phenomenology of mind-第71章

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each　by　itself；　there　is　no　necessity　to　be　found　between　them；　and　no　law　of　their　relation　to　one
another。　




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　　　　　　　　　　　　　Observation　of　the　Relation　of　Self…Consciousness
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　its　Immediate　Actuality　—
　　　　　　　　　　　　Physiognomy　&　Phrenology。　（1）

PSYCHOLOGICAL　observation　discovers　no　law　for　the　relation　of　self…consciousness　to
actuality　or　the　world　over　against　it；　and　owing　to　their　mutual　indifference　it　is　forced　to　fall　back
on　the　peculiar　determinate　characteristic　of　real　individuality；　which　has　a　being　in　and　for　itself　or
contains　the　opposition　of　subjective　self…existence　（Fürsichseyn）　and　objective　inherent
existence　（Ansichseyn）　dissolved　and　extinguished　within　its　own　process　of　absolute　mediation。
Individuality　is　now　the　object　for　observation；　or　the　object　to　which　observation　now　passes。

The　individual　exists　in　himself　and　for　himself。　He　is　for　himself；　or　is　a　free　activity；　he　is；
however；　also　in　himself；　or　has　himself　an　original　determinate　being　of　his　own　—　a　character
which　is　in　principle　the　same　as　what　psychology　sought　to　find　outside　him。　Opposition　thus
breaks　out　in　his　own　self；　it　has　this　twofold　nature；　it　is　a　process　or　movement　of　consciousness；
and　it　is　the　fixed　being　of　a　reality　with　a　phenomenal　character；　a　reality　which　in　it　is　directly　its
own。　This　being；　the　〃body〃　of　the　determinate　individuality；　is　its　original　source；　that　in　the　making
of　which　it　has　had　nothing　to　do。　But　since　the　individual　at　the　same　time　merely　is　what　he　has
done；　his　body　is　also　an　〃expression〃　of　himself　which　he　has　brought　about；　a　sign　and　indication
as　well；　which　has　not　remained　a　bare　immediate　fact；　but　through　which　the　individual　only
makes　known　what　is　actually　implied　by　his　setting　his　original　nature　to　work。

If　we　consider　the　moments　we　have　here　in　relation　to　the　view　previously　indicated；　we　find　a
general　human　shape　and　form；　or　at　least　the　general　character　of　a　climate；　of　a　portion　of　the
world；　of　a　people；　just　as　formerly　we　found　in　the　same　way　general　customs　and　culture。　In
addition　the　particular　circumstances　and　situation　are　within　the　universal　reality；　here　this
particular　reality　is　a　particular　formation　of　the　shape　of　the　individual。　On　the　other　side；　whereas
formerly　we　were　dealing　with　the　free　activity　of　the　individual；　and　reality　in　the　sense　of　his　own
reality　was　put　in　contrast　and　opposition　to　reality　as　given；　here　the　shape　assumed　by　the
individual　stands　as　an　expression　of　his　own　actualization　established　by　the　individual　himself；　it
bears　the　lineaments　and　forms　of　his　spontaneously　active　being。　But　the　reality；　both　universal　as
well　as　particular；　which　observation　formerly　found　outside　the　individual；　is　here　the　actual　reality
of　the　individual；　his　connate　body；　and　within　this　very　body　the　expression　due　to　his　own　action
appears。　From　the　psychological　point　of　view　objective　reality　in　and　for　itself　and　determinate
individuality　had　to　be　brought　into　relation　to　one　another；　here；　however；　it　is　the　whole
determinate　individuality　that　is　the　object　for　observation；　and　each　aspect　of　the　opposition　it
entails　is　itself　this　whole。　Thus；　to　the　outer　whole　belongs　not　merely　the　original　primordial　being；
the　connate　body；　but　the　formation　of　the　body　as　well；　which　is　due　to　activity　from　the　inner
side；　the　body　is　a　unity　of　unformed　and　formed　existence；　and　is　the　reality　of　the　individual
permeated　by　his　reference　to　self。　This　whole　embraces　the　definite　parts　fixed　originally　and　from
the　first；　and　also　the　lineaments　which　arise　only　as　the　result　of　action；　this　whole　so　formed　is；
and　this　being　is　an　expression　of　what　is　inner；　of　the　individual　constituted　as　a　consciousness　and
as　a　process。

