　the　law；　the　religious　sanction；　by　those　expected　from　the　Ruler　of　the　Universe；　and　the　popular　which　he　characteristically　calls　also　the　moral　sanction；　operating　through　the　pains　and　pleasures　arising　from　the　favour　or　disfavour　of　our　fellow…creatures。　　　　　Such　is　Bentham's　theory　of　the　world。　And　now；　in　a　spirit　neither　of　apology　nor　of　censure；　but　of　calm　appreciation；　we　are　to　inquire　how　far　this　view　of　human　nature　and　life　will　carry　any　one：　how　much　it　will　accomplish　in　morals；　and　how　much　in　political　and　social　philosophy：　what　it　will　do　for　the　individual；　and　what　for　society。　　　　　It　will　do　nothing　for　the　conduct　of　the　individual；　beyond　prescribing　some　of　the　more　obvious　dictates　of　worldly　prudence；　and　outward　probity　and　beneficence。　There　is　no　need　to　expatiate　on　the　deficiencies　of　a　system　of　ethics　which　does　not　pretend　to　aid　individuals　in　the　formation　of　their　own　character。　which　recognizes　no　such　wish　as　that　of　self　culture；　we　may　even　say　no　such　power；　as　existing　in　human　nature；　and　if　it　did　recognize；　could　furnish　little　assistance　to　that　great　duty；　because　it　overlooks　the　existence　of　about　half　of　the　whole　number　of　mental　feelings　which　human　beings　are　capable　of；　including　all　those　of　which　the　direct　objects　are　states　of　their　own　mind。　　　　　Morality　consists　of　two　parts。　One　of　these　is　self…education；　the　training；　by　the　human　being　himself；　of　his　affections　and　will。　That　department　is　a　blank　in　Bentham's　system。　The　other　and　co…equal　part；　the　regulation　of　his　outward　actions；　must　be　altogether　halting　and　imperfect　without　the　first；　for　how　can　we　judge　in　what　manner　many　an　action　will　affect　even　the　worldly　interests　of　ourselves　or　others；　unless　we　take　in；　as　part　of　the　question；　its　influence　on　the　regulation　o