bentham-第3章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


ct　the　whole；　as　we　unquestionably　must　a　large　part；　of　the　opinions　themselves。　　　　　Bentham's　method　may　be　shortly　described　as　the　method　of　detail；　of　treating　wholes　by　separating　them　into　their　parts；　abstractions　by　resolving　them　into　Things；　classes　and　generalities　by　distinguishing　them　into　the　individuals　of　which　they　are　made　up；　and　breaking　every　question　into　pieces　before　attempting　to　solve　it。　The　precise　amount　of　originality　of　this　process；　considered　as　a　logical　conception　　its　degree　of　connexion　with　the　methods　of　physical　science；　or　with　the　previous　labours　of　Bacon；　Hobbes　or　Locke　　is　not　an　essential　consideration　in　this　pace。　Whatever　originality　there　was　in　the　method　　in　the　subjects　he　applied　it　to；　and　in　the　rigidity　with　which　he　adhered　to　it；　there　was　the　greatest。　Hence　his　interminable　classifications。　Hence　his　elaborate　demonstrations　of　the　most　acknowledged　truths。　That　murder；　incendiarism；　robbery；　are　mischievous　actions；　he　will　not　take　for　granted　without　proof；　let　the　thing　appear　ever　so　self…evident；　he　will　know　the　why　and　the　how　of　it　with　the　last　degree　of　precision；　he　will　distinguish　all　the　different　mischiefs　of　a　crime；　whether　of　the　first；　the　second　or　the　third　order；　namely；　1。　the　evil　to　the　sufferer；　and　to　his　personal　connexions；　2。　the　danger　from　example；　and　the　alarm　or　painful　feeling　of　insecurity；　and　3。　the　discouragement　to　industry　and　useful　pursuits　arising　from　the　alarm；　and　the　trouble　and　resources　which　must　be　expended　in　warding　off　the　danger。　After　this　enumeration；　he　will　prove　from　the　laws　of　human　feeling；　that　even　the　first　of　these　evils；　the　sufferings　of　the　immediate　victim；　will　on　the　average　greatly　outweigh　the　pleasure　reaped　by　the　offender；　much　more　when　all　the　other　evils　are　taken　into　account。　Unless　this　could　be　proved；　he　would　account　the　infliction　of　punishment　unwarrantable；　and　for　taking　the　trouble　to　prove　it　formally；　his　defence　is；　'there　are　truths　which　it　is　necessary　to　prove；　not　for　their　own　sakes；　because　they　are　acknowledged；　but　that　an　opening　may　be　made　for　the　reception　of　other　truths　which　depend　upon　them。　It　is　in　this　manner　we　provide　for　the　reception　of　first　principles；　which；　once　received；　prepare　the　way　for　admission　of　all　other　truths。'　To　which　may　be　added；　that　in　this　manner　also　we　discipline　the　mind　for　practising　the　same　sort　of　dissection　upon　questions　more　complicated　and　of　more　doubtful　issue。　　　　　It　is　a　sound　maxim；　and　one　which　all　close　thinkers　have　felt；　but　which　no　one　before　Bentham　ever　so　consistently　applied；　that　error　lurks　in　generalities：　that　the　human　mind　is　not　capable　of　embracing　a　complex　whole；　until　it　has　surveyed　and　catalogued　the　parts　of　which　that　whole　is　made　up；　that　abstractions　are　not　realities　per　se；　but　an　abridged　mode　of　expressing　facts；　and　that　the　only　practical　mode　of　dealing　with　them　is　to　trace　them　back　to　the　facts　（whether　of　experience　or　of　consciousness）　of　which　they　are　the　expression。　Proceeding　on　this　principle；　Bentham　makes　short　work　with　the　ordinary　modes　of　moral　and　political　reasoning。　These；　it　appeared　to　him；　when　hunted　to　their　source；　for　the　most　part　terminated　in　phrases。　In　politics；　liberty；　social　order；　constitution；　law　of　nature；　social　compact；　etc。；　were　the　catchwords：　ethics　had　its　analogous　ones。　Such　were　the　arguments　on　which　the　gravest　questions　of　morality　and　policy　were　made　to　turn；　not　reasons；　but　allusions　to　reasons；　sacramental　expressions；　by　which　a　summary　appeal　was　made　to　some　general　sentiment　of　mankind；　or　to　some　maxim　in　familiar　use；　which　might　be　true　or　not；　but　the　limitations　of　which　no　one　had　ever　critically　examined。　And　this　satisfied　other　people；　but　not　Bentham。　He　required　something　more　than　opinion　as　a　reason　for　opinion。　