the+critique+of+practical+reason-第35章

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rational　but　finite　being；　the　only　thing　possible　is　an　endless
progress　from　the　lower　to　higher　degrees　of　moral　perfection。　The
Infinite　Being；　to　whom　the　condition　of　time　is　nothing；　sees　in　this
to　us　endless　succession　a　whole　of　accordance　with　the　moral　law；　and
the　holiness　which　his　mand　inexorably　requires；　in　order　to　be
true　to　his　justice　in　the　share　which　He　assigns　to　each　in　the
summum　bonum；　is　to　be　found　in　a　single　intellectual　intuition　of　the
whole　existence　of　rational　beings。　All　that　can　be　expected　of　the
creature　in　respect　of　the　hope　of　this　participation　would　be　the
consciousness　of　his　tried　character；　by　which　from　the　progress　he
has　hitherto　made　from　the　worse　to　the　morally　better；　and　the
immutability　of　purpose　which　has　thus　bee　known　to　him；　he　may
hope　for　a　further　unbroken　continuance　of　the　same；　however　long
his　existence　may　last；　even　beyond　this　life；*　and　thus　he　may
hope；　not　indeed　here；　nor　in　any　imaginable　point　of　his　future
existence；　but　only　in　the　endlessness　of　his　duration　（which　God
alone　can　survey）　to　be　perfectly　adequate　to　his　will　（without
indulgence　or　excuse；　which　do　not　harmonize　with　justice）。

　　*It　seems；　nevertheless；　impossible　for　a　creature　to　have　the
conviction　of　his　unwavering　firmness　of　mind　in　the　progress
towards　goodness。　On　this　account　the　Christian　religion　makes　it　e
only　from　the　same　Spirit　that　works　sanctification；　that　is；　this
firm　purpose；　and　with　it　the　consciousness　of　steadfastness　in　the
moral　progress。　But　naturally　one　who　is　conscious　that　he　has
persevered　through　a　long　portion　of　his　life　up　to　the　end　in　the
progress　to　the　better；　and　this　genuine　moral　motives；　may　well
have　the　forting　hope；　though　not　the　certainty；　that　even　in　an
existence　prolonged　beyond　this　life　he　will　continue　in　these
principles；　and　although　he　is　never　justified　here　in　his　own　eyes；
nor　can　ever　hope　to　be　so　in　the　increased　perfection　of　his
nature；　to　which　he　looks　forward；　together　with　an　increase　of
duties；　nevertheless　in　this　progress　which；　though　it　is　directed
to　a　goal　infinitely　remote；　yet　is　in　God's　sight　regarded　as
equivalent　to　possession；　he　may　have　a　prospect　of　a　blessed
future；　for　this　is　the　word　that　reason　employs　to　designate
perfect　well…being　independent　of　all　contingent　causes　of　the
world；　and　which；　like　holiness；　is　an　idea　that　can　be　contained　only
in　an　endless　progress　and　its　totality；　and　consequently　is　never
fully　attained　by　a　creature。

