the+critique+of+practical+reason-第16章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


reality；　but　not　the　less　it　has　a　real　application；　which　is
exhibited　in　concreto　in　intentions　or　maxims；　that　is；　it　has　a
practical　reality　which　can　be　specified；　and　this　is　sufficient　to
justify　it　even　with　a　view　to　noumena。
　　Now；　this　objective　reality　of　a　pure　concept　of　the　understanding
in　the　sphere　of　the　supersensible；　once　brought　in；　gives　an
objective　reality　also　to　all　the　other　categories；　although　only　so
far　as　they　stand　in　necessary　connexion　with　the　determining
principle　of　the　will　（the　moral　law）；　a　reality　only　of　practical
application；　which　has　not　the　least　effect　in　enlarging　our
theoretical　knowledge　of　these　objects；　or　the　discernment　of　their
nature　by　pure　reason。　So　we　shall　find　also　in　the　sequel　that
these　categories　refer　only　to　beings　as　intelligences；　and　in　them
only　to　the　relation　of　reason　to　the　will；　consequently；　always
only　to　the　practical；　and　beyond　this　cannot　pretend　to　any　knowledge
of　these　beings；　and　whatever　other　properties　belonging　to　the
theoretical　representation　of　supersensible　things　may　be　brought　into
connexion　with　these　categories；　this　is　not　to　be　reckoned　as
knowledge；　but　only　as　a　right　（in　a　practical　point　of　view；　however；
it　is　a　necessity）　to　admit　and　assume　such　beings；　even　in　the　case
where　we　＇conceive＇　supersensible　beings　（e。g。；　God）　according　to
analogy；　that　is；　a　purely　rational　relation；　of　which　we　make　a
practical　use　with　reference　to　what　is　sensible；　and　thus　the
application　to　the　supersensible　solely　in　a　practical　point　of　view
does　not　give　pure　theoretic　reason　the　least　encouragement　to　run
riot　into　the　transcendent。
　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Concept　of　an　Object　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　a　concept　of　the　practical　reason　I　understand　the　idea　of　an
object　as　an　effect　possible　to　be　produced　through　freedom。　To　be
an　object　of　practical　knowledge；　as　such；　signifies；　therefore；
only　the　relation　of　the　will　to　the　action　by　which　the　object　or　its
opposite　would　be　realized；　and　to　decide　whether　something　is　an
object　of　pure　practical　reason　or　not　is　only　to　discern　the
possibility　or　impossibility　of　willing　the　action　by　which；　if　we　had
the　required　power　（about　which　experience　must　decide）；　a　certain
object　would　be　realized。　If　the　object　be　taken　as　the　determining
principle　of　our　desire；　it　must　first　be　known　whether　it　is
physically　possible　by　the　free　use　of　our　powers；　before　we　decide
whether　it　is　an　object　of　practical　reason　or　not。　On　the　other　hand；
if　the　law　can　be　considered　a　priori　as　the　determining　principle
of　the　action；　and　the　latter　therefore　as　determined　by　pure
practical　reason；　the　judgement　whether　a　thing　is　an　object　of　pure
practical　reason　or　not　does　not　depend　at　all　on　the　parison
with　our　physical　power；　and　the　question　is　only　whether　we　should
will　an　action　that　is　directed　to　the　existence　of　an　object；　if
the　object　were　in　our　power；　hence　the　previous　question　is　only　as
the　moral　possibility　of　the　action；　for　in　this　case　it　is　not　the
object；　but　the　law　of　the　will；　that　is　the　determining　principle
of　the　action。　The　only　objects　of　practical　reason　are　therefore
those　of　good　and　evil。　For　by　the　former　is　meant　an　object
necessarily　desired　according　to　a　principle　of　reason；　by　the
latter　one　necessarily　shunned；　also　according　to　a　principle　of
reason。
　　If　the　notion　of　good　is　not　to　be　derived　from　an　antecedent
practical　law；　but；　on　the　contrary；　is　to　serve　as　its　foundation；　it
can　only　be　the　notion　of　something　whose　existence　promises　pleasure；
and　thus　determines　the　causality　of　the　subject　to　produce　it；　that
is　to　say；　determines　the　faculty　of　desire。　Now；　since　it　is
impossible　to　discern　a　priori　what　idea　will　be　acpanied　with
pleasure　and　what　with　pain；　it　will　depend　on　experience　alone　to
find　out　what　is　primarily　good　or　evil。　The　property　of　the
subject；　with　reference　to　which　alone　this　experiment　can　be　made；　is
the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain；　a　receptivity　belonging　to　the
internal　sense；　thus　that　only　would　be　primarily　good　with　which
the　sensation　of　pleasure　is　immediately　connected；　and　that　simply
evil　which　immediately　excites　pain。　Since；　however；　this　is　opposed
even　to　the　usage　of　language；　which　distinguishes　the　pleasant　from
the　good；　the　unpleasant　from　the　evil；　and　requires　that　good　and
evil　shall　always　be　judged　by　reason；　and；　therefore；　by　concepts
which　can　be　municated　to　everyone；　and　not　by　mere　sensation；
which　is　limited　to　individual　＇subjects＇　and　their　susceptibility；
and；　since　nevertheless；　pleasure　or　pain　cannot　be　connected　with　any
idea　of　an　object　a　priori；　the　philosopher　who　thought　himself
obliged　to　make　a　feeling　of　pleasure　the　foundation　of　his
practical　judgements　would　call　that　good　which　is　a　means　to　the
pleasant；　and　evil；　what　is　a　cause　of　unpleasantness　and　pain；　for
the　judgement　on　the　relation　of　means　to　ends　certainly　belongs　to
reason。　But；　although　reason　is　alone　capable　of　discerning　the
connexion　of　means　with　their　ends　（so　that　the　will　might　even　be
defined　as　the　faculty　of　ends；　since　these　are　always　determining
principles　of　the　desires）；　yet　the　practical　maxims　which　would
follow　from　the　aforesaid　principle　of　the　good　being　merely　a
means；　would　never　contain　as　the　object　of　the　will　anything　good
in　itself；　but　only　something　good　for　something；　the　good　would
always　be　merely　the　useful；　and　that　for　which　it　is　useful　must
always　lie　outside　the　will；　in　sensation。　Now　if　this　as　a　pleasant
sensation　were　to　be　distinguished　from　the　notion　of　good；　then　there
would　be　nothing　primarily　good　at　all；　but　the　good　would　have　to
be　sought　only　in　the　means　to　something　else；　namely；　some
pleasantness。
　　It　is　an　old　formula　of　the　schools：　Nihil　appetimus　nisi　sub
ratione　boni；　Nihil　aversamur　nisi　sub　ratione　mali；　and　it　is　used
often　correctly；　but　often　also　in　a　manner　injurious　to　philosophy；
because　the　expressions　boni　and　mali　are　ambiguous；　owing　to　the
poverty　of　language；　in　consequence　of　which　they　admit　a　double
sense；　and；　therefore；　inevitably　bring　the　practical　laws　into
ambiguity；　and　philosophy；　which　in　employing　them　bees　aware　of
the　different　meanings　in　the　same　word；　but　can　find　no　special
expressions　for　them；　is　driven　to　subtile　distinctions　about　which
there　is　subsequently　no　unanimity；　because　the　distinction　could
not　be　directly　marked　by　any　suitable　expression。*

