the+critique+of+practical+reason-第42章

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end。　Now　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative　Reason　proves　that　this　is
incapable　of　solving　satisfactorily　the　most　weighty　problems　that　are
proposed　to　it；　although　it　does　not　ignore　the　natural　and
important　hints　received　from　the　same　reason；　nor　the　great　steps
that　it　can　make　to　approach　to　this　great　goal　that　is　set　before　it；
which；　however；　it　can　never　reach　of　itself；　even　with　the　help　of
the　greatest　knowledge　of　nature。　Nature　then　seems　here　to　have
provided　us　only　in　a　stepmotherly　fashion　with　the　faculty　required
for　our　end。
　　Suppose；　now；　that　in　this　matter　nature　had　conformed　to　our　wish
and　had　given　us　that　capacity　of　discernment　or　that　enlightenment
which　we　would　gladly　possess；　or　which　some　imagine　they　actually
possess；　what　would　in　all　probability　be　the　consequence？　Unless
our　whole　nature　were　at　the　same　time　changed；　our　inclinations；
which　always　have　the　first　word；　would　first　of　all　demand　their
own　satisfaction；　and；　joined　with　rational　reflection；　the　greatest
possible　and　most　lasting　satisfaction；　under　the　name　of　happiness；
the　moral　law　would　afterwards　speak；　in　order　to　keep　them　within
their　proper　bounds；　and　even　to　subject　them　all　to　a　higher　end；
which　has　no　regard　to　inclination。　But　instead　of　the　conflict　that
the　moral　disposition　has　now　to　carry　on　with　the　inclinations；　in
which；　though　after　some　defeats；　moral　strength　of　mind　may　be
gradually　acquired；　God　and　eternity　with　their　awful　majesty　would
stand　unceasingly　before　our　eyes　（for　what　we　can　prove　perfectly
is　to　us　as　certain　as　that　of　which　we　are　assured　by　the　sight　of
our　eyes）。　Transgression　of　the　law；　would；　no　doubt；　be　avoided；　what
is　manded　would　be　done；　but　the　mental　disposition；　from　which
actions　ought　to　proceed；　cannot　be　infused　by　any　mand；　and　in
this　case　the　spur　of　action　is　ever　active　and　external；　so　that
reason　has　no　need　to　exert　itself　in　order　to　gather　strength　to
resist　the　inclinations　by　a　lively　representation　of　the　dignity　of
the　law：　hence　most　of　the　actions　that　conformed　to　the　law　would
be　done　from　fear；　a　few　only　from　hope；　and　none　at　all　from　duty；
and　the　moral　worth　of　actions；　on　which　alone　in　the　eyes　of
supreme　wisdom　the　worth　of　the　person　and　even　that　of　the　world
depends；　would　cease　to　exist。　As　long　as　the　nature　of　man　remains
what　it　is；　his　conduct　would　thus　be　changed　into　mere　mechanism；
in　which；　as　in　a　puppet…show；　everything　would　gesticulate　well；
but　there　would　be　no　life　in　the　figures。　Now；　when　it　is　quite
otherwise　with　us；　when　with　all　the　effort　of　our　reason　we　have　only
a　very　obscure　and　doubtful　view　into　the　future；　when　the　Governor　of
the　world　allows　us　only　to　conjecture　his　existence　and　his
majesty；　not　to　behold　them　or　prove　them　clearly；　and　on　the　other
hand；　the　moral　law　within　us；　without　promising　or　threatening
anything　with　certainty；　demands　of　us　disinterested　respect；　and　only
when　this　respect　has　bee　active　and　dominant；　does　it　allow　us
by　means　of　it　a　prospect　into　the　world　of　the　supersensible；　and
then　only　with　weak　glances：　all　this　being　so；　there　is　room　for　true
moral　disposition；　immediately　devoted　to　the　law；　and　a　rational
creature　can　bee　worthy　of　sharing　in　the　summum　bonum　that
corresponds　to　the　worth　of　his　person　and　not　merely　to　his
actions。　Thus　what　the　study　of　nature　and　of　man　teaches　us
sufficiently　elsewhere　may　well　be　true　here　also；　that　the
unsearchable　wisdom　by　which　we　exist　is　not　less　worthy　of　admiration
in　what　it　has　denied　than　in　what　it　has　granted。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。

　　　　　　　　　　Methodology　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　the　methodology　of　pure　practical　reason　we　are　not　to　understand
the　mode　of　proceeding　with　pure　practical　principles　（whether　in
study　or　in　exposition）；　with　a　view　to　a　scientific　knowledge　of
them；　which　alone　is　what　is　properly　called　method　elsewhere　in
theoretical　philosophy　（for　popular　knowledge　requires　a　manner；
