the+critique+of+practical+reason-第44章

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everything　that　men　may　regard　as　part　of　happiness。　Morality；　then；
must　have　the　more　power　over　the　human　heart　the　more　purely　it　is
exhibited。　Whence　it　follows　that；　if　the　law　of　morality　and　the
image　of　holiness　and　virtue　are　to　exercise　any　influence　at　all　on
our　souls；　they　can　do　so　only　so　far　as　they　are　laid　to　heart　in
their　purity　as　motives；　unmixed　with　any　view　to　prosperity；　for　it
is　in　suffering　that　they　display　themselves　most　nobly。　Now　that
whose　removal　strengthens　the　effect　of　a　moving　force　must　have
been　a　hindrance；　consequently　every　admixture　of　motives　taken　from
our　own　happiness　is　a　hindrance　to　the　influence　of　the　moral　law
on　the　heart。　I　affirm　further　that　even　in　that　admired　action；　if
the　motive　from　which　it　was　done　was　a　high　regard　for　duty；　then
it　is　just　this　respect　for　the　law　that　has　the　greatest　influence　on
the　mind　of　the　spectator；　not　any　pretension　to　a　supposed　inward
greatness　of　mind　or　noble　meritorious　sentiments；　consequently
duty；　not　merit；　must　have　not　only　the　most　definite；　but；　when　it　is
represented　in　the　true　light　of　its　inviolability；　the　most
penetrating；　influence　on　the　mind。
　　It　is　more　necessary　than　ever　to　direct　attention　to　this　method　in
our　times；　when　men　hope　to　produce　more　effect　on　the　mind　with　soft；
tender　feelings；　or　high…flown；　puffing…up　pretensions；　which　rather
wither　the　heart　than　strengthen　it；　than　by　a　plain　and　earnest
representation　of　duty；　which　is　more　suited　to　human　imperfection　and
to　progress　in　goodness。　To　set　before　children；　as　a　pattern；　actions
that　are　called　noble；　magnanimous；　meritorious；　with　the　notion　of
captivating　them　by　infusing　enthusiasm　for　such　actions；　is　to　defeat
our　end。　For　as　they　are　still　so　backward　in　the　observance　of　the
monest　duty；　and　even　in　the　correct　estimation　of　it；　this　means
simply　to　make　them　fantastical　romancers　betimes。　But；　even　with
the　instructed　and　experienced　part　of　mankind；　this　supposed　spring
has；　if　not　an　injurious；　at　least　no　genuine；　moral　effect　on　the
heart；　which；　however；　is　what　it　was　desired　to　produce。
　　All　feelings；　especially　those　that　are　to　produce　unwonted
exertions；　must　acplish　their　effect　at　the　moment　they　are　at
their　height　and　before　the　calm　down；　otherwise　they　effect
nothing；　for　as　there　was　nothing　to　strengthen　the　heart；　but　only　to
excite　it；　it　naturally　returns　to　its　normal　moderate　tone　and；　thus；
falls　back　into　its　previous　languor。　Principles　must　be　built　on
conceptions；　on　any　other　basis　there　can　only　be　paroxysms；　which　can
give　the　person　no　moral　worth；　nay；　not　even　confidence　in　himself；
without　which　the　highest　good　in　man；　consciousness　of　the　morality
of　his　mind　and　character；　cannot　exist。　Now　if　these　conceptions
are　to　bee　subjectively　practical；　we　must　not　rest　satisfied
with　admiring　the　objective　law　of　morality；　and　esteeming　it　highly
in　reference　to　humanity；　but　we　must　consider　the　conception　of　it　in
relation　to　man　as　an　individual；　and　then　this　law　appears　in　a
form　indeed　that　is　highly　deserving　of　respect；　but　not　so　pleasant
as　if　it　belonged　to　the　element　to　which　he　is　naturally
accustomed；　but　on　the　contrary　as　often　pelling　him　to　quit　this
element；　not　without　self…denial；　and　to　betake　himself　to　a　higher；
in　which　he　can　only　maintain　himself　with　trouble　and　with
unceasing　apprehension　of　a　relapse。　In　a　word；　the　moral　law
demands　obedience；　from　duty　not　from　predilection；　which　cannot　and
ought　not　to　be　presupposed　at　all。
　　Let　us　now　see；　in　an　example；　whether　the　conception　of　an
action；　as　a　noble　and　magnanimous　one；　has　more　subjective　moving
power　than　if　the　action　is　conceived　merely　as　duty　in　relation　to
the　solemn　law　of　morality。　The　action　by　which　a　man　endeavours　at
the　greatest　peril　of　life　to　rescue　people　from　shipwreck；　at　last
losing　his　life　in　the　attempt；　is　reckoned　on　one　side　as　duty；　but
on　the　other　and　for　the　most　part　as　a　meritorious　action；　but　our
esteem　for　it　is　much　weakened　by　the　notion　of　duty　to　himself
which　seems　in　this　case　to　be　somewhat　infringed。　More　decisive　is
the　magnanimous　sacrifice　of　life　for　the　safety　of　one's　country；　and
yet　there　still　remains　some　scruple　whether　it　is　a　perfect　duty　to
devote　one's　self　to　this　purpose　spontaneously　and　unbidden；　and
the　action　has　not　in　itself　the　full　force　of　a　pattern　and　impulse
to　imitation。　But　if　an　indispensable　duty　be　in　question；　the
transgression　of　which　violates　the　moral　law　itself；　and　without
regard　to　the　welfare　of　mankind；　and　as　it　were　tramples　on　its
holiness　（such　as　are　usually　called　duties　to　God；　because　in　Him
we　conceive　the　ideal　of　holiness　in　substance）；　then　we　give　our　most
perfect　esteem　to　the　pursuit　of　it　at　the　sacrifice　of　all　that　can
have　any　value　for　the　dearest　inclinations；　and　we　find　our　soul
strengthened　and　elevated　by　such　an　example；　when　we　convince
ourselves　by　contemplation　of　it　that　human　nature　is　capable　of　so
great　an　elevation　above　every　motive　that　nature　can　oppose　to　it。
Juvenal　describes　such　an　example　in　a　climax　which　makes　the　reader
feel　vividly　the　force　of　the　spring　that　is　contained　in　the　pure　law
of　duty；　as　duty：

