the+critique+of+practical+reason-第22章

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itself　in　its　solemn　majesty　is　exposed　to　this　endeavour　to　save
oneself　from　yielding　it　respect。　Can　it　be　thought　that　it　is　for　any
other　reason　that　we　are　so　ready　to　reduce　it　to　the　level　of　our
familiar　inclination；　or　that　it　is　for　any　other　reason　that　we　all
take　such　trouble　to　make　it　out　to　be　the　chosen　precept　of　our　own
interest　well　understood；　but　that　we　want　to　be　free　from　the
deterrent　respect　which　shows　us　our　own　unworthiness　with　such
severity？　Nevertheless；　on　the　other　hand；　so　little　is　there　pain
in　it　that　if　once　one　has　laid　aside　self…conceit　and　allowed
practical　influence　to　that　respect；　he　can　never　be　satisfied　with
contemplating　the　majesty　of　this　law；　and　the　soul　believes　itself
elevated　in　proportion　as　it　sees　the　holy　law　elevated　above　it　and
its　frail　nature。　No　doubt　great　talents　and　activity　proportioned
to　them　may　also　occasion　respect　or　an　analogous　feeling。　It　is
very　proper　to　yield　it　to　them；　and　then　it　appears　as　if　this
sentiment　were　the　same　thing　as　admiration。　But　if　we　look　closer
we　shall　observe　that　it　is　always　uncertain　how　much　of　the　ability
is　due　to　native　talent；　and　how　much　to　diligence　in　cultivating
it。　Reason　represents　it　to　us　as　probably　the　fruit　of　cultivation；
and　therefore　as　meritorious；　and　this　notably　reduces　our
self…conceit；　and　either　casts　a　reproach　on　us　or　urges　us　to
follow　such　an　example　in　the　way　that　is　suitable　to　us。　This
respect；　then；　which　we　show　to　such　a　person　（properly　speaking；　to
the　law　that　his　example　exhibits）　is　not　mere　admiration；　and　this　is
confirmed　also　by　the　fact　that　when　the　mon　run　of　admirers
think　they　have　learned　from　any　source　the　badness　of　such　a　man's
character　（for　instance　Voltaire's）　they　give　up　all　respect　for
him；　whereas　the　true　scholar　still　feels　it　at　least　with　regard　to
his　talents；　because　he　is　himself　engaged　in　a　business　and　a
vocation　which　make　imitation　of　such　a　man　in　some　degree　a　law。
　　Respect　for　the　moral　law　is；　therefore；　the　only　and　the
undoubted　moral　motive；　and　this　feeling　is　directed　to　no　object；
except　on　the　ground　of　this　law。　The　moral　law　first　determines　the
will　objectively　and　directly　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　and　freedom；
whose　causality　can　be　determined　only　by　the　law；　consists　just　in
this；　that　it　restricts　all　inclinations；　and　consequently
self…esteem；　by　the　condition　of　obedience　to　its　pure　law。　This
restriction　now　has　an　effect　on　feeling；　and　produces　the
impression　of　displeasure　which　can　be　known　a　priori　from　the　moral
law。　Since　it　is　so　far　only　a　negative　effect　which；　arising　from　the
influence　of　pure　practical　reason；　checks　the　activity　of　the
subject；　so　far　as　it　is　determined　by　inclinations；　and　hence
checks　the　opinion　of　his　personal　worth　（which；　in　the　absence　of
agreement　with　the　moral　law；　is　reduced　to　nothing）；　hence；　the
effect　of　this　law　on　feeling　is　merely　humiliation。　We　can；
therefore；　perceive　this　a　priori；　but　cannot　know　by　it　the　force
of　the　pure　practical　law　as　a　motive；　but　only　the　resistance　to
motives　of　the　sensibility。　But　since　the　same　law　is　objectively；
that　is；　in　the　conception　of　pure　reason；　an　immediate　principle　of
determination　of　the　will；　and　consequently　this　humiliation　takes
place　only　relatively　to　the　purity　of　the　law；　hence；　the　lowering　of
the　pretensions　of　moral　self…esteem；　that　is；　humiliation　on　the
sensible　side；　is　an　elevation　of　the　moral；　i。e。；　practical；　esteem
for　the　law　itself　on　the　intellectual　side；　in　a　word；　it　is
respect　for　the　law；　and　therefore；　as　its　cause　is　intellectual；　a
positive　feeling　which　can　be　known　a　priori。　For　whatever
diminishes　the　obstacles　to　an　activity　furthers　this　activity　itself。
Now　the　recognition　of　the　moral　law　is　the　consciousness　of　an
activity　of　practical　reason　from　objective　principles；　which　only
fails　to　reveal　its　effect　in　actions　because　subjective
（pathological）　causes　hinder　it。　Respect　for　the　moral　law　then　must