　　*Besides　this；　the　expression　sub　ratione　boni　is　also　ambiguous。
For　it　may　mean：　〃We　represent　something　to　ourselves　as　good；　when
and　because　we　desire　（will）　it〃；　or　〃We　desire　something　because　we
represent　it　to　ourselves　as　good；〃　so　that　either　the　desire
determines　the　notion　of　the　object　as　a　good；　or　the　notion　of　good
determines　the　desire　（the　will）；　so　that　in　the　first　case　sub
ratione　boni　would　mean；　〃We　will　something　under　the　idea　of　the
good〃；　in　the　second；　〃In　consequence　of　this　idea；〃　which；　as
determining　the　volition；　must　precede　it。

　　The　German　language　has　the　good　fortune　to　possess　expressions
which　do　not　allow　this　difference　to　be　overlooked。　It　possesses
two　very　distinct　concepts　and　especially　distinct　expressions　for
that　which　the　Latins　express　by　a　single　word；　bonum。　For　bonum　it
has　das　Gute　＇good＇；　and　das　Wohl　＇well；　weal＇；　for　malum　das　Bose
＇evil＇；　and　das　Ubel　＇ill；　bad＇；　or　das　Well　＇woe＇。　So　that　we　express
two　quite　distinct　judgements　when　we　consider　in　an　action　the　good
and　evil　of　it；　or　our　weal　and　woe　（ill）。　Hence　it　already　follows
that　the　above　quoted　psychological　proposition　is　at　least　very
doubtful　if　it　is　translated：　〃We　desire　nothing　except　with　a　view　to
our　weal　or　woe〃；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　render　it　thus：　〃Under
the　direction　of　reason　we　desire　nothing　except　so　far　as　we　esteem
it　good　or　evil；〃　it　is　indubitably　certain　and　at　the　same　time　quite
clearly　expressed。
　　Well　or　ill　always　implies　only　a　reference　to　our　condition；　as
pleasant　or　unpleasant；　as　one　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　if　we　desire
or　avoid　an　object　on　this　account；　it　is　o