common sense-第2章

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a　common　interest　with　every　part　of　the　community；　they　will

mutually　and　naturally　support　each　other；　and　on　this　（not　on

the　unmeaning　name　of　king）　depends　the　STRENGTH　OF　GOVERNMENT；

AND　THE　HAPPINESS　OF　THE　GOVERNED。



Here　then　is　the　origin　and　rise　of　government；　namely；　a　mode　rendered

necessary　by　the　inability　of　moral　virtue　to　govern　the　world；

here　too　is　the　design　and　end　of　government；　viz。　　freedom　and　security。

And　however　our　eyes　may　be　dazzled　with　show；　or　our　ears　deceived　by　sound；

however　prejudice　may　warp　our　wills；　or　interest　darken　our　understanding；

the　simple　voice　of　nature　and　of　reason　will　say；　it　is　right。



I　draw　my　idea　of　the　form　of　government　from　a　principle　in　nature；

which　no　art　can　overturn；　viz。　　that　the　more　simple　any　thing　is；

the　less　liable　it　is　to　be　disordered；　and　the　easier　repaired

when　disordered；　and　with　this　maxim　in　view；　I　offer　a　few　remarks

on　the　so　much　boasted　constitution　of　England。　　That　it　was　noble

for　the　dark　and　slavish　times　in　which　it　was　erected；　is　granted。

When　the　world　was　overrun　with　tyranny　the　least　remove　therefrom

was　a　glorious　rescue。　　But　that　it　is　imperfect；　subject　to　convulsions；

and　incapable　of　producing　what　it　seems　to　promise；　is　easily　demonstrated。



Absolute　governments　（tho'　the　disgrace　of　human　nature）　have　this

advantage　with　them；　that　they　are　simple；　if　the　people　suffer；

they　know　the　head　from　which　their　suffering　springs；　know　likewise

the　remedy；　and　are　not　bewildered　by　a　variety　of　causes　and　cures。

But　the　constitution　of　England　is　so　exceedingly　complex；

that　the　nation　may　suffer　for　years　together　without　being　able　to　discover

in　which　part　the　fault　lies；　some　will　say　in　one　and　some　in　another；

and　every　political　physician　will　advise　a　different　medicine。



I　know　it　is　difficult　to　get　over　local　or　long　standing　prejudices；

yet　if　we　will　suffer　ourselves　to　examine　the　component　parts　of　the

English　constitution；　we　shall　find　them　to　be　the　base　remains　of　two

ancient　tyrannies；　compounded　with　some　new　republican　materials。





FIRST　…　The　remains　of　monarchial　tyranny　in　the　person　of　the　king。

SECONDLY　…　The　remains　of　aristocratical　tyranny　in　the　persons　of　the　peers。

THIRDLY　…　The　new　republican　materials　in　the　persons　of　the　commons；

　　　　　　　　　　on　whose　virtue　depends　the　freedom　of　England。





The　two　first；　by　being　hereditary；　are　independent　of　the　people；

wherefore　in　a　CONSTITUTIONAL　SENSE　they　contribute　nothing　towards

the　freedom　of　the　state。



To　say　that　the　constitution　of　England　is　a　UNION　of　three　powers

reciprocally　CHECKING　each　other；　is　farcical；　either　the　words　have

no　meaning；　or　they　are　flat　contradictions。



To　say　that　the　commons　is　a　check　upon　the　king；　presupposes　two　things：



FIRST　…　That　the　king　is　not　to　be　trusted　without　being　looked　after；

or　in　other　words；　that　a　thirst　for　absolute　power　is　the　natural

disease　of　monarchy。



SECONDLY　…　That　the　commons；　by　being　appointed　for　that　purpose；

are　either　wiser　or　more　worthy　of　confidence　than　the　crown。



But　as　the　same　constitution　which　gives　the　commons　a　power　to　check

the　king　by　withholding　the　supplies；　gives　afterwards　the　king　a　power

to　check　the　commons；　by　empowering　him　to　reject　their　other　bills；

it　again　supposes　that　the　king　is　wiser　than　those　whom　it　has　already

supposed　to　be　wiser　than　him。　　A　mere　absurdity！



There　is　something　exceedingly　ridiculous　in　the　composition　of　monarchy；

it　first　excludes　a　man　from　the　means　of　information；　yet　empowers　him

to　act　in　cases　where　the　highest　judgment　is　required。　　The　state　of　a　king

shuts　him　from　the　world；　yet　the　business　of　a　king　requires　him　to　know

it　thoroughly；　wherefore　the　different　parts；　by　unnaturally　opposing

and　destroying　each　other；　prove　the　whole　character　to　be　absurd　and　useless。