be　regarded　as　a　positive；　though　indirect；　effect　of　it　on　feeling；
inasmuch　as　this　respect　weakens　the　impeding　influence　of
inclinations　by　humiliating　selfesteem；　and　hence　also　as　a　subjective
principle　of　activity；　that　is；　as　a　motive　to　obedience　to　the　law；
and　as　a　principle　of　the　maxims　of　a　life　conformable　to　it。　From　the
notion　of　a　motive　arises　that　of　an　interest；　which　can　never　be
attributed　to　any　being　unless　it　possesses　reason；　and　which
signifies　a　motive　of　the　will　in　so　far　as　it　is　conceived　by　the
reason。　Since　in　a　morally　good　will　the　law　itself　must　be　the
motive；　the　moral　interest　is　a　pure　interest　of　practical　reason
alone；　independent　of　sense。　On　the　notion　of　an　interest　is　based
that　of　a　maxim。　This；　therefore；　is　morally　good　only　in　case　it
rests　simply　on　the　interest　taken　in　obedience　to　the　law。　All
three　notions；　however；　that　of　a　motive；　of　an　interest；　and　of　a
maxim；　can　be　applied　only　to　finite　beings。　For　they　all　suppose　a
limitation　of　the　nature　of　the　being；　in　that　the　subjective
character　of　his　choice　does　not　of　itself　agree　with　the　objective
law　of　a　practical　reason；　they　suppose　that　the　being　requires　to
be　impelled　to　action　by　something；　because　an　internal　obstacle
opposes　itself。　Therefore　they　cannot　be　applied　to　the　Divine　will。
　　There　is　something　so　singular　in　the　unbounded　esteem　for　the
pure　moral　law；　apart　from　all　advantage；　as　it　is　presented　for　our
obedience　by　practical　reason；　the　voice　of　which　makes　even　the
boldest　sinner　tremble　and　pels　him　to　hide　himself　from　it；　that
we　cannot　wonder　if　we　find　this　influence　of　a　mere　intellectual　idea
on　the　feelings　quite　inprehensible　to　speculative　reason　and
have　to　be　satisfied　with　seeing　so　much　of　this　a　priori　that　such
a　feeling　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　conception　of　the　moral
law　in　every　finite　rational　being。　If　this　feeling　of　respect　were
pathological；　and　therefore　were　a　feeling　of　pleasure　based　on　the
inner　sense；　it　would　be　in　vain　to　try　to　discover　a　connection　of　it
with　any　idea　a　priori。　But　＇it＇　is　a　feeling　that　applies　merely　to
what　is　practical；　and　depends　on　the　conception　of　a　law；　simply　as
to　its　form；　not　on　account　of　any　object；　and　therefore　cannot　be
reckoned　either　as　pleasure　or　pain；　and　yet　produces　an　interest　in
obedience　to　the　law；　which　we　call　the　moral　interest；　just　as　the
capacity　of　taking　such　an　interest　in　the　law　（or　respect　for　the
moral　law　itself）　is　properly　the　moral　feeling。
　　The　consciousness　of　a　free　submission　of　the　will　to　the　law；　yet
bined　with　an　inevitable　constraint　put　upon　all　inclinations；
though　only　by　our　own　reason；　is　respect　for　the　law。　The　law　that
demands　this　respect　and　inspires　it　is　clearly　no　other　than　the
moral　（for　no　other　precludes　all　inclinations　from　exercising　any
direct　influence　on　the　will）。　An　action　which　is　objectively
practical　according　to　this　law；　to　the　exclusion　of　every　determining
principle　of　inclination；　is　duty；　and　this　by　reason　of　that
exclusion　includes　in　its　concept　practical　obligation；　that　is；　a
determination　to　actions；　however　reluctantly　they　may　be　done。　The
feeling　that　arises　from　the　consciousness　of　this　obligation　is　not
pathological；　as　would　be　a　feeling　produced　by　an　object　of　the
senses；　but　practical　only；　that　is；　it　is　made　possible　by　a
preceding　（objective）　determination　of　the　will　and　a　causality　of　the
reason。　As　submission　to　the　law；　therefore；　that　is；　as　a　mand
（announcing　constraint　for　the　sensibly　affected　subject）；　it　contains
in　it　no　pleasure；　but　on　the　contrary；　so　far；　pain　in　the　action。　On
the　other　hand；　however；　as　this　constraint　is　exercised　merely　by　the
legislation　of　our　own　reason；　it　also　contains　something　elevating；
and　this　subjective　effect　on　feeling；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical
reason　is　the　sole　cause　of　it；　may　be　called　in　this　respect
self…approbation；　since　we　recognize　ourselves　as　determined　thereto
solely　by　the　law　without　any　interest；　and　are　now　conscious　of　a
quite　different　interest　subjectively　produced　thereby；　and　which　is
purely　pra