lect12-第6章

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student's　view　of　morals。　The　discussion　of　ethics；　like　many


others；　is　conducted　amid　much　obscurity　of　thought；　and　there　is


no　specific　more　sovereign　for　dispelling　such　obscurity　than　the


association　of　the　cardinal　terms　which　enter　into　our　enquiry


with　absolutely　consistent　meanings；　and　the　employment　of　the


terms　with　these　meanings　as　a　test　for　the　detection　of


equivocal　phraseology。　It　is　the　one　inestimable　service　of　the


Analytical　School　to　jurisprudence　and　morals　that　it　furnishes


them　with　a　rigidly　consistent　terminology。　But　there　is　not　the


faintest　reason　for　thinking　that　the　intelligent　and


appreciative　student　of　the　system　must　necessarily　be　an


utilitarian。


　　　　I　shall　state　hereafter　what　I　believe　to　be　the　true　point


of　contact　between　Austin's　system　and　the　utilitarian


philosophy。　Meantime；　devotion　to　this　philosophy；　coupled　with


what　I　hold　to　be　a　faulty　arrangement；　has　produced　the　most


serious　blemish　in　the　'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined。'


The　2nd；　3rd；　and　4th　Lectures　are　occupied　with　an　attempt　to


identify　the　law　of　God　and　the　law　of　Nature　（so　far　as　these


last　words　can　be　allowed　to　have　any　meaning）　with　the　rules


required　by　the　theory　of　utility。　The　lectures　contain　many


just；　interesting；　and　valuable　observations；　but　the


identification；　which　is　their　object；　is　quite　gratuitous　and


valueless　for　any　purpose。　Written；　I　doubt　not；　in　the　honest


belief　that　they　would　help　to　obviate　or　remove　prejudices；　they


have　attracted　to　Austin's　system　a　whole　cloud　of　prejudices


both　from　the　theological　and　from　the　philosophical　side。　If；


however；　following　the　order　I　have　suggested；　Austin；　after


concluding　the　examination　of　the　nature　of　Sovereignty　and　of


positive　law；　had　entered　on　an　enquiry　into　the　nature　of　the


laws　of　God；　it　must　have　taken　the　form　of　an　investigation　of


the　question　how　far　the　characteristics　of　the　human　superiors


called　Sovereigns　can　be　supposed　to　attach　to　an　all…powerful


and　non…human　ruler；　and　how　many　of　the　conceptions　dependent　on


human　Sovereignty　must　be　considered　as　contained　in　his


commands。　I　much　doubt　whether　such　an　enquiry　would　have　seemed


called　for　in　a　treatise　like　Austin's。　Taken　at　its　best；　it　is


a　discussion　belonging　not　to　the　philosophy　of　law　but　to　the


philosophy　of　legislation。　The　jurist；　properly　so　called；　has


nothing　to　do　with　any　ideal　standard　of　law　or　morals。