Some　writers　have　explained　the　English　constitution　thus：　The　king；

say　they；　is　one；　the　people　another；　the　peers　are　a　house　in　behalf

of　the　king；　the　commons　in　behalf　of　the　people；　but　this　hath　all

the　distinctions　of　a　house　divided　against　itself；　and　though

the　expressions　be　pleasantly　arranged；　yet　when　examined；

they　appear　idle　and　ambiguous；　and　it　will　always　happen；

that　the　nicest　construction　that　words　are　capable　of；

when　applied　to　the　description　of　some　thing　which　either

cannot　exist；　or　is　too　incomprehensible　to　be　within

the　compass　of　description；　will　be　words　of　sound　only；

and　though　they　may　amuse　the　ear；　they　cannot　inform　the　mind；

for　this　explanation　includes　a　previous　question；　viz。

HOW　CAME　THE　KING　BY　A　POWER　WHICH　THE　PEOPLE　ARE　AFRAID　TO　TRUST；

AND　ALWAYS　OBLIGED　TO　CHECK？　　Such　a　power　could　not　be　the　gift

of　a　wise　people；　neither　can　any　power；　WHICH　NEEDS　CHECKING；

be　from　God；　yet　the　provision；　which　the　constitution　makes；

supposes　such　a　power　to　exist。



But　the　provision　is　unequal　to　the　task；　the　means　either　cannot

or　will　not　accomplish　the　end；　and　the　whole　affair　is　a　felo　de　se；

for　as　the　greater　weight　will　always　carry　up　the　less；　and　as　all

the　wheels　of　a　machine　are　put　in　motion　by　one；　it　only　remains　to　know

which　power　in　the　constitution　has　the　most　weight；　for　that　will　govern；

and　though　the　others；　or　a　part　of　them；　may　clog；　or；　as　the　phrase　is；

check　the　rapidity　of　its　motion；　yet　so　long　as　they　cannot　stop　it；

their　endeavours　will　be　ineffectual；　the　first　moving　power　will

at　last　have　its　way；　and　what　it　wants　in　speed；　is　supplied　by　time。



That　the　crown　is　this　overbearing　part　in　the　English　constitution；

needs　not　be　mentioned；　and　that　it　derives　its　whole　consequence

merely　from　being　the　giver　of　places　and　pensions；　is　self…evident；

wherefore；　though　we　have　been　wise　enough　to　shut　and　lock　a　door

against　absolute　monarchy；　we　at　the　same　time　have　been　foolish

enough　to　put　the　crown　in　possession　of　the　key。



The　prejudice　of　Englishmen　in　favour　of　their　own　government　by　king；

lords；　and　commons；　arises　as　much　or　more　from　national　pride　than　reason。

Individuals　are　undoubtedly　safer　in　England　than　in　some　other　countries；

but　the　WILL　of　the　king　is　as　much　the　LAW　of　the　land　in　Britain

as　in　France；　with　this　difference；　that　instead　of　proceeding　directly

from　his　mouth；　it　is　handed　to　the　people　under　the　more　formidable　shape

of　an　act　of　parliament。　　For　the　fate　of　Charles　the　First　hath　only　made

kings　more　subtle　…　not　more　just。



Wherefore；　laying　aside　all　national　pride　and　prejudice

in　favour　of　modes　and　forms；　the　plain　truth　is；　that

IT　IS　WHOLLY　OWING　TO　THE　CONSTITUTION　OF　THE　PEOPLE；

AND　NOT　TO　THE　CONSTITUTION　OF　THE　GOVERNMENT；

that　the　crown　is　not　as　oppressive　in　England　as　in　Turkey。



An　inquiry　into　the　CONSTITUTIONAL　ERRORS　in　the　English　form

of　government　is　at　this　time　highly　necessary；　for　as　we　are　never

in　a　proper　condition　of　doing　justice　to　others；　while　we　continue　under

the　influence　of　some　leading　partiality；　so　neither　are　we　capable　of

doing　it　to　ourselves　while　we　remain　fettered　by　any　obstinate　prejudice。

And　as　a　man。　　who　is　attached　to　a　prostitute；　is　unfitted　to　choose

or　judge　a　wife；　so　any　prepossession　in　favour　of　a　rotten　constitution

of　government　will　disable　us　from　discerning　a　good　one。









OF　MONARCHY　AND　HEREDITARY　SUCCESSION







Mankind　being　originally　equals　in　the　order　of　creation；　the　equality

could　only　be　destroyed　by　some　subsequent　circumstance；　the　distinctions

of　rich；　and　poor；　may　in　a　great　measure　be　accounted　for；　and　that　without

having　recourse　to　the　harsh；　ill…sounding　names　of　oppression　and　avarice。

Oppression　is　often　the　CONSEQUENCE；　but　seldom　or　never　the　MEANS　of　riches；

and　though　avarice　will　preserve　a　man　from　being　necessitously　poor；

it　generally　makes　him　too　timorous　to　be　wealthy。



But　there　is　another　a