　　　　Esto　bonus　miles；　tutor　bonus；　arbiter　idem
　　　　Integer；　ambiguae　si　quando　citabere　testis
　　　　Incertaeque　rei；　Phalaris　licet　imperet　ut　sis
　　　　Falsus；　et　admoto　dictet　periuria　tauro；
　　　　Summum　crede　nefas　animam　praeferre　pudori；
　　　　Et　propter　vitam　vivendi　perdere　causas。*

　　*＇Juvenal；　Satirae；　〃Be　you　a　good　soldier；　a　faithful　tutor；　an
uncorrupted　umpire　also；　if　you　are　summoned　as　a　witness　in　a
doubtful　and　uncertain　thing；　though　Phalaris　should　mand　that
you　should　be　false；　and　should　dictate　perjuries　with　the　bull
brought　to　you；　believe　it　the　highest　impiety　to　prefer　life　to
reputation；　and　for　the　sake　of　life；　to　lose　the　causes　of　living。〃＇

　　When　we　can　bring　any　flattering　thought　of　merit　into　our　action；
then　the　motive　is　already　somewhat　alloyed　with　self…love　and　has
therefore　some　assistance　from　the　side　of　the　sensibility。　But　to
postpone　everything　to　the　holiness　of　duty　alone；　and　to　be　conscious
that　we　can　because　our　own　reason　recognises　this　as　its　mand
and　says　that　we　ought　to　do　it；　this　is；　as　it　were；　to　raise
ourselves　altogether　above　the　world　of　sense；　and　there　is
inseparably　involved　in　the　same　a　consciousness　of　the　law；　as　a
spring　of　a　faculty　that　controls　the　sensibility；　and　although　this
is　not　always　attended　with　effect；　yet　frequent　engagement　with
this　spring；　and　the　at　first　minor　attempts　at　using　it；　give　hope
that　this　effect　may　be　wrought；　and　that　by　degrees　the　greatest；　and
that　a　purely　moral　interest　in　it　may　be　produced　in　us。
　　The　method　then　takes　the　following　course。　At　first　we　are　only
concerned　to　make　the　judging　of　actions　by　moral　laws　a　natural
employment　acpanying　all　our　own　free　actions；　as　well　as　the
observation　of　those　of　others；　and　to　make　it　as　it　were　a　habit；　and
to　sharpen　this　judgement；　asking　first　whether　the　action　conforms
objectively　to　the　moral　law；　and　to　what　law；　and　we　distinguish
the　law　that　merely　furnishes　a　principle　of　obligation　from　that
which　is　really　obligatory　（leges　obligandi　a　legibus　obligantibus）；
as；　for　instance；　the　law　of　what　men's　wants　require　from　me；　as
contrasted　with　that　which　their　rights　demand；　the　latter　of　which
prescribes　essential；　the　former　only　non…essential　duties；　and　thus
we　teach　how　to　distinguish　different　kinds　of　duties　which　meet　in
the　same　action。　The　other　point　to　which　attention　must　be　directed
is　the　question　whether　the　action　was　also　（subjectively）　done　for
the　sake　of　the　moral　law；　so　that　it　not　only　is　morally　correct　as　a
deed；　but　also；　by　the　maxim　from　which　it　is　done；　has　moral　worth　as
a　disposition。　Now　there　is　no　doubt　that　this　practice；　and　the
resulting　culture　of　our　reason　in　judging　merely　of　the　practical；
must　gradually　produce　a　certain　interest　even　in　the　law　of　reason；
and　consequently　in　morally　good　actions。　For　we　ultimately　take　a
liking　for　a　thi