science　a　method；　i。e。；　a　process　according　to　principles　of　reason　by
which　alone　the　manifold　of　any　branch　of　knowledge　can　bee　a
system）。　On　the　contrary；　by　this　methodology　is　understood　the　mode
in　which　we　can　give　the　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　access　to　the
human　mind　and　influence　on　its　maxims；　that　is；　by　which　we　can
make　the　objectively　practical　reason　subjectively　practical　also。
　　Now　it　is　clear　enough　that　those　determining　principles　of　the　will
which　alone　make　maxims　properly　moral　and　give　them　a　moral　worth；
namely；　the　direct　conception　of　the　law　and　the　objective　necessity
of　obeying　it　as　our　duty；　must　be　regarded　as　the　proper　springs　of
actions；　since　otherwise　legality　of　actions　might　be　produced；　but
not　morality　of　character。　But　it　is　not　so　clear；　on　the　contrary；　it
must　at　first　sight　seem　to　every　one　very　improbable　that　even
subjectively　that　exhibition　of　pure　virtue　can　have　more　power　over
the　human　mind；　and　supply　a　far　stronger　spring　even　for　effecting
that　legality　of　actions；　and　can　produce　more　powerful　resolutions　to
prefer　the　law；　from　pure　respect　for　it；　to　every　other
consideration；　than　all　the　deceptive　allurements　of　pleasure　or　of
all　that　may　be　reckoned　as　happiness；　or　even　than　all　threatenings
of　pain　and　misfortune。　Nevertheless；　this　is　actually　the　case；　and
if　human　nature　were　not　so　constituted；　no　mode　of　presenting　the　law
by　roundabout　ways　and　indirect　remendations　would　ever　produce
morality　of　character。　All　would　be　simple　hypocrisy；　the　law　would　be
hated；　or　at　least　despised；　while　it　was　followed　for　the　sake　of
one's　own　advantage。　The　letter　of　the　law　（legality）　would　be　found
in　our　actions；　but　not　the　spirit　of　it　in　our　minds　（morality）；
and　as　with　all　our　efforts　we　could　not　quite　free　ourselves　from
reason　in　our　judgement；　we　must　inevitably　appear　in　our　own　eyes
worthless；　depraved　men；　even　though　we　should　seek　to　pensate
ourselves　for　this　mortification　before　the　inner　tribunal；　by
enjoying　the　pleasure　that　a　supposed　natural　or　divine　law　might　be
imagined　to　have　connected　with　it　a　sort　of　police　machinery；
regulating　its　operations　by　what　was　done　without　troubling　itself
about　the　motives　for　doing　it。
　　It　cannot　indeed　be　denied　that　in　order　to　bring　an　uncultivated　or
degraded　mind　into　the　track　of　moral　goodness　some　preparatory
guidance　is　necessary；　to　attract　it　by　a　view　of　its　own　advantage；
or　to　alarm　it　by　fear　of　loss；　but　as　soon　as　this　mechanical　work；
these　leading…strings　have　produced　some　effect；　then　we　must　bring
before　the　mind　the　pure　moral　motive；　which；　not　only　because　it　is
the　only　one　that　can　be　the　foundation　of　a　character　（a
practically　consistent　habit　of　mind　with　unchangeable　maxims）；　but
also　because　it　teaches　a　man　to　feel　his　own　dignity；　gives　the
mind　a　power　unexpected　even　by　himself；　to　tear　himself　from　all
sensible　attachments　so　far　as　they　would　fain　have　the　rule；　and　to
find　a　rich　pensation　for　the　sacrifice　he　offers；　in　the
independence　of　his　rational　nature　and　the　greatness　of　soul　to　which
he　sees　that　he　is　destined。　We　will　therefore　show；　by　such
observations　as　every　one　can　make；　that　this　property　of　our　minds；
this　receptivity　for　a　pure　moral　interest；　and　consequently　the
moving　force　of　the　pure　conception　of　virtue；　when　it　is　properly
applied　to　the　human　heart；　is　the　most　powerful　spring　and；　when　a
continued　and　punctual　observance　of　moral　maxims　is　in　question；
the　only　spring　of　good　conduct。　It　must；　however；　be　remembered
that　if　these　observations　only　prove　the　reality　of　such　a　feeling；
but　do　not　show　any　moral　improvement　brought　about　by　it；　this　is
no　argument　against　the　only　method　that　exists　of　making　the
objectively　practical　laws　of　pure　reason　subjectively　practical；
through　the　mere　force　of　the　conception　of　duty；　nor　does　it　prove
that　this　method　is　a　vain　delusion。　For　as　it　has　never　yet　e　into
vogue；　experience　can　say　nothing　of　its　results；　one　can　only　ask　for
proofs　of　the　receptivity　for　such　springs；　and　these　I　will　now
briefly　present；　and　then　sketch　t