the+critique+of+practical+reason-第32章

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with　part　of　the　containing　notion；　but　not　with　the　whole；　and
moreover　two　wholes　may　be　specifically　distinct；　although　they
consist　of　the　same　parts；　namely　if　the　parts　are　united　into　a　whole
in　totally　different　ways。　The　Stoic　maintained　that　the　virtue　was
the　whole　summum　bonum；　and　happiness　only　the　consciousness　of
possessing　it；　as　making　part　of　the　state　of　the　subject。　The
Epicurean　maintained　that　happiness　was　the　whole　summum　bonum；　and
virtue　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　for　its　pursuit；　viz。；　the
rational　use　of　the　means　for　attaining　it。
　　Now　it　is　clear　from　the　Analytic　that　the　maxims　of　virtue　and
those　of　private　happiness　are　quite　heterogeneous　as　to　their　supreme
practical　principle；　and；　although　they　belong　to　one　summum　bonum
which　together　they　make　possible；　yet　they　are　so　far　from　coinciding
that　they　restrict　and　check　one　another　very　much　in　the　same
subject。　Thus　the　question：　〃How　is　the　summum　bonum　practically
possible？〃　still　remains　an　unsolved　problem；　notwithstanding　all
the　attempts　at　coalition　that　have　hitherto　been　made。　The　Analytic
has；　however；　shown　what　it　is　that　makes　the　problem　difficult　to
solve；　namely；　that　happiness　and　morality　are　two　specifically
distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　therefore；　their
bination　cannot　be　analytically　cognised　（as　if　the　man　that
seeks　his　own　happiness　should　find　by　mere　analysis　of　his　conception
that　in　so　acting　he　is　virtuous；　or　as　if　the　man　that　follows　virtue
should　in　the　consciousness　of　such　conduct　find　that　he　is　already
happy　ipso　facto）；　but　must　be　a　synthesis　of　concepts。　Now　since　this
bination　is　recognised　as　a　priori；　and　therefore　as　practically
necessary；　and　consequently　not　as　derived　from　experience；　so　that
the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　does　not　rest　on　any　empirical
principle；　it　follows　that　the　deduction　＇legitimation＇　of　this
concept　must　be　transcendental。　It　is　a　priori　（morally）　necessary
to　produce　the　summum　bonum　by　freedom　of　will：　therefore　the
condition　of　its　possibility　must　rest　solely　on　a　priori　principles
of　cognition。

　　　　　　　　　　I。　The　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　In　the　summum　bonum　which　is　practical　for　us；　i。e。；　to　be
realized　by　our　will；　virtue　and　happiness　are　thought　as
necessarily　bined；　so　that　the　one　cannot　be　assumed　by　pure
practical　reason　without　the　other　also　being　attached　to　it。　Now　this
bination　（like　every　other）　is　either　analytical　or　synthetical。　It
bas　been　shown　that　it　cannot　be　analytical；　it　must　then　be
synthetical　and；　more　particularly；　must　be　conceived　as　the
connection　of　cause　and　effect；　since　it　concerns　a　practical　good；
i。e。；　one　that　is　possible　by　means　of　action；　consequently　either　the
desire　of　happiness　must　be　the　motive　to　maxims　of　virtue；　or　the
maxim　of　virtue　must　be　the　efficient　cause　of　happiness。　The　first　is
absolutely　impossible；　because　（as　was　proved　in　the　Analytic）
maxims　which　place　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　desire
of　personal　happiness　are　not　moral　at　all；　and　no　virtue　can　be
founded　on　them。　But　the　second　is　also　impossible；　because　the
practical　connection　of　causes　and　effects　in　the　world；　as　the　result
of　the　determination　of　the　will；　does　not　depend　upon　the　moral
dispositions　of　the　will；　but　on　the　knowledge　of　the　laws　of　nature
and　the　physical　power　to　use　them　for　one's　purposes；　consequently　we
cannot　expect　in　the　world　by　the　most　punctilious　observance　of　the
moral　laws　any　necessary　connection　of　happiness　with　virtue
adequate　to　the　summum　bonum。　Now；　as　the　promotion　of　this　summum
bonum；　the　conception　of　which　contains　this　connection；　is　a　priori　a
necessary　object　of　our　will　and　inseparably　attached　to　the　moral
law；　the　impossibility　of　the　former　must　prove　the　falsity　of　the
latter。　If　then　the　supreme　good　is　not　possible　by　practical　rules；
then　the　moral　law　also　which　mands　us　to　promote　it　is　directed　to
vain　imaginary　ends　and　must　consequently　be　false。