This　inner　is；　too；　no　longer　formal；　spontaneous　activity　without　any　content　or　determinateness　of
its　own；　an　activity　With　its　content　and　specific　nature；　as　in　the　former　case；　lying　in　external
circumstances；　it　is　an　original　inherently　determinate　Character；　whose　form　alone　is　the　activity。
What；　then；　we　have　to　consider　here　is　the　relation　subsisting　between　the　two　sides；　the　point　to
observe　is　how　this　relation　is　determined；　and　what　is　to　be　understood　by　the　inner　finding
expression　in　the　outer。

This　outer；　in　the　first　place；　does　not　act　as　an　organ　making　the　inner　visible；　or；　in　general　terms；
a　being　for　another；　for　the　inner；　so　far　as　it　is　in　the　organ；　is　the　activity　itself。　The　mouth　that
speaks；　the　hand　that　works；　with　the　legs　too；　if　we　care　to　add　them；　are　the　operative　organs
effecting　the　actual　realization；　and　they　contain　the　action　qua　action；　or　the　inner　as　such；　the
externality；　however；　which　the　inner　obtains　by　their　means　is　the　deed；　the　act；　in　the　sense　of　a
reality　separated　and　cut　off　from　the　individual。　Language　and　labour　are　outer　expressions　in
which　the　individual　no　longer　retains　possession　of　himself　per　se；　but　lets　the　inner　get　right
outside　him；　and　surrenders　it　to　something　else。　For　that　reason　we　might　just　as　truly　say　that
these　outer　expressions　express　the　inner　too　much　as　that　they　do　so　too　little：　too　much　—
because　the　inner　itself　breaks　out　in　them；　and　there　remains　no　opposition　between　them　and　it；
they　not　merely　give　an　expression　of　the　inner；　they　give　the　inner　itself　directly　and　immediately：
too　little　—　because　in　speech　and　action　the　inner　turns　itself　into　something　else；　into　an　other；
and　thereby　puts　itself　at　the　mercy　of　the　element　of　change；　which　transforms　the　spoken　word
and　the　accomplished　act；　and　makes　something　else　out　of　them　than　they　are　in　and　for
themselves　as　actions　of　a　particular　determinate　individual。　Not　only　do　the　products　of　actions；
owing　to　this　externality；　lose　by　the　influence　of　others　the　character　of　being　something　constant
vis…a…vis　other　individualities；　but　by　their　assuming　towards　the　inner　which　they　contain；　the
attitude　of　something　external；　separate；　independent；　and　indifferent；　they　can；　through　the
individual　himself；　be　qua　inner　something　other　than　they　seem。　Either　the　individual　intentionally
makes　them　in　appearance　something　else　than　they　are　in　truth；　or　he　is　too　incompetent　to　give
himself　the　outer　aspect　be　really　wanted；　and　to　give　them　such　fixity　and　permanence　that　the
product　of　his　action　cannot　become　misrepresented　by　others。　The　action；　then；　in　the　form　of　a
completed　product　has　the　double　and　opposite　significance　of　being　either　the　inner　individuality
and　not　its　expression；　or；　qua　external；　a　reality　detached　from　the　inner；　a　reality　which　is
something　quite　different　from　the　inner。　On　account　of　this　ambiguity；　we　must　look　about　for　the
inner　as　it　still　is　within　the　individual　himself；　but　in　a　visible　or　external　form。　In　the　organ；
however；　it　exists　merely　as　immediate　activity　as　such；　which　attains　its　externalization　in　the　act　or
deed；　that　either　does　or　again　does　not　represent　the　inner。　The　organ；　in　the　light　of　this
opposition；　thus　does　not　afford　the　expression　which　is　sought。

If　now　the　external　shape　and　form　were　able　to　express　the　inner　individuality　only　in　so　far　as
that　shape　is　neither　an　organ　nor　action；　hence　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　inert　passive　whole；　it
would　then　play　the　r？le　of　a　subsistent　thing；　which　received　undisturbed　the　inner　as　an　alien
element　into　its　own　passive　being；　and　thereby　became　the　sign　and　symbol　of　it　—　an　external
contingent　expression；　whose　actual　concrete　aspect　has　no　meaning　of　its　own　—　a　language
whose　sounds　and　tone…combinations　are　not　the　real　fact　itself；　but　are　capriciously　connected
with　it　and　a　mere　accident　so　far　as　it　is　concerned。

Such　a　capricious　association　of　factors　that　are　external　for　one　another　does　not　give　a　law。
Physiognomy；　however；　would　claim　distinction　from　other　spurious　arts　and　unwholesome
studies　on　the　ground　that　in　dealing　with　determinate　individuality　it　considers　the　necessary
opposition　of　an　inner　and　an　outer；　of　character　as　a　conscious　nature　and　character　as　a
definitely