Whenever　he　found　a　phrase　used　as　an　argument　for　or　against　anything；　he　insisted　upon　knowing　what　it　meant；　whether　it　appealed　to　any　standard；　or　gave　intimation　of　any　matter　of　fact　relevant　to　the　question；　and　if　he　could　not　find　that　it　did　either；　he　treated　it　as　an　attempt　on　the　part　of　the　disputant　to　impose　his　own　individual　sentiment　on　other　people；　without　giving　them　a　reason　for　it；　a　'　contrivance　for　avoiding　the　obligation　of　appealing　to　any　external　standard；　and　for　prevailing　upon　the　reader　to　accept　of　the　author's　sentiment　and　opinion　as　a　reason；　and　that　a　sufficient　one；　for　itself。　Bentham　shall　speak　for　himself　on　this　subject：　the　passage　is　from　his　first　systematic　work；　'Introduction　to　the　Principles　of　Morals　and　Legislation'；　and　we　could　scarcely　quote　anything　more　strongly　exemplifying　both　the　strength　and　weakness　of　his　mode　of　philosophizing。

　　　　It　is　curious　enough　to　observe　the　variety　of　inventions　men　have　hit　upon；　and　the　variety　of　phrases　they　have　brought　forward；　in　order　to　conceal　from　the　world；　and；　if　possible；　from　themselves；　this　very　general　and　therefore　very　pardonable　self…sufficiency。　　　　　1。　One　man　says；　he　has　a　thing　made　on　purpose　to　tell　him　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong；　and　that　is　called　a　'moral　sense'。。　and　then　he　goes　to　work　at　his　ease；　and　says；　such　a　thing　is　right；　and　such　a　thing　is　wrong　　why？　'Because　my　moral　sense　tells　me　it　is。'　　　　　2。　Another　man　comes　and　alters　the　phrase：　leaving　out　moral；　and　putting　in　common　in　the　room　of　it。　He　then　tells　you　that　his　common　sense　tells　him　what　is　right　and　wrong；　as　surely　as　the　other's　moral　sense　did；　meaning　by　common　sense　a　sense　of　some　kind　or　other；　which；　he　says；　is　possessed　by　all　mankind：　the　sense　of　those　whose　sense　is　not　the　same　as　the　author's　being　struck　out　as　not　worth　taking。　This　contrivance　does　better　than　the　other；　for　a　moral　sense　being　a　new　thing；　a　man　may　feel　about　him　a　good　while　without　being　able　to　find　it　out：　but　common　sense　is　as　old　as　the　creation；　and　there　is　no　man　but　would　be　ashamed　to　be　thought　not　to　have　as　much　of　it　as　his　neighbours。　It　has　another　great　advantage：　by　appearing　to　share　power；　it　lessens　envy；　for　when　a　man　gets　up　upon　this　ground；　in　order　to　anathematize　those　who　differ　from　him；　it　is　not　by　a　sic　volo　sic　jubeo；　but　by　a　velitis　jubeatis。　　　　　3。　Another　man　comes；　and　says；　that　as　to　a　moral　sense　indeed；　he　cannot　find　that　he　has　any　such　thing：　that；　however；　he　has　an　understanding；　which　will　do　quite　as　well。　This　understanding；　he　says；　is　the　standard　of　right　and　wrong：　it　tells　him　so　and　so。　All　good　and　wise　men　understand　as　he　does：　if　other　men's　understandings　differ　in　any　part　from　his；　so　much　the　worse　for　them：　it　is　a　sure　sign　they　are　either　defective　or　corrupt。　　　　　4。　Another　man　says；　that　there　is　an　eternal　and　immutable　Rule　of　Right：　that　the　rule　of　right　dictates　so　and　so：　and　then　he　begins　giving　you　his　sentiments　upon　anything　that　comes　uppermost：　and　these　sentiments　（you　are　to　take　for　granted）　are　so　many　branches　of　the　eternal　rule　of　right。　　　　　5。　Another　man；　or　perhaps　the　same　man　（it　is　nO　matter）；　says　that　there　are　certain　practices　conformable　and　others　repugnant；　to　the　Fitness　of　Things；　and　then　he　tells　you；　at　his　leisure；　what　practices　are　conformable；　and　what　repugnant：　just　as　he　happens　to　like　a　practice　or　dislike　it。　　　　　6。　A　great　multitude　of　people　are　continually　talking　of　the　Law　of　Nature；　and　then　they　go　on　giving　you　their　sentiments　about　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong：　and　these　sentiments；　you　are　to　understand；　are　so　many　chapters　and　sections　of　the　Law　of　Nature。　　　　　7。　Instead　of　the　phrase；　Law　of　Nature；　you　have　sometimes　Law　of　Reason；　Right　Reason；　Natural　Justice；　Natural　Equity；　Good　Order。　Any　of　them　will　do　equally　well。　This　latter　is　most　used　in　politics。　The　three　last　are　much　more　tolerable　than　the　others；　because　they　do　not　very　explicitly　claim　to　be　anything　more　than　phrases：　they　insist　but　feebly　upon　their　being　looked　upon　as　so　many　positive　standards　of　themselves；　and　seem　content　to　be　taken；　upon　occasion；　for　phrases　expressive　of　the　conformity　of　the　thing　in　question　to　the　proper　standards；　whatever　that　may　be。　On　most　occasions；　howe