　　　II。　Critical　Solution　of　the　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　The　antinomy　of　pure　speculative　reason　exhibits　a　similar
conflict　between　freedom　and　physical　necessity　in　the　causality　of
events　in　the　world。　It　was　solved　by　showing　that　there　is　no　real
contradiction　when　the　events　and　even　the　world　in　which　they　occur
are　regarded　（as　they　ought　to　be）　merely　as　appearances；　since　one
and　the　same　acting　being；　as　an　appearance　（even　to　his　own　inner
sense）；　has　a　causality　in　the　world　of　sense　that　always　conforms
to　the　mechanism　of　nature；　but　with　respect　to　the　same　events；　so
far　as　the　acting　person　regards　himself　at　the　same　time　as　a
noumenon　（as　pure　intelligence　in　an　existence　not　dependent　on　the
condition　of　time）；　he　can　contain　a　principle　by　which　that　causality
acting　according　to　laws　of　nature　is　determined；　but　which　is
itself　free　from　all　laws　of　nature。
　　It　is　just　the　same　with　the　foregoing　antinomy　of　pure　practical
reason。　The　first　of　the　two　propositions；　〃That　the　endeavour　after
happiness　produces　a　virtuous　mind；〃　is　absolutely　false；　but　the
second；　〃That　a　virtuous　mind　necessarily　produces　happiness；〃　is
not　absolutely　false；　but　only　in　so　far　as　virtue　is　considered　as
a　form　of　causality　in　the　sensible　world；　and　consequently　only　if
I　suppose　existence　in　it　to　be　the　only　sort　of　existence　of　a
rational　being；　it　is　then　only　conditionally　false。　But　as　I　am　not
only　justified　in　thinking　that　I　exist　also　as　a　noumenon　in　a
world　of　the　understanding；　but　even　have　in　the　moral　law　a　purely
intellectual　determining　principle　of　my　causality　（in　the　sensible
world）；　it　is　not　impossible　that　morality　of　mind　should　have　a
connection　as　cause　with　happiness　（as　an　effect　in　the　sensible
world）　if　not　immediate　yet　mediate　（viz。；　through　an　intelligent
author　of　nature）；　and　moreover　necessary；　while　in　a　system　of　nature
which　is　merely　an　object　of　the　senses；　this　bination　could
never　occur　except　contingently　and；　therefore；　could　not　suffice
for　the　summum　bonum。
　　Thus；　notwithstanding　this　seeming　conflict　of　practical　reason　with
itself；　the　summum　bonum；　which　is　the　necessary　supreme　end　of　a　will
morally　determined；　is　a　true　object　thereof；　for　it　is　practically
possible；　and　the　maxims　of　the　will　which　as　regards　their　matter
refer　to　it　have　objective　reality；　which　at　first　was　threatened　by
the　antinomy　that　appeared　in　the　connection　of　morality　with
happiness　by　a　general　law；　but　this　was　merely　from　a
misconception；　because　the　relation　between　appearances　was　taken
for　a　relation　of　the　things　in　themselves　to　these　appearances。
　　When　we　find　ourselves　obliged　to　go　so　far；　namely；　to　the
connection　with　an　intelligible　world；　to　find　the　possibility　of
the　summum　bonum；　which　reason　points　out　to　all　rational　beings　as
the　goal　of　all　their　moral　wishes；　it　must　seem　strange　that；
nevertheless；　the　philosophers　both　of　ancient　and　modern　times　have
been　able　to　find　happiness　in　accurate　proportion　to　virtue　even　in
this　life　（in　the　sensible　world）；　or　have　persuaded　themselves　that
they　were　conscious　thereof。　For　Epicurus　as　well　as　the　Stoics
extolled　above　everything　the　happiness　that　springs　from　the
consciousness　of　living　virtuously；　and　the　former　was　not　so　base
in　his　practical　precepts　as　one　might　infer　from　the　principles　of
his　theory；　which　he　used　for　explanation　and　not　for　action；　or　as
they　were　interpreted　by　many　who　were　misled　by　his　using　the　term
pleasure　for　contentment；　on　the　contrary；　he　reckoned　the　most
disinterested　practice　of　good　amongst　the　ways　of　enjoying　the　most
intimate　delight；　and　his　scheme　of　pleasure　（by　which　he　meant
constant　cheerfulness　of　mind）　included　the　moderation　and　control
of　the　inclinations；　such　as　the　strictest　moral　philosopher　might
require。　He　differed　from　the　Stoics　chiefly　in　making　this　pleasure
the　motive；　which　they　very　rightly　refused　to　do。　For；　on　the　one
hand；　the　virtuous　Epicurus；　like　many　well…intentioned　men　of　this
day　who　do　not　reflect　deeply　enough　on　their　principles；　fell　into
the　error　of　presupposing　the　virtuo