　　V。　The　Existence　of　God　as　a　Postulate　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　In　the　foregoing　analysis　the　moral　law　led　to　a　practical　problem
which　is　prescribed　by　pure　reason　alone；　without　the　aid　of　any
sensible　motives；　namely；　that　of　the　necessary　pleteness　of　the
first　and　principle　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　viz。；　morality；
and；　as　this　can　be　perfectly　solved　only　in　eternity；　to　the
postulate　of　immortality。　The　same　law　must　also　lead　us　to　affirm　the
possibility　of　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　viz。；　happiness
proportioned　to　that　morality；　and　this　on　grounds　as　disinterested　as
before；　and　solely　from　impartial　reason；　that　is；　it　must　lead　to　the
supposition　of　the　existence　of　a　cause　adequate　to　this　effect；　in
other　words；　it　must　postulate　the　existence　of　God；　as　the
necessary　condition　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　（an
object　of　the　will　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　the　moral
legislation　of　pure　reason）。　We　proceed　to　exhibit　this　connection
in　a　convincing　manner。
　　Happiness　is　the　condition　of　a　rational　being　in　the　world　with
whom　everything　goes　according　to　his　wish　and　will；　it　rests；
therefore；　on　the　harmony　of　physical　nature　with　his　whole　end　and
likewise　with　the　essential　determining　principle　of　his　will。　Now　the
moral　law　as　a　law　of　freedom　mands　by　determining　principles；
which　ought　to　be　quite　independent　of　nature　and　of　its　harmony
with　our　faculty　of　desire　（as　springs）。　But　the　acting　rational　being
in　the　world　is　not　the　cause　of　the　world　and　of　nature　itself。　There
is　not　the　least　ground；　therefore；　in　the　moral　law　for　a　necessary
connection　between　morality　and　proportionate　happiness　in　a　being
that　belongs　to　the　world　as　part　of　it；　and　therefore　dependent　on
it；　and　which　for　that　reason　cannot　by　his　will　be　a　cause　of　this
nature；　nor　by　his　own　power　make　it　thoroughly　harmonize；　as　far　as
his　happiness　is　concerned；　with　his　practical　principles。
Nevertheless；　in　the　practical　problem　of　pure　reason；　i。e。；　the
necessary　pursuit　of　the　summum　bonum；　such　a　connection　is　postulated
as　necessary：　we　ought　to　endeavour　to　promote　the　summum　bonum；
which；　therefore；　must　be　possible。　Accordingly；　the　existence　of　a
cause　of　all　nature；　distinct　from　nature　itself　and　containing　the
principle　of　this　connection；　namely；　of　the　exact　harmony　of
happiness　with　morality；　is　also　postulated。　Now　this　supreme　cause
must　contain　the　principle　of　the　harmony　of　nature；　not　merely　with　a
law　of　the　will　of　rational　beings；　but　with　the　conception　of　this
law；　in　so　far　as　they　make　it　the　supreme　determining　principle　of
the　will；　and　consequently　not　merely　with　the　form　of　morals；　but
with　their　morality　as　their　motive；　that　is；　with　their　moral
character。　Therefore；　the　summum　bonum　is　possible　in　the　world　only
on　the　supposition　of　a　Supreme　Being　having　a　causality　corresponding
to　moral　character。　Now　a　being　that　is　capable　of　acting　on　the
conception　of　laws　is　an　intelligence　（a　rational　being）；　and　the
causality　of　such　a　being　according　to　this　conception　of　laws　is
his　will；　therefore　the　supreme　cause　of　nature；　which　must　be
presupposed　as　a　condition　of　the　summum　bonum　is　a　being　which　is　the
cause　of　nature　by　intelligence　and　will；　consequently　its　author；
that　is　God。　It　follows　that　the　postulate　of　the　possibility　of　the
highest　derived　good　（the　best　world）　is　likewise　the　postulate　of　the
reality　of　a　highest　original　good；　that　is　to　say；　of　the　existence
of　God。　Now　it　was　seen　to　be　a　duty　for　us　to　promote　the　summum
bonum；　consequently　it　is　not　merely　allowable；　but　it　is　a
necessity　connected　with　duty　as　a　requisite；　that　we　should
presuppose　the　possibility　of　this　summum　bonum；　and　as　this　is
possible　only　on　condition　of　the　existence　of　God；　it　inseparably
connects　the　supposition　of　this　with　duty；　that　is；　it　is　morally
necessary　to　assume　the　existence　of　God。
　　It　must　be　remarked　here　that　this　moral　necessity　is　subjective；
that　is；　it　is　a　want；　and　not　objective；　that　is；　itself　a　duty；
for　there　cannot　be　a　duty　to　suppose　the　existence　of　anything　（since
this　concerns　only　the　theoretical　employment　of　reason）。　Moreover；　it
is　not　meant　by　this　that　it　is　necessary　to　suppose　the　existence
of　God　as　a　basis　of　all　obligation　in　general　（for　this　rests；　as　has
been　sufficiently　proved；　simply　on　the　autonomy　of　reason　itself）。
What　belongs　to　duty　here　is　only　the　endeavour　to　realize　and　promote
the　summum　bonum　in　the　world；　the　possibility　of　which　can
therefore　be　postulated；　and　as　our　reason　finds　it　not　conceivable
except　on　the　supposition　of　a　supreme　intelligence；　the　admission
of　this　existence　is　therefore　connected　with　the　consciousness　of　our
duty；　although　the　admission　itself　belongs　to　the　domain　of
speculative　reason。　Considered　in　respect　of　this　alone；　as　a
principle　of　explanation；　it　may　be　called　a　hypothesis；　but　in
reference　to　the　intelligibility　of　an　object　given　us　by　the　moral
law　（the　summum　bonum）；　and　consequently　of　a　requirement　for
practical　purposes；　it　may　be　called　faith；　that　is　to　say　a　pure
rational　faith；　since　pure　reason　（both　in　its　theoretical　and
practical　use）　is　the　sole　source　from　which　it　springs。
　　From　this　deduction　it　is　now　intelligible　why　the　Greek　schools
could　never　attain　the　solution　of　their　problem　of　the　practical
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　because　they　made　the　rule　of　the　use
which　the　will　of　man　makes　of　his　freedom　the　sole　and　sufficient
ground　of　this　possibility；　thinking　that　they　had　no　need　for　that
purpose　of　the　existence　of　God。　No　d