lect12-第3章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
not the least ground for questioning the Sovereignty of George
the First and Second and of the Parliaments elected at their
summons。 The Jacobite view; that the Hanoverian Kings were
exclusively Sovereign in Hanover; would at once be throw aside by
Austin as not raising that question of fact which is alone
disputable under his system。
Next; the Sovereign must receive an habitual obedience from
the bulk of the community。 In European societies professing the
Roman Catholic faith; the great majority of the population
receives a variety of directions on points of personal conduct;
either mediately or immediately; from the See of Rome。 But;
compared with the number of times it submits itself to the laws
of the country it inhabits; its obedience to these extrinsic
commands is only occasional; and not habitual。 At the same time a
dim appreciation of the principles brought into light by Austin
may be detected in several famous ecclesiastical controversies;
which sometimes tend to become disputes whether the obedience to
the See of Rome which is actually paid is or is not so frequent
as to fall under the description of habitual。
A further characteristic of Sovereignty is immunity from the
control of every other human superior。 The limitation is
obviously necessary; for otherwise the Governor…General of India
in Council would be Sovereign; and indeed would exhibit a closer
correspondence with the more salient features of Sovereignty than
almost any other potentate on the face of the globe。
Those who have observed with what slowness definite
conceptions are developed in the field of history and politics
will be prepared to hear that this whole view of the nature of
Sovereignty is older than Austin's work。 But; so far as my own
knowledge extends; I do not think that any material portion of it
is older than Hobbes。 On the other hand; in the Leviathan of
Hobbes and in the Chapter De Cive in his Treatise first published
in Latin; called the Elementa Philosophiae; the analysis of
Government and Society and the determination of Sovereignty are
so nearly completed that little could be added to them by Bentham
and Austin。 The originality of these later writers; and more
particularly of Austin; resides in their much fuller examination
of the conceptions dependent on the notion of Sovereignty
positive law; positive duty; sanction and right in setting
forth the relations of these conceptions to others superficially
resembling them; in combating objections to the theory by which
the entire group of notions are connected together; and in
applying this theory to certain complex states of fact which had
arisen since Hobbes wrote。 There is; however; one great
difference between Hobbes and his latest successor。 The process
of Hobbes was scientific; but his object was less scientific than
political。 When; with a keenness of intuition and lucidity of
statement which have never been rivalled; he has made out a case
for the universal theoretical existence of Sovereignty; it
becomes clear that he has; to say the least; a strong preference
for monarchies over aristocracies and democracies; or (to use the
phraseology of the school which he founded) for individual over
corporate Sovereignty。 Those of his intellectual followers who
would have repudiated his politics have often asserted that he
has been misunderstood; and no doubt some superficial readers
have supposed that he was pointing at despotism when he was
really referring to the essentially unqualified power of the
Sovereign whatever the form of the Sovereignty。 But I do not
think it can in candour be denied that his strong dislike of the
Long Parliament and of the English Common law; as the great
instrument of resistance to the Stuart Kings; has occasionally
coloured the language which he uses in examining the nature of
Sovereignty; Law; and Anarchy; nor is it matter for surprise that
he should have been charged during his life with having devised
his system with the secret intention of making his peace with the
Protector; though the accusation itself is sufficiently refuted
by dates。 But Austin's object is strictly scientific。 If he has
fallen into errors; he has been led into them by his philosophy;
and his language scarcely ever betrays the colour of his
political opinions。
Another considerable difference is this。 Hobbes; it is well
known; speculated on the origin of Government and Sovereignty。 It
is the one fact which some persons seem to have learned about
him; and they appear to think his philosophy sufficiently
condemned by it。 But Austin barely enters on this enquiry;。 and
indeed he occasionally; though perhaps inadvertently; uses
language which almost seems to imply that Sovereignty and the
conceptions dependent on it have an * priori existence。 Now in
this matter I myself hold that the method of Hobbes was correct。
It is true that nothing can be more worthless in itself than
Hobbes's conjectural account of the origin of society and
government。 Mankind; he asserts; were originally in a state of
war。 They then made a compact under which every man abandoned his
powers of aggression; and the result was Sovereignty; and through
Sovereignty law; peace; and order。 The theory is open to every
sort of objection。 There is no evidence of any stage of the
supposed history; and the little we know of primitive man
contradicts it。 The universal disorder of the race in its infancy
may be true of the contests of tribe with tribe and of family
with family; but it is not true of the relations of individual
man with individual man; whom we; on the contrary; first discern
living together under a regimen which; if we are compelled to
employ modern phraseology; we must call one of ultra…legality。
And; in addition; the theory is open to precisely the same
objection as the counter…hypothesis of Locke; that it antedates
the modern juridical conception of Contract。 But still I think
that Hobbes did correctly in addressing himself to the problem;
though he did little to solve it。 The duty of enquiring; if not
how Sovereignty arose; at all events through what stages it has
passed; is in my judgment indispensable。 It is only thus that we
can assure ourselves in what degree the results of the Austinian
analysis tally with facts。
There is; in truth; nothing more important to the student of
jurisprudence than that he should carefully consider how far the
observed facts of human nature and society bear out the
assertions which are made or seem to be made about Sovereignty by
the Analytical Jurists。 To begin with; these assertions must be
disentangled from one another。 The first of them is that; in
every independent community of men; there resides the power of
acting with irresistible force on the several members of that
community。 This may be accepted as actual fact。 If all the
members of the community had equal physical strength and were
unarmed; the power would be a mere result from the superiority of
numbers; but; as a matter。 of fact; various causes; of which much
the most important have been the superior physical strength and
the superior armament of portions of the community have conferred
on numerical minorities the power of applying irresistible
pressure to the individuals who make up the community as a whole。
The next assertion is that; in every independent political
community; that is in every independent community neither in a
state of nature on the one hand nor in a state of anarchy on the
other; the power of using or directing the irresistible force
stored…up in the society resides in some person or combination of
persons who belong to the society themselves。 The truth of this
assertion is