the+critique+of+practical+reason-第30章

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problematically　thought　（this　speculative　reason　could　prove　to　be
feasible）；　but　is　even　as　regards　the　law　of　its　causality
definitely　and　assertorially　known；　and　with　it　the　fact　that　a
being　（I　myself）；　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　belongs　also　to　the
supersensible　world；　this　is　also　positively　known；　and　thus　the
reality　of　the　supersensible　world　is　established　and　in　practical
respects　definitely　given；　and　this　definiteness；　which　for
theoretical　purposes　would　be　transcendent；　is　for　practical
purposes　immanent。　We　could　not；　however；　make　a　similar　step　as
regards　the　second　dynamical　idea；　namely；　that　of　a　necessary
being。　We　could　not　rise　to　it　from　the　sensible　world　without　the　aid
of　the　first　dynamical　idea。　For　if　we　attempted　to　do　so；　we　should
have　ventured　to　leave　at　a　bound　all　that　is　given　to　us；　and　to　leap
to　that　of　which　nothing　is　given　us　that　can　help　us　to　effect　the
connection　of　such　a　supersensible　being　with　the　world　of　sense
（since　the　necessary　being　would　have　to　be　known　as　given　outside
ourselves）。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　now　obvious　that　this
connection　is　quite　possible　in　relation　to　our　own　subject；
inasmuch　as　I　know　myself　to　be　on　the　one　side　as　an　intelligible
＇supersensible＇　being　determined　by　the　moral　law　（by　means　of
freedom）；　and　on　the　other　side　as　acting　in　the　world　of　sense。　It　is
the　concept　of　freedom　alone　that　enables　us　to　find　the　unconditioned
and　intelligible　for　the　conditioned　and　sensible　without　going　out　of
ourselves。　For　it　is　our　own　reason　that　by　means　of　the　supreme　and
unconditional　practical　law　knows　that　itself　and　the　being　that　is
conscious　of　this　law　（our　own　person）　belong　to　the　pure　world　of
understanding；　and　moreover　defines　the　manner　in　which；　as　such；　it
can　be　active。　In　this　way　it　can　be　understood　why　in　the　whole
faculty　of　reason　it　is　the　practical　reason　only　that　can　help　us
to　pass　beyond　the　world　of　sense　and　give　us　knowledge　of　a
supersensible　order　and　connection；　which；　however；　for　this　very
reason　cannot　be　extended　further　than　is　necessary　for　pure　practical
purposes。
　　Let　me　be　permitted　on　this　occasion　to　make　one　more　remark；
namely；　that　every　step　that　we　make　with　pure　reason；　even　in　the
practical　sphere　where　no　attention　is　paid　to　subtle　speculation；
nevertheless　accords　with　all　the　material　points　of　the　Critique　of
the　Theoretical　Reason　as　closely　and　directly　as　if　each　step　had
been　thought　out　with　deliberate　purpose　to　establish　this
confirmation。　Such　a　thorough　agreement；　wholly　unsought　for　and　quite
obvious　（as　anyone　can　convince　himself；　if　he　will　only　carry　moral
inquiries　up　to　their　principles）；　between　the　most　important
proposition　of　practical　reason　and　the　often　seemingly　too　subtle　and
needless　remarks　of　the　Critique　of　the　Speculative　Reason；
occasions　surprise　and　astonishment；　and　confirms　the　maxim　already
recognized　and　praised　by　others；　namely；　that　in　every　scientific
inquiry　we　should　pursue　our　way　steadily　with　all　possible
exactness　and　frankness；　without　caring　for　any　objections　that　may　be
raised　from　outside　its　sphere；　but；　as　far　as　we　can；　to　carry　out
our　inquiry　truthfully　and　pletely　by　itself。　Frequent
observation　has　convinced　me　that；　when　such　researches　are　concluded；
that　which　in　one　part　of　them　appeared　to　me　very　questionable；
considered　in　relation　to　other　extraneous　doctrines；　when　I　left　this
doubtfulness　out　of　sight　for　a　time　and　only　attended　to　the　business
in　hand　until　it　was　pleted；　at　last　was　unexpectedly　found　to
agree　perfectly　with　what　had　been　discovered　separately　without　the
least　regard　to　those　doctrines；　and　without　any　partiality　or
prejudice　for　them。　Authors　would　save　themselves　many　errors　and　much
labour　lost　（because　spent　on　a　delusion）　if　they　could　only　resolve
to　go　to　work　with　more　frankness。
　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　a　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　Pure　reason　always　has　its　dialetic；　whether　it　is　considered　in　its
speculative　or　its　practical　employment；　for　it　requires　the
absolute　totality　of　the　'conditions　of　what　is　given　conditioned；　and
this　can　only　be　found　in　things　in　themselves。　But　as　all　conceptions
of　things　in　themselves　must　be　referred　to　intuitions；　and　with　us
men　these　can　never　be　other　than　sensible　and　hence　can　never
enable　us　to　know　objects　as　things　in　themselves　but　only　as
appearances；　and　since　the　unconditioned　can　never　be　found　in　this
chain　of　appearances　which　consists　only　of　conditioned　and
conditions；　thus　from　applying　this　rational　idea　of　the　totality　of
the　conditions　（in　other　words　of　the　unconditioned）　to　appearances；
there　arises　an　inevitable　illusion；　as　if　these　latter　were　things　in
themselves　（for　in　the　absence　of　a　warning　critique　they　are　always
regarded　as　such）。　This　illusion　would　never　be　noticed　as　delusive　if
it　did　not　betray　itself　by　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；　when
it　applies　to　appearances　its　fundamental　principle　of　presupposing
the　unconditioned　to　everything　conditioned。　By　this；　however；
reason　is　pelled　to　trace　this　illusion　to　its　source；　and　search
how　it　can　be　removed；　and　this　can　only　be　done　by　a　plete
critical　examination　of　the　whole　pure　faculty　of　reason；　so　that
the　antinomy　of　the　pure　reason　which　is　manifest　in　its　dialectic
is　in　fact　the　most　beneficial　error　into　which　human　reason　could
ever　have　fallen；　since　it　at　last　drives　us　to　search　for　the　key
to　escape　from　this　labyrinth；　and　when　this　key　is　found；　it
further　discovers　that　which　we　did　not　seek　but　yet　had　need　of；
namely；　a　view　into　a　higher　and　an　immutable　order　of　things；　in
which　we　even　now　are；　and　in　which　we　are　thereby　enabled　by　definite
precepts　to　continue　to　live　according　to　the　highest　dictates　of
reason。
　　It　may　be　seen　in　detail　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　how　in　its
speculative　employment　this　natural　dialectic　is　to　be　solved；　and　how
the　error　which　arises　from　a　very　natural　illusion　may　be　guarded
against。　But　reason　in　its　practical　use　is　not　a　whit　better　off。
As　pure　practical　reason；　it　likewise　seeks　to　find　the
unconditioned　for　the　practically　conditioned　（which　rests　on
inclinations　and　natural　wants）；　and　this　is　not　as　the　determining
principle　of　the　will；　but　even　when　this　is　given　（in　the　moral
law）　it　seeks　the　unconditioned　totality　of　the　object　of　pure
practical　reason　under　the　name　of　the　summum　bonum。
　　To　define　this　idea　practically；　i。e。；　sufficiently　for　the　maxims
of　our　rational　conduct；　is　the　business　of　practical　wisdom；　and　this
again　as　a　science　is　philosophy；　in　the　sense　in　which　the　word　was
understood　by　the　ancients；　with　whom　it　meant　instruction　in　the
conception　in　which　the　summum　bonum　was　to　be　placed；　and　the　conduct
by　which　it　was　to　be　obtained。　It　would　be　well　to　leave　this　word　in
its　ancient　signification　as　a　doctrine　of　the　summum　bonum；　so　far　as
reason　endeavours　to　make　this　into　a　science。　For　on　the　one　band　the
restriction　annexed　would　suit　the　Greek　expression　（which　signifies
the　love　of　wisdom）；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　would　be　sufficient　to
embrace　under　the　name　of　philosophy　the　love　of　science：　that　is　to
say；　of　all　speculative　rational　knowledge；　so　far　as　it　is
serviceable　to　reason；　both　for　that　conception　and　also　for　the
practical　principle　determining　our　conduct；　without　letting　out　of
sight　the　main　end；　on　account　of　which　alone　it　can　be　called　a
doctrine　of　practical　wisdom。　On　the　other　hand；　it　would　be　no　harm
to　deter　the　self…conceit　of　one　who　ventures　to　claim　the　title　of
philosopher　by　holding　before　him　in　the　very　definition　a　standard　of
self…estimation　which　would　very　much　lower　his　pretensions。　For　a
teacher　of　wisdom　would　mean　something　more　than　a　scholar　who　has　not
e　so　far　as　to　guide　himself；　much　less　to　guide　others；　with
certain　expectation　of　attaining　so　high　an　end：　it　would　mean　a
master　in　the　knowledge　of　wisdom；　which　implies　more　than　a　modest
man　would　claim　for　himself。　Thus　philosophy　as　well　as　wisdom　would
alway