the+critique+of+practical+reason-第23章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


solely　by　the　law　without　any　interest；　and　are　now　conscious　of　a
quite　different　interest　subjectively　produced　thereby；　and　which　is
purely　practical　and　free；　and　our　taking　this　interest　in　an　action
of　duty　is　not　suggested　by　any　inclination；　but　is　manded　and
actually　brought　about　by　reason　through　the　practical　law；　whence
this　feeling　obtains　a　special　name；　that　of　respect。
　　The　notion　of　duty；　therefore；　requires　in　the　action；
objectively；　agreement　with　the　law；　and；　subjectively　in　its　maxim；
that　respect　for　the　law　shall　be　the　sole　mode　in　which　the　will　is
determined　thereby。　And　on　this　rests　the　distinction　between　the
consciousness　of　having　acted　according　to　duty　and　from　duty；　that
is；　from　respect　for　the　law。　The　former　（legality）　is　possible　even
if　inclinations　have　been　the　determining　principles　of　the　will；
but　the　latter　（morality）；　moral　worth；　can　be　placed　only　in　this；
that　the　action　is　done　from　duty；　that　is；　simply　for　the　sake　of　the
law。*

　　*If　we　examine　accurately　the　notion　of　respect　for　persons　as　it
has　been　already　laid　down；　we　shall　perceive　that　it　always　rests
on　the　consciousness　of　a　duty　which　an　example　shows　us；　and　that
respect；　therefore。　can　never　have　any　but　a　moral　ground；　and　that　it
is　very　good　and　even；　in　a　psychological　point　of　view；　very　useful
for　the　knowledge　of　mankind；　that　whenever　we　use　this　expression
we　should　attend　to　this　secret　and　marvellous；　yet　often　recurring；
regard　which　men　in　their　judgement　pay　to　the　moral　law。

　　It　is　of　the　greatest　importance　to　attend　with　the　utmost　exactness
in　all　moral　judgements　to　the　subjective　principle　of　all　maxims；
that　all　the　morality　of　actions　may　be　placed　in　the　necessity　of
acting　from　duty　and　from　respect　for　the　law；　not　from　love　and
inclination　for　that　which　the　actions　are　to　produce。　For　men　and　all
created　rational　beings　moral　necessity　is　constraint；　that　is
obligation；　and　every　action　based　on　it　is　to　be　conceived　as　a　duty；
not　as　a　proceeding　previously　pleasing；　or　likely　to　be　Pleasing　to
us　of　our　own　accord。　As　if　indeed　we　could　ever　bring　it　about　that
without　respect　for　the　law；　which　implies　fear；　or　at　least
apprehension　of　transgression；　we　of　ourselves；　like　the　independent
Deity；　could　ever　e　into　possession　of　holiness　of　will　by　the
coincidence　of　our　will　with　the　pure　moral　law　being　as　it　were
part　of　our　nature；　never　to　be　shaken　（in　which　case　the　law　would
cease　to　be　a　mand　for　us；　as　we　could　never　be　tempted　to　be
untrue　to　it）。
　　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　for　the　will　of　a　perfect　being　a　law　of
holiness；　but　for　the　will　of　every　finite　rational　being　a　law　of
duty；　of　moral　constraint；　and　of　the　determination　of　its　actions
by　respect　for　this　law　and　reverence　for　its　duty。　No　other
subjective　principle　must　be　assumed　as　a　motive；　else　while　the
action　might　chance　to　be　such　as　the　law　prescribes；　yet；　as　does　not
proceed　from　duty；　the　intention；　which　is　the　thing　properly　in
question　in　this　legislation；　is　not　moral。
　　It　is　a　very　beautiful　thing　to　do　good　to　men　from　love　to　them　and
from　sympathetic　good　will；　or　to　be　just　from　love　of　order；　but　this
is　not　yet　the　true　moral　maxim　of　our　conduct　which　is　suitable　to
our　position　amongst　rational　beings　as　men；　when　we　pretend　with
fanciful　pride　to　set　ourselves　above　the　thought　of　duty；　like
volunteers；　and；　as　if　we　were　independent　on　the　mand；　to　want
to　do　of　our　own　good　pleasure　what　we　think　we　need　no　mand　to　do。
We　stand　under　a　discipline　of　reason　and　in　all　our　maxims　must　not
forget　our　subjection　to　it；　nor　withdraw　anything　therefrom；　or　by　an
egotistic　presumption　diminish　aught　of　the　authority　of　the　law
（although　our　own　reason　gives　it）　so　as　to　set　the　determining
principle　of　our　will；　even　though　the　law　be　conformed　to；　anywhere
else　but　in　the　law　itself　and　in　respect　for　this　law。　Duty　and
obligation　are　the　only　names　that　we　must　give　to　our　relation　to　the
moral　law。　We　are　indeed　legislative　members　of　a　moral　kingdom
rendered　possible　by　freedom；　and　presented　to　us　by　reason　as　an
object　of　respect；　but　yet　we　are　subjects　in　it；　not　the　sovereign；
and　to　mistake　our　inferior　position　as　creatures；　and
presumptuously　to　reject　the　authority　of　the　moral　law；　is　already　to
revolt　from　it　in　spirit；　even　though　the　letter　of　it　is　fulfilled。
　　With　this　agrees　very　well　the　possibility　of　such　a　mand　as：
Love　God　above　everything；　and　thy　neighbour　as　thyself。*　For　as　a
mand　it　requires　respect　for　a　law　which　mands　love　and　does　not
leave　it　to　our　own　arbitrary　choice　to　make　this　our　principle。
Love　to　God；　however；　considered　as　an　inclination　（pathological
love）；　is　impossible；　for　He　is　not　an　object　of　the　senses。　The
same　affection　towards　men　is　possible　no　doubt；　but　cannot　be
manded；　for　it　is　not　in　the　power　of　any　man　to　love　anyone　at
mand；　therefore　it　is　only　practical　love　that　is　meant　in　that
pith　of　all　laws。　To　love　God　means；　in　this　sense；　to　like　to　do
His　mandments；　to　love　one's　neighbour　means　to　like　to　practise
all　duties　towards　him。　But　the　mand　that　makes　this　a　rule
cannot　mand　us　to　have　this　disposition　in　actions　conformed　to
duty；　but　only　to　endeavour　after　it。　For　a　mand　to　like　to　do　a
thing　is　in　itself　contradictory；　because　if　we　already　know　of
ourselves　what　we　are　bound　to　do；　and　if　further　we　are　conscious
of　liking　to　do　it；　a　mand　would　be　quite　needless；　and　if　we　do　it
not　willingly；　but　only　out　of　respect　for　the　law；　a　mand　that
makes　this　respect　the　motive　of　our　maxim　would　directly　counteract
the　disposition　manded。　That　law　of　all　laws；　therefore；　like　all
the　moral　precepts　of　the　Gospel；　exhibits　the　moral　disposition　in
all　its　perfection；　in　which；　viewed　as　an　ideal　of　holiness；　it　is
not　attainable　by　any　creature；　but　yet　is　the　pattern　which　we　should
strive　to　approach；　and　in　an　uninterrupted　but　infinite　progress
bee　like　to。　In　fact；　if　a　rational　creature　could　ever　reach
this　point；　that　he　thoroughly　likes　to　do　all　moral　laws；　this
would　mean　that　there　does　not　exist　in　him　even　the　possibility　of
a　desire　that　would　tempt　him　to　deviate　from　them；　for　to　overe
such　a　desire　always　costs　the　subject　some　sacrifice　and　therefore
requires　self…pulsion；　that　is；　inward　constraint　to　something　that
one　does　not　quite　like　to　do；　and　no　creature　can　ever　reach　this
stage　of　moral　disposition。　For；　being　a　creature；　and　therefore
always　dependent　with　respect　to　what　be　requires　for　plete
satisfaction；　he　can　never　be　quite　free　from　desires　and
inclinations；　and　as　these　rest　on　physical　causes；　they　can　never
of　themselves　coincide　with　the　moral　law；　the　sources　of　which　are
quite　different；　and　therefore　they　make　it　necessary　to　found　the
mental　disposition　of　one's　maxims　on　moral　obligation；　not　on　ready
inclination；　but　on　respect；　which　demands　obedience　to　the　law；
even　though　one　may　not　like　it；　not　on　love；　which　apprehends　no
inward　reluctance　of　the　will　towards　the　law。　Nevertheless；　this
latter；　namely；　love　to　the　law　（which　would　then　cease　to　be　a
mand；　and　then　morality；　which　would　have　passed　subjectively
into　holiness；　would　cease　to　be　virtue）　must　be　the　constant　though
unattainable　goal　of　his　endeavours。　For　in　the　case　of　what　we　highly
esteem；　but　yet　（on　account　of　the　consciousness　of　our　weakness）
dread；　the　increased　facility　of　satisfying　it　changes　the　most
reverential　awe　into　inclination；　and　respect　into　love；　at　least　this
would　be　the　perfection　of　a　disposition　devoted　to　the　law；　if　it
were　possible　for　a　creature　to　attain　it。

　　*This　law　is　in　striking　contrast　with　the　principle　of　private
happiness　which　some　make　the　supreme　principle　of　morality。　This
would　be　expressed　thus：　Love　thyself　above　everything；　and　God　and
thy　neighbour　for　thine　own　sake。

　　This　reflection　is　intended　not　so　much　to　clear　up　the
evangelical　mand　just　cited；　in　order　to　prevent　religious
fanaticism　in　regard　to　love　of　God；　but　to　define　accurately　the
moral　disposition　with　regard　directly　to　our　duties　towards　men；
